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The cruelty and scope of the widespread criminality of humans in the world, which 
was a feature of the past century, was fuelled by scientific progress, egoism and 
humanity‟s power of destruction. The criminal consequences of the many 
imperialistic, hegemonic and barbarous wars in that century were immeasurable in 
terms of violations of human rights.  
 
Notwithstanding the emergence of international criminal justice through the 
experience of the International Criminal Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and Tokyo 
and later the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, globally, impunity for egregious crimes continues.  
 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the end of the 20th 
century was saluted as a major step forward in the evolution of international criminal 
justice. While previous tribunals were ad hoc, the ICC is permanent and has large 
territorial jurisdiction. This raises hope among the many Congolese victims of the first 
African World War, who view the ICC as a paradigm change that will put a stop to 
impunity for crimes against humanity and the crimes of genocide and war. 
 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the past decades have been marked 
by instability and horrible armed conflicts (1996-97 and 1998-2003) which left 
several million people dead, and which were marked by gross war crimes. The 
negative consequences of those atrocities persist until today. While the ICC initiated 
the prosecution of some war criminals in 2004, most crimes committed before 2002 
remain unpunished, because the ICC‟s jurisdiction is limited to after that time.  
 
It is therefore imperative to examine other mechanisms to deal with impunity for 
various grave crimes, including war crimes, perpetrated between 1996 and 2002. Thus 
the aim of this research is to contribute to the fight against impunity for crimes in the 
DRC by examining how other modes of jurisdiction such as the principle of 
universality can be applied, and to assess the need for the establishment of a specific 
tribunal for the DRC. 
 ix 
 
Considering the inability and incapacity of the Congolese judicial apparatus, this 
study concludes by recommending the establishment of a Special Criminal Tribunal 
which can put an end to impunity for serious crimes committed in the DRC.  
 x 
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The emergence of international criminal justice, aimed at prosecuting odious (mass 
atrocities) crimes committed during the numerous terrible wars in the twentieth 
century, culminated in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the 
dawn of the third millennium. The ICC is designed to end the culture of impunity for 
crimes of concern to the international community.1 
 
Since 1960, the DRC has been subjected to diverse and multiple conflicts2 which have 
resulted in a massive loss of lives. The situation is fuelled “by the vicious cycle of the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources on one hand, often to fund the illegal 
                                                 
1 See Preamble of the Rome Statute as adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered into force on 1 July 2002, 
see, W W Burke-White „Proactive complementarity: The International Criminal Court and national 
courts in the Rome System of International Justice‟ (2008) 49 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 
53-54 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hilj49&id=1&size=2&collection=journal
s&index=journals/hilj, accessed on10 Jan 2011; L Moreno-Ocampo „The International Criminal Court: 
Seeking Global Justice‟ (2007-2008) (40) (1 & 2) in Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law 215-216 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cwrint40&id=1&size=2&collection=jour
nals&index=journals/cwrint, accessed on21 Jan 2011; P Kirsch & J T Holmes „The birth of the 
International Criminal Court: the Rome Conference‟ (1998) Canadian Yearbook of International law 
3-5 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cybil36&id=1&size=2&collection=journ
als&index=journals/cybil, accessed on 20 Jan 2011; P M Wald „International Criminal Courts – a 
stormy adolescence‟ (2006) 46 (2) in Virginia Journal of International Law 319-320 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/vajint46&id=1&size=2&collection=jour
nals&index=journals/vajint, accessed on 23 Jan 2011. Note: in this study the expression „international 
community‟ is used to name nation states acting together because it is commonly used and well known, 
even if its definition is controversial. The expression „international society‟ reflects the reality of 
contradictions between states on the international scene. For more comments, see M Schuman „Is there 
an international community?‟ available at http://americanfuture.net/?p=1122, accessed on 23 March 
2011; K Annan „The meaning of international community‟ (2007) available at 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/1999/sg2478.html, accessed on 23 March 2011.  
2 T Kanza Conflict in Congo, the rise and the fall of Lumumba (1972) 265-323; F Fanon Toward the 
African Revolution (1980) 191-197; C Braeckman Lumumba: un crime d’Etat (2002) 57-69. As noted 
by MONUC (MONUSCO since 1 July 2010): “Congo is emerging from a difficult past: a long colonial 
period, followed by a birth and infancy in the midst of Cold War, then several decades of chronic 
instability, followed by two wars over a five-year period. Overall, it has suffered a history of some four 
decades of autocratic rule and economic mismanagement‟. Overview of the roles and responsibilities of 
the components of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the DR Congo (2006)  4. 
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importation of arms on the other. The result has too often been egregious human 
rights abuses and widespread violence”.3 The scope of the recent two wars (1996-97 
and 1998-2002) was so wide, that they were described by some as “Africa‟s first 
world war”.4 These two conflicts saw the direct involvement of six African countries‟ 
armed forces and had a devastating impact in many respects: human,5 material,6 
environmental,7 political,8 economical,9 judicial,10 social,11 and cultural.12 There has 
been a gross, serious and systematic violation of human rights, particularly in the 
eastern part of the DRC where in some places systematic sexual violence was 
generalised and used as an instrument of war against the civilian population.13 
According to MONUC:  
                                                 
3 MONUC (note 2 above) For more updated data, see UNOHCRH (2010) „Report of the Mapping 
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law 
committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and 
June2003‟ (2010) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf, accessed 
on 22 March 2011. 
4 N Ngoma „Hawks, doves or penguins? A critical review of the SADC military intervention in the 
DRC‟ (2004) (ISS Papers) available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER88.PDF, accessed on 20 
February 2010; M Sassoli & A Bouvier Un droit dans la Guerre? (2003) Vol II 1695; H Ngbanda 
Nzambo :Crimes organisés en Afrique centrale: révélations sur les réseaux rwandais et occidentaux 
(2004) 25. 
5 Oxfam, Save the Children Fund et Christian Aid   Aucune perspective en vue, la tragédie humaine du 
conflit en République Démocratique du Congo (2001) 1 and following. 
6 G Lynda „Civil wars and looting in the Congo: how the poor pay the bill‟ (2005) 5 (2) in African 
Journal on Conflict Resolution 7-31 available at 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ajcr/ajcr_2011_2.pdf, accessed on 30 March 2011.  
7 A Malonga Mulenda De la Responsabilité Internationale des acteurs impliqués dans les guerres de 
1996 et 1998 en République Démocratique du Congo au regard des violations liées au droit 
international de l`environnement (2007-2008) (unpublished Masters dissertation) available at 
http://www.memoireonline.com/08/09/2602/De-la-Responsabilite-Internationale-des-acteurs-
impliques-dans-lesguerres-de-1996-et-1.html, accessed 30 March 2011. 
8 K Masire „The Lusaka Agreement: prospects for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo‟ (2001) 
(10) (1) African Security Review available at http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/10No1/Masire.html, 
accessed on 30 March 2011; T Ngoy L’Accord de Lusaka et la paix en RDC: une autre lecture 2 ed. 
(2002) 192-203.  
9 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Ressources and Others Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/drcongo.htm, accessed on 18 April 2011; Rapport des travaux de la 
Commission spéciale de l`Assemblée Nationale chargée de l`examen de la validité des conventions  a 
caractère économiques et financiers conclues pendant les guerres de 1996-1998 et de 1998-2003 (26 
June 2005); J M Bokongo République Démocratique du Congo Richesse et développement la solution? 
Available at http://www.congovison.com/livres_bokongo.html, accessed on 31 March 2011.  
10 H Friman The Democratic Republic of Congo Justice in the aftermath of peace? Vol 10 (3) African 
Security Review (2001) available at http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/10No3/Friman.html, accessed 
on 28 March 2011; N M Songa „Droit pénal dans la tourmente‟ (2004) (1) in Revue Pénale Congolaise 
4-19.  
11 T Trefon „Reinventing Order‟ in T Trefon (ed) Reinventing order in the Congo: how people respond 
to state failure in Kinshasa (2004) 1-19.  
12 M Wrong In the footsteps of Mr Kurtz living on the brink of disaster in the  Congo  (2000) passim. 
13 J Muthangai Katusya  „The Rape Ordeal in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)‟ 2011 
available at http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1250, accessed on 21 March 2011; S Kirchner 
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The DRC is one of the world‟s greatest living tragedies: 3.8 million14 dead as result of 
the war; a further 2.4 million internally displaced; 388,000 refugees outside of the 
country; 17 million malnourished; 1.3 million stricken with HIV/AIDS; and more than 
2000 victimised by landmines since 1998. It is a bitter irony that one of Africa‟s 
potentially richest countries is one of the world‟s poorest; ranked 167 out of 177 
countries in the 2005 UNDP human development index.15 
 
Comparing Congolese atrocities to the Jewish Holocaust, Jewish Rabbis noted: “The 
people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have for over 11 years endured 
violence, war crimes, corruption, humanitarian crisis, looting and rape on a scale that 
defies comprehension”.16 
 
To date, those responsible for these mass atrocities and crimes remain unpunished. 
Although the war was said to have ended in 2003,17 impunity for these wars crime is 
an ongoing issue. Worse still, some of the alleged war criminals hold senior positions 
in society18 and are involved in ongoing crimes. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
„Wartime rape. Sexual terrorism in the Eastern Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo – 
international law and human rights‟ (2008) available at 
http://www.hausarbeiten.de/faecher/vorschau/118118.html, accessed on 15 May 2011.  
14 This number is approximate and needs to be updated. In 2010 Christoph wrote about roughly 7 
million deaths – see N D Kristof The world capital of killing (06 February 2010) New York Times 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/opinion/07kristof.html?src=twr, accessed on 10 May 
2010. In the same vein, in a letter to the Guardian, Jewish Rabbis recalled the 5,4 million death toll 
given by the International Rescue Committee in DRC in April 2007, and note that „This horrific figure 
continues to rise at a rate of 45,000 a month. The additional consequences of disease and malnutrition 
has resulted in a rise in the death toll to at least 7 million, not to mention the millions of refugees‟ – see 
„We must not forget the victims of the war in Congo‟(Friday 23 April 2010) Guardian available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/23/victims-of-war-in-congo, accessed on 05 March 2010. 
However those numbers are not unanimous – for more information read UNOHCRH (note 3 above).  
15 MONUC (note 2 above). 
16 Jewish Rabbis (note 14 above).  
17 In spite of the official end of the Second War in 2003 the aftermath is not easy; some parts of the 
DRC especially in the East, are still affected by fighting between rebel groups who are committing 
rapes, murders and other numerous crimes, see, H Soysal „The situation in DR Congo‟ (2011) available 
at http://www.rcimun.org/SC_1.pdf, accessed on 10 March 2011. The violence phenomenon seems to 
have attained the complex process of escalation described by P Waldmann which leads to the 
independisation, privatisation and commercialisation of violence – see „Civil wars: dynamics and 
consequences‟ (1999) in World Encyclopedia of Peace Volume I 2 ed 208-212. 
18 Observatoire National des Droits de L`Homme Actes du Forum National sur les droits de l`homme 
en République Démocratique du Congo, «Etat de lieux de la situation des droits de l`homme en 
République Démocratique du Congo» (2004) 18. 
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This research study aims to examine the necessity of instigating the prosecution of 
those serious crimes and other grave violations of human rights perpetrated in the 
recent Congolese armed conflicts.  
 
Although some individuals19 are being prosecuted by the ICC for a number of crimes 
committed in the DRC during the war periods, many serious crimes, and notably war 
crimes perpetrated before 2002, remain unpunished.  
 
This study aims to answer the following questions: 
 Were war crimes really committed in the DRC between 1996 and 2002?  
 Why do the perpetrators of these crimes remain unpunished today? 
 How can the perpetrators of those crimes be prosecuted and punished 
effectively? 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
 
The study intends to investigate war crimes committed in the DRC, which remain 
unpunished and cannot be prosecuted by the ICC. Article 11 (1) and (2) of the Rome 
Statute,20 provides that the jurisdiction of the ICC may only be exercised after the 
entry into force of the Statute, or, for any State which becomes a party to the Statute, 
after the entry into force of the Statute for that state, except if the latter declares 
otherwise.21 The DRC signed the Statute on 8 September 2000 and ratified the 
Statute22 with effect from 11 April 2002. Hence, the ICC may only exercise its 
                                                 
19 Such as Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo, Bosco Ntaganda, Callixte 
Mbarushimana. See „Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/, accessed on 14 May 2011. 
Have alleged committed crimes after July 2002 the year of Inter -Congolese Dialogue period during 
which, war was almost finished. It is an irony that the entry into force of the Rome Statute coincides 
with the official end of the war in the DRC, and it is a tragedy that it cannot act retroactively. 
20 The founding document of the ICC adopted in Rome by 120 states on 17 July 1998 entered into force 
in the DRC on the 1st July 2002, the DRC being the 60th state to ratify it. The term Rome Statute is the 
most commonly used to describe this foundation instrument of ICC, however it would be more logical 
or correct to call it Rome Treaty or Rome Convention or ICC Statute. 
21 According to article 12 paragraph 3 of the Rome Statute, if the acceptance of a State which is not a 
Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the 
Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question. The 
accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in accordance with Part 
9. 
22 See „Democratic Republic of Congo: signature status; ratification and implementation status‟ 
available at 
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jurisdiction in terms of crimes committed in DRC after the entry into force of its 
Statue, which was effective from July 2002. Unfortunately, many gross and serious 
crimes in the DRC were perpetrated during the course of armed conflicts prior to this 
date. 
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the referral by the DRC authorities in March 2004 to the 
Office of Prosecutor of the Congolese situation,23 the Court is unable to prosecute war 
crimes committed in the Congo between 1996 and 2002 during the last two armed 
conflicts.24 The dilemma of impunity resulting from this is unacceptable25 and raises 
the necessity of looking for a mechanism to combat it, whether at the national or 
international level. Since the Congolese judicial machinery has failed to try those war 
criminals, universal jurisdiction is examined and the argument for a Special Criminal 
Tribunal is explored. 
 
Hence this study intends to:  
 demonstrate that odious international crimes and specifically war crimes were 
perpetrated in the DRC on a large scale between 1996 and 2002; 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Cong
o.htm, accessed on 11 April 2011. 




accessed on 14 May 2011. 
24 There is no doubt that many other war crimes were committed before 1996 during the pre-colonial, 
colonial and Mobutu regime. However, while a longer extension of jurisdiction is preferable, it could 
be unrealistic and inefficient. Hence this research focuses on war crimes committed during the period 
1996 to 2003. As for crimes committed before that time frame, other mechanisms can be investigated 
to indict those responsible. The recent complaint filed by the Lumumba family under Belgian criminal 
jurisdiction to try 12 Belgians suspected to be involved in the plot to assassinate Lumumba 50 years 
earlier, is an example in this respect. See Procès de l`assassinat de P.E Lumumba Ludo De Witte: 
“C`est sous la responsabilité des officiers belges que P.E. Lumumba a été torturé et, finalement, 
exécuté” (09 Jan 2011). Interview with Ludo De Witte available at 
http://kilimandjero.blogs.dhnet.be/archive/2011/01/09/congo-kinshasa-belgique-proces-de-l-
assassinat-de-p-e-lumumb.html, accessed on 15 February 2011; Le Potentiel Lumumba c`est 
maintenant le temps de la vérité judiciaire (27 December 2010). Interview with Annemie Schaus and 
Christophe Marchand available at 
http://universeprod.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=110:lumumba-cest-
maintenant-le-temps-de-la-verite-judiciairer&catid=40:politique&Itemid=135, accessed on 15 
February 2011; CADTM Communiqué de Presse (24 June 2010) http://www.cadtm.org/Militant-
inlassable-contre-l, accessed on 15 February 2011.  
25 Relating to impunity in the DRC see C Kabati Ntamulenga „Réflexion sur les mécanismes de lutte 
contre l‟impunité des crimes internationaux en RDC‟ (2010) Paroles de Justice Revue Annuelle de 
Doctrine 137-147.  
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 show the inadequacy and/or incapacity of the Congolese judicial system to 
punish those crimes; 
 demonstrate the limits of the ratione temporis jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court and the universal jurisdiction mode to prosecute those crimes 
committed in the DRC; 
 unravel the socio-political reasons why the international community remains 
unconcerned about those serious crimes despite their severe consequences 
(approximately seven million deaths);26 
 protect the DRC as well as the international community from the adverse 
effects of those crimes on their perpetrators and victims; 
 denounce the impunity for those odious crimes as a negative example for 
future generations; and  
 explore the best legal way to establish a special criminal tribunal for the DRC.  
 
This research analysis will be based on four principle theories. 
 
The first relates to transitional justice. Guided by this theory, this thesis examines the 
transition process from a war-torn society to a unified and peaceful one. The 
outcomes of the serious crimes committed during the war in the post-conflict context 
are discussed. This raises a fundamental question: how to reconcile the need for 
justice on the part of victims with the numerous risks that a penal approach could 
cause to a society that has just achieved peace by means of political negotiations. 
Democracy in the DRC is young and its foundations are weak. One of the 
consequences of delay and/or absence of justice is that sometimes victims themselves 
become perpetrators of heinous crimes.27 This leads to an analysis of the options: are 
judicial mechanisms or extra-judicial mechanisms, such as amnesty or a truth and 
reconciliation commission, the best way forward?28 In terms of the threat of ongoing 
crimes in the country, and the negative impact of the impunity precedent, there is a 
                                                 
26 N D Kristof (note 14 above).  
27 UNOHCRH(note 3 above). In the Foreword, Navanethem  Pillay, commenting on the situation 
related to the incapacity of justice in Congo, observes that “In some cases, victims became perpetrators, 
while perpetrators were themselves sometimes subjected to serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law, in a cycle of violence that has not yet abated”. 
28 For instance South Africa‟s experience of the TRC seems interesting and insightful in certain 
respects. See the Most Revd Archbishop Emeritus D Tutu in Foreword South Africa Department of 
Justice Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Final Report (1998) Vol 5: 6. 
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need for justice, which could act as a deterrent to criminals and restore victims‟ sense 
of self-worth. In order to enhance national cohesion, this study examines how extra-
judicial mechanisms can be applied to some types of crimes, with the criminal justice 
system being applied to others. The option of a complementary approach of a range of 
transitional solutions is considered.29 Without justice,30 there can be no true 
reconciliation and sustained peace; justice is a pillar of democracy. However the 
exercise of good justice must take into account the safeguarding of the social order.31  
 
The second theory is based on the deterrent effect of criminal justice. Criminal law 
plays a crucial role in protecting the values32 of human society, by using a range of 
sanctions to prevent community members from violating the rule of law. Either at the 
national or international level, criminal justice must be a deterrent to criminals.33 This 
theory will help to examine how effective the criminal process set up by the ICC in 
the DRC is.  
 
The third theory is grounded on the principle of universality: judex deprehensionis. 
While many national judicial systems have failed to curb the commission of serious 
crimes, which have become more and more transnational, the transformation of the 
world to a global village also encompasses justice. The establishment of a global 
judicial system is a beacon of hope for victims of odious crimes and promises the 
promotion of justice and humans rights. This theory focus on the right of domestic 
                                                 
29 M Du Plessis & J Ford Justice and Peace in a New Zimbabwe. Transitionnel Justice Options, (2008) 
available at http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=3059, accessed on 28 April 2010; Luzolo Bambi 
Lessa Justice transitionnelle et nouvel ordre politique en République Démocratique du Congo (2003) 
9. 
30 Luzolo Bambi Lessa „L‟impunité: Source de violations graves et répétitives des droits de l‟homme 
en République Démocratique du Congo‟ in Actes du Forum National sur les Droits de l’homme en 
République Démocratique du Congo (2004) p 159. This author states: „Il n‟ya pas de paix sans 
réconciliation nationale, pas de réconciliation nationale sans justice, pas de justice sans réparation, pas 
de réparation sans vérité et pas de vérité sans pardon‟ which we translate as „there is no sustainable 
peace without national reconciliation, no reconciliation without justice, no justice without reparation, 
no reparation without truth, and no truth without forgivness‟. 
31 The recent ICC intervention in the Libyan crisis illustrates how a suitable solution can be 
compromised by the administration of justice. See A Louw „Africa should work with, not against the 
ICC in resolving the Libyan crisis‟ available at http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1323, accessed 
on 27 July 2011. 
32 J Burchell & J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 2 ed (2005) 9; N M Songa Traité de droit pénal 
général congolais 2 ed (2007) 15; L Bolongo Droit Pénal Spécial Zaïrois 2 ed (1985) 12.  
33 D Kuwali „From promise to practice: towards universal jurisdiction to deter commission of mass 
atrocities in Africa‟ in Africa Security Review 2010 (19) (1) 48-61; R Ali Shalan The international 
Criminal Court: is it a deterrent to international crimes?‟ (unpublished Masters dissertation) 
University of KwaZulu-Natal (2005) 40-90, 107, 150; N M Songa (note 32 above; 347). 
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justice to prosecute and adjudicate criminals‟ arrest in a given country for breach of 
law, wherever these acts are committed and regardless of the nationality of the 
criminal or the victims. It also examines how this jurisdiction, based on articles 49 
and 146 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 can be used to effectively 
combat impunity in the DRC. 
 
The fourth theory is based on the sovereign equality of states. It submits that, in the 
international judicial order, states have the same rights and must be treated in the 
same way. This is proclaimed in article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) of 
1945. Considering that the DRC is a sovereign and independent member of the UN, 
the study will examine why the DRC‟s need for a special criminal tribunal is still 
unfulfilled while at the same time such courts have been established for other states 
with similar circumstances such as Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone and Lebanon. 
 
1.3 The significance of the study 
 
A focused examination of ways to combat this impunity for war crimes in the DRC 
could offer a worthwhile model. This research study adopts a holistic approach in its 
scrutiny of the principles of international humanitarian law, international criminal law 
and Congolese criminal law related to the prosecution of war crimes committed in the 
DRC. It will hopefully enhance the understanding and appraisal of the efficiency of 
international criminal justice against the impunity for serious crimes committed on the 
African continent.34 As Kabange notes “Practically, the OAU has served as talking 
shop for African states but has displayed considerable reluctance in intervening in 
systematic human rights abuses by various regime in the region”.35 In the same vein 
                                                 
34 In connection with crimes on the Africa continent read D Kuwali (note 33 above; 48-61); M 
Meredith The state of Africa: a history of fifty years of independence (2006) 312 passim; M Ogunlana 
„Effective strategies for conflict prevention in West Africa‟ in Proceeding of the eleventh annual 
conference (1999) 334; O N Rurihose „Problématique des droits de l‟homme et des peuples en Afrique‟ 
in Philosophie et droits de l'homme: actes de la 5e semaine philosophique de Kinshasa du 26 avril au 
1er mai 1981 (1982) 139; D Kalindye Byanjira Nécessité de l’Etat de Droit dans la promotion des 
droits de l’homme au Zaïre (unpublished PhD dissertation) Catholic University of Lyon (1995) 23; G 
Basue Babu Kazadi L’action internationale en faveur de la démocratie en Afrique: le cas du Zaïre 
(unpublished PhD dissertation) University of Nancy (1999) 2 ; S Mugangu  Matabaro ‟Les Droits de 
l‟Homme dans la Région des Grands Lacs Bilan et Perspectives‟ in Les Droits de l’Homme dans la 
Région des Grands Lacs Réalité et Illusions(2003)419,419-426  .    
35 C J Kabange Nkongolo „Protection of human rights in Africa: Africa human rights in comparative 
perspective‟ (2011) in Journal Officiel de la République démocratique du Congo available at 
http://www.leganet.cd/Doctrine.textes/Droitpublic/DH/kabange.II.pdf, accessed on 27 July 2011.  
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du Plessis points out that “several of Africa‟s leaders in the fights for independence 
led their newly liberated nations into totalitarianism with an ineffectual OAU doing 
little to put a stop to this African malaise”.36  
 
This research is required in the academic arena, considering that limited studies have 
been conducted on this topic in the DRC. It will also contribute towards an 
understanding of current discourse on the relevance of the ICC in Africa.37  
 
This analysis will hopefully serve as a tool in the search to restore justice in a country 
where war crimes have been committed, but the perpetrators are walking free, despite 
the consequences of recurring wars and the alleged serious crimes committed by them 
in the DRC.38 For, as Kuwali39notes “mass atrocities crime is facilitated by a „culture 
of impunity‟. If potential perpetrators think that they can get away with impunity, they 
are more likely to resort [to] such crimes in pursuit of their political or economic 
goals”. Justice is a tool to build and consolidate peace, security, and development in 
the African Great Lakes Region. As MONUC points out:  
 
Once stable, the DRC presents real opportunities for intra-regional economic 
cooperation, foreign investment, and sustained growth and development. But a DRC 
in decay, vulnerable to plunder and susceptible to violence, is a threat to itself, and to 
the region with negative implications for the entire continent.40  
 
In the same vein Frantz Fanon asserted “Let us be sure never to forget it: the fate of 
all us is at stake in the Congo”.41  
 
                                                 
36 M Du Plessis „The African Union‟ in J Dugard International law: a South African perspective 3 ed 
(2005) 546, 549-550. 
37 M Du Plessis „Africa and the International Criminal Court‟ (2005) available at 
http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/confpaps/duplessis.htm, accessed on 01 April 2010; „The International 
Criminal Court and its work in Africa‟ (2008) available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=3078, accessed on 27 April 2010; Kofi Annan „The ICC 
represents hope for victims of atrocities‟ (2009) New African 68-69. 
38 I Mpinga Tshibasu „Note introductive‟ Actes du Forum National sur les Droits de l’homme en 
République Démocratique du Congo (2004) 4. Also Kenneth Roth „DR Congo: UN Report exposes 
grave crimes‟ available at www.hrw.org/fr/news/2010/10/01/rd-c, accessed on 02 0ctober 2010.  
39 D Kuwali (note 33 above). 
40 MONUC (note 3 above). 
41 F Fanon (note 2 above; 197). 
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Visiting refugees in the Congo in 2003, Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees and actress Angelina Jolie observed a ripple of 
genocide and concluded “I believe I am right in saying that here peace would not just 
stop the killing but begin to give hope and stability to all Africa”.42  
 
The stakes are high in the Congo and a sustained solution requires a comprehensive 
approach. This study examines the judicial aspects of such a solution.  
 
1.4 Research approach and methods 
 
This study is a desk top research exercise.  
 
Data has been collected from primary sources related to the ICC such as: 
 the Rome Statute (18 July 1998);  
 the Element of Crimes and The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC 
(10 September 2002), as well as other documents on the basis of which the 
ICC was established;  
 the Constitution of the DRC (18 February 2006 as revised on 20 January 
2011); 
 Interim Accords on Cooperation and Immunity of the ICC in the DRC or 
Accords Provisoires de Coopération des Privileges et Immunité de la Cour 
Pénale Internationale en RDC (13 October 2004);  
 the Congolese code on organization and jurisdiction of the judiciary (31 
March 1982); and 
 Congolese criminal military law (18 November 2002). 
The above has been systematized and clarified by doctrinal research or the „black-
letter law‟ approach.43  
 
To understand the gap between „law in book‟ and „law in action‟ the study has utilised 
the socio-legal studies methodology, which is complementary to doctrinal research.  
                                                 
42 A Jolie & J Prendergast „Ripples of genocide Journey through Eastern Congo‟ available at 
http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/congojournal/download/transcript.pdf, accessed on 10 
May 2011. 
43 M McConville & W Hong Chui „Introduction and Overview‟ in M McConville & W Hong Chui 
Research methods for law (1988) 3-4.  
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This study takes into account The Hague (29 July 1899 and 18 October 1907) and 
Geneva (12 August 1949) Conventions on the laws of war and international 
humanitarian law. Consideration has been given to cases of war crimes such as the 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case (ICC, 2006), the Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo case (ICC, 2009), and similar cases such as the DRC v Uganda case 
(ICJ, 2005) the Yerodia case (ICJ 2002), the Tadic case (TPIY, 1995), and the 
Akeyesu case (TPIR, 1998), where the comparative and international approach44 have 
been applied. On a national level cases such as the Songo Mboyo case (Mbandaka 
Military Tribunal of Garrison, judgment of 12 April 2006) and the Milobs case (Ituri 
military Tribunal of Garrison, judgement of 19 February 2007) has also been 
considered. 
 
Secondary sources include textbooks, journals, reviews, reports, and critical and 
evaluative works on the primary data. Several works have been considered, including 
The African Stakes of the Congo War (J F Clark, 2002); Crimes organisés en Afrique 
Centrale (H Ngbanda, 2004); The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global 
Justice (L Moreno-Ocampo, 2008); Proactive complementarity: The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice (W 
W Burke-White, 2008); The International Criminal Court that Africa wants (Max du 
Plessis, 2010); From promise to practice: towards universal jurisdiction to deter the 
commission of mass atrocities in Africa (D Kuwali, 2010); The Legal System and 
Research of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): An Overview (D Zongwe F 
Butedi & P M Clement, 2010); The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction (H Kissinger, 
2001); Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, Mapping 
Report (UN, 2010); and Amnesty International Report 2001 The State of the World’s 
Human Rights (Amnesty International, 2011) etc.   
 
 
                                                 
44 S Hall „Researching International Law‟ in M McConville & W Hong Chui Research methods for law 
(1988) 181-183.  
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1.5 The structure of the research  
 
The first chapter covers the research design, and presents background information 
related to the research project.  
 
Chapter 2 focuses on armed conflicts in the DRC. This chapter will examine the 
causes of war and crimes committed during the course of war. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the effectiveness of the Congolese judiciary‟s jurisdiction to try 
these war crimes. 
 
Chapter 4 will consider the contribution of the ICC to bringing war criminals in the 
DRC to trial. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the limitations of the ICC‟s jurisdiction and the impunity for war 
crimes in the DRC. 
 
Chapter 6 argues for the establishment of a special tribunal for the DRC, as a 
mechanism to combat impunity.  
 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, will draw conclusions from the study and make 
recommendations that could be implemented to help fight impunity for crimes in 
general and particularly war crimes in the DRC.  
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Chapter 2: The armed conflicts in the DRC  
 
“What I am opposed to is a dumb war. A rash war. A war based not on reason but on passion, 
not on principle but on politics”  
(Hussein Barack Obama Remarks against going to war with Iraq 2 October 2002 Chicago) 
 
 
War is a plague that has afflicted humanity for countless centuries. In order to 
understand armed conflict in the DRC, this chapter begins by examining the contours 
of the concept of armed conflict by means of an analysis of the notion of armed 
violence, and the definition and characteristics of armed conflict. Later in the chapter, 
the two deadliest wars in the recent past of the DRC are examined. In terms of 
violations of human rights, loss and destruction, these remain some of the most 
dramatic events in world history in the past decades. The impunity of those 
responsible for the deaths of several million people in the DRC is unacceptable.   
 
2.1 Notion of armed conflict 
 
The illegitimate use of force has contributed to several forms of abuse in human 
history. From the times of antiquity and the violence45 of battles fought with stones 
and iron weapons, to the use of nuclear weapons46 during the contemporary period, 
the scourge of violence has presented itself as a real challenge to human civilization47 
                                                 
45 Analyzing conflict and violence in the history of KwaZulu-Natal, for example, A V Minnaar notes 
that several factors (warriors ethnic conflict, land policies etc.) played their part in creating tensions 
between groups within tribes, or between tribes or clans and even within families and led to the social 
conditions which encouraged the eruption of violence and explained how violence can become 
widespread and endemic. See Conflict and violence in Natal/KwaZulu: historical perspectives (1991) 1 
and 52, and R Jolly Cultured violence, narrative, social suffering, and engendering human rights in 
contemporary South Africa (2010) 1-36. 
46 It is regrettable that those weapons of mass destruction were used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki during 
World War II by the so called „modern‟ and „civilized‟ nations. See an interesting comment by A 
Cassese Violence and law in the Modern age (1988) 1-29; M N Shaw „Nuclear weapons and 
international law‟ in Istvan Pogany (ed) Nuclear weapons and international law (1987) 1-21. 
47 The eruption of violence is general and observable at all levels (family, local structure, intrastate or 
interstate) whether in African, American, Asian or in Western societies/civilizations. It is shameful and 
ironic to use the term civilization as long as wars are a daily reality in the world several decades after 
its prohibition by international modern law. The essence of warfare is a flagrant denial of humanity. 
See, article 38 (c) of ICJ Statute and article 3 (1) (d) of; Geneva Convention of 1949 (I); „Reservation 
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and a threat to the whole planet. War is most often the source, if not the pinnacle, of 
diverse armed violence. According to Grotius:48  
 
War is the State or Situation of those who dispute by Force of Arms. The Etymology of 
the Word; for the Latin Word Bellum (war) comes from the old Word Duellum (a Duel) 
as bonus Duonus, and Bis from Duis .Now Duellum was derived from Duo, and thereby 
implied a Difference between two persons, in the same sense as term Peace Unity (from 
Unitas) for a contrary reason.49  
 
Hence, war denotes the idea of opposition, for most conflict is a result of various 
contradictions between different parties. The consequences of warfare are of great 
concern to peace and security worldwide. 
 
Boister notes: “Armed conflict is the most anarchic of human conditions. Societies at 
war discard many of the mores that restrain human behavior in peacetime”.50 
 
Indeed, it is important to note that as long as war exists, the regulation of warfare will 
be necessary to avoid chaos. Although war has been outlawed in international 
relations, the advent of numerous incidents where force is used does not ensure that 
our society is totally protected from the consequences of war.51  
 
What exactly does the term „armed conflict‟ mean? Does it refer to the same reality as 
war? Can these two terms be used interchangeably?  
 
As noted above the term „war‟ – bellum in Latin – is not recent in world history. In 
classical international law there was a distinction between yus ad bellum and yus in 
                                                                                                                                            
to the Convention on Genocide Advisory opinion I.C.J. Reports 1951, p15‟ (23) available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf, accessed on 05 April 2011; J M White „Equity – a 
general principal of law recognised by civilised nations?‟ in QUTLJJ (2004) 4 (1) 103-116 available at 
http://www.law.qut.edu.au/ljj/editions/v4n1/pdf/White.pdf, accessed on 05 April 2011; articles 1 & 2 of 
the Kellog Briand-Pact of 1929; Article 2 (4) of UN Charter; G Best Humanity in warfare: the modern 
history of the international law of armed conflicts (1980) 2. 
48 According to J Dugard, Grotius is acclaimed as the “father of international law”. See J Dugard  
International law: a South African perspective 3 ed (2005) 11. 
49 H Grotius The rights of war and peace (R Tuck & K Haakonssen (eds) Book 1 (2005) 134-135. 
50 N B Boister International legal protection for combatants in the South African armed conflict 
(unpublished Masters Dissertation) University of Natal (1988) 2. 
51 D Schindler and J Toman (eds) The laws of armed conflicts: a collections of conventions, resolutions 
and other documents 2 ed (1981) VIII. 
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bello. The first means the right to resort to force. It is related to the regulation of cases 
in which resort to force by states is allowed. The latter means international 
humanitarian law or legal rules that bind belligerent parties during a war.52 In spite of 
the prohibition on war in modern international law, war has not yet been eradicated 
from the globe.53 
 
The Use of Force Committee of the International Law Association notes that the 
terms „war‟ and „armed attack‟ are of particular significance. With respect to „war‟, in 
classic pre-Charter jus ad bellum, this was the international law term used to describe 
the situation of armed conflict between states, and it is still in use today. It has 
undergone a particular resurgence in public discourse in the context of the so-called 
„war on terror‟.54  
 
The terms „war‟ and „armed conflict‟ have almost55 the same meaning but the former 
is less frequently56 used and the expression „armed conflict‟ is preferred because it 
appropriately reflects several realities relating to armed violence and combat on the 
ground, and has been adjusted to the evolution of international law.57  
                                                 
52 M Freeman „International law and international armed conflict: clarifying the interplay between 
human rights and humanitarian protection‟ available at http://www.jha.ac/articles/a059.htm, accessed 
on 05 April 2011; G Best (note 47 above) 8-16; J Dugard (note 48 above; 526). 
53 Examining violent conflicts over time, the Use of Force Committee identified three periods (1945-
1980, 1980-2000 and 2000-2010) and observed that: “The majority of armed conflicts since 1945 have 
in fact been internal armed conflicts, often with the intervention of outside powers. Numerous inter-
state conflicts have occurred as well […] Cherif Bassiouni identifies 313 such conflicts during the 
period 1945 to 2008 ….” The Committee cites M Cherif Bassiouni (ed) The pursuit of international 
criminal justice:  world study on conflicts, victimization, and post-conflict justice 79 (1) 2010. See Use 
of Force Committee of the International Law Association Final Report of the Hague conference on the 
meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law (2010) 7 available at www.ila-
hq.org/download.../2176DC63-D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87, accessed on 01 April 2011. For more 
relating to the rate of conflict in the world see UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program available at 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18070_armedconflicts_2009.pdf, accessed on15 May 2011. 
54 Ibidem 7; As noted in N Balendra relating to the war against terrorism: “The emergence of non-State 
groups as a major threat to international peace and security and the U.S. decision to characterize the 
events of September 11 as an act of war and the many strands of the U.S. reaction to those events as an 
armed conflict have rendered the definition of armed conflict even more controversial” in „Defining 
armed conflict‟ in New York University Public Law and Legal Theory working papers Paper 63 (2007) 
2471 available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/63, accessed on 15 May 2011. 
55 Relating to the distinction between these concepts, I Detter Delupis notes: “Naturally not all armed 
conflicts amount to war, so armed conflict may not be war. Since the subjective meaning of war has 
been […] the distinction between war and conflict is not really fruitful and is not one of type but one of 
scale and degree”. See I Detter Delupis The Law of War (1987) 18. 
56 Ibidem (note 55 above) 1 and 33, 10-11; S Nalhik „Précis abrégé de droit international humanitaire‟ 
(1948) in Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge 7. 
57 CICR „Commentary on Geneva Conventions‟ available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/365-
570005?OpenDocument, accessed on 01 April 2011.  
 16 
 
2.1.1 Definitions  
 
Despite war being such a major feature of history and current world circumstances, 
there is no authoritative legal definition of war or armed conflict. There is also a 
dichotomy perpetuated in international instruments between definition of international 
and non-international wars. When a situation exists, such as in the DRC, in which 
there are components of both international and non-international war, this lack of 
clarity can lead to confusion regarding jurisdiction and applicable laws and 
conventions. For this reason, the definitions of war and armed conflict will be 
discussed in detail here in order to lay the basis for the definition of war crimes which 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the UN proclaims: “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations”. This article merely prohibited58 war but doesn‟t 
define what an armed conflict is. Even in the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and their two Additional Protocols59 of 8 June 1977 there is no definition. In 
article 2 of all the Conventions, we read: “The present Convention shall apply to all 
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one 
of them”. Instead of providing a definition, this article sets out the scope of its 
application.60 
 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute related to war crimes, makes several references to war, 
to the Geneva Conventions, and to armed conflicts, whether of an international or 
                                                 
58 Although there is a formal prohibition on war, the resort to arms is allowed in the Charter in case of 
individual or collective self-defence (article 51) or by/with Security Council approval (Chapter VII).  
59 Since 8 December 2005 a Third Protocol has been added to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 
1949 relating to the adoption of an additional distinctive emblem. See http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-
and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp, accessed on 03 April 2011. 
60 It is obvious that the primary goal of these Conventions is first and foremost humanitarian; therefore 
a strict legalistic definition of armed conflict might shrink the scope of their applicability.  
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local character, but doesn‟t provide a definition of armed conflict in any of its 
provisions (see article 8 (2) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (iii) (f).61 
 
In its quest for a definition, the Use of Force Committee searched international law, 
and examined both primary and secondary sources, but the Committee did not find 
any common conventional definition of armed conflict at a multilateral level. The 
Committee then decided to consider the meaning of armed conflict as provided in 
customary international law, demonstrated by state practice, opinion juris, 
jurisprudence and doctrine.62 
 
At the level of jurisprudence, an overview of the decisions of judicial bodies and 
especially the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter 
ICTY) is helpful and might lead to a definition of armed conflict. 
 
In the Tadic case for instance it was stated that “an armed conflict exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a State”.63  
 
This definition is not perfect but it is a step in the right direction. It was considered by 
the Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) in 
the Akeyesu case64 and more recently the Pre-trial Chamber of the ICC in Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo case65 referred to it. 
                                                 
61 Even in the Elements of Crimes which help in the interpretation and application of article 8 there is 
no definition. See the commentary of the Pre-trial Chamber I Case The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo decision on the confirmation of charges N.: ICC-01/04-01/06 29 Jan 2007 para 205 available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF, accessed on 06 April 2011); A Cullen „The 
definition of non-international armed conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
an analysis of the threshold of application contained in Article 8 (2) (f) Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law (2007) 12 (3) 419-445. 
62 Use of Force Committee(note 53 above; 5).  
63 Prosecutor v Tadic, Case No.IT-94-1-I,Decision on Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
2 October 1995 para 70. Available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm accessed 
on 05 April 2011. 
64 Prosecutor  v Akeyesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, 2 September 1998, para 619 available at 
http://www.unictr.org/tabid/128/Default.aspx?id=18&mnid=4, accessed on 06 April 2011. 
65 Pre-trial Chamber I Case Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (note 61 above) para 287. See also the 
Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Gombo Case Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 15 June 2009 para 229 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
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In an attempt to define armed conflict various suggestions have been made. To 
paraphrase Pietro Verri,66 the general term „armed conflicts‟ is applied to different 
types of clashes, that may occur between two or more state entities, between a state 
entity and a non-state entity, between a state entity and a dissident faction, or between 
two different ethnic groups within a state entity.  
 
This definition is a further development of the concept, but it is not complete. The 
detailed definition of Cherif Bassiouni looks more promising and is compatible with 
the understanding of armed conflict proposed by the Use of Force Committee.  
 
Clashing of interests (positional differences) over national values of some duration and 
magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, 
organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and achieve their goals 
and/or a „contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where 
the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is a state, results in 25 
battle-related deaths‟ and „protracted armed conflict between such groups‟.67  
 
This definition is sophisticated, but too long. Hence this study uses the concise 
definition by the CICR, which defines armed conflict as follows:  
 
International armed conflicts exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two 
or more States …. Non-International armed conflicts are protracted armed 
confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and forces of one or more 
armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a State. The armed 
confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the 
conflict must show a minimum of organization.68  
                                                 
66 P Verri Dictionnaire de droit international des conflits armés (1988) 36-37.  
67 Cherif Bassiouni (ed.) The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A Word Study on Conflicts, 
Victimization, and Post-Conflict Justice (2009)79 1) cited by the Final Report on the Meaning of 
Armed Conflict in International Law of the Use of Force Committee of the International Law 
Association, Hague, 2010 (10). See a detailed definition of armed conflict proposed by Uppsala 
Universitet , Department of Peace and Conflict Research available at 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/, accessed on 06 April 
2011. 
68 See the paper of the ICRC posted in 2008 on its Website, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” 
Defined in International Humanitarian Law? 5  available at 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/armed-conflict-article-170308/$file/Opinion-paper-
armedconflict, accessed on 06 April 2011, cited by Use of Force Committee (note 53 above; 19).  
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This definition utilizes a typology that sets up two kinds of conflicts – an international 
one and a non-international one. However, this classification69 seems insufficient, 
arbitrary, limited and outdated.70 There are other, more complex conflicts such as 
internationalized ones71 and so called „war against terror‟. 
 
What exactly is the meaning of international armed conflict and internal conflict (non-
international conflict) and what is the difference between these terms? 
 
2.1.2 International armed conflict 
 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC refers to two types of conflict, of which one 
is international armed conflict but, as demonstrated above, there are no definitions of 
armed conflict or international conflict. Therefore to analyze international armed 
conflict it is necessary to consult the Geneva Conventions, which constitute a 
summary of the core principles of international humanitarian law applicable in the 
case of the eruption of armed conflict. 
 
A close analysis of the Geneva Conventions reveals that, most of their pertinent 
provisions seem to be related more to the regulation of war between States than within 
States.72 
 
According to article 2 common to these Conventions they “shall apply to all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them”. The Convention “shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of 
                                                 
69 Delupis‟ classification of wars distinguishes four types of war as follows: 1) Geographical war: Inter-
State war, Civil war, Internal war, Internationalized war; 2) Programmatic war: Liberation war, 
Resistance or partisan war, Revolutionary war, Separatist war, Preemptive war; 3) Unequal war; 4) 
Methodological war: guerilla war (note 55 above) 33-53. 
70 S Bula-Bula „Droit international humanitaire‟(1999) in Droits de l’homme et droit international 
humanitaire, séminaire de formation cinquantenaire de la DUDH, 18 novembre-10 décembre, 1998, 
131, 145. 
71 J Mrazek „Armed conflict and use of force‟ (2010) 87, 90; J G Stewart „Towards a single definition 
of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict‟ 
(2003) 314-315 available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/others/irrc_850_stewart.pdf, accessed 
on 31 March 2011). 
72 J G Stewart (note 71 above; 317).  
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the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no 
armed resistance”.  
 
A meticulous analysis of this article reveals two dimensions. On one hand, there is the 
international aspect and on the other, the military aspect.  
 
Hence, international conflict can be considered in general as combat between two or 
more than two states.73 However, an elaborated definition in jurisprudence74 will not 
be sought, because today there is a trend towards a single definition of international 
and non-international conflict. 
 
Classically, interstate warfare is named international armed conflict and non-
international armed conflict is considered as an armed conflict between a state and an 
armed group within its territory. However there is a trend to apply International 
Humanitarian Law even to conflict not engaging governmental authorities. The case 
of the territory of a collapsed state is illustrative. There is a tendency to adopt a single 
and simple conception of regulation of armed conflict either in the decision-making 
structures of international judicial bodies, or in international instruments, or in State 
practice.75 
 
2.1.3 Local armed conflict 
 
By outlawing the resort to force in international relations, the United Nations Charter 
inaugurated a new age in 1945. But the provisions of this important international 
                                                 
73As part of interstate conflict, wars of national liberation are also considered international armed 
conflict. M Freeman considers the latter as “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to 
self-determination”. For instance, the ANC in South Africa was considered as a Movement of National 
Liberation. See Tom Farer “Humanitarian law and armed conflicts: toward a definition of 
“international armed conflict”‟ (1971) 71 (1) Columbia Law Review 37, 53. See also M Freeman 
„International law and internal armed conflicts: clarifying the interplay between human rights and 
humanitarian protections available at for comment‟; J Dugard et al. (note 48 above; 523). 
74 In  the Tadic case for instance: It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes 
place between two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out in the 
territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international 
in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through 
its troops, or alternatively if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of 
that other State. See Prosecutor v Tadic, T-94-1-A Judgement, 15 July 1999 para 84. 
75 Use of Force Committee of International Law Association (note 53 above; 8-9). 
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convention and numerous others seem limited only to protecting the international 
order from the consequences of war, and seem less applicable to internal State order. 
It is therefore not surprising that “the majority of armed conflicts since 1945 have in 
fact been internal armed conflicts, often with the intervention of outside powers”.76 
 
For Bouchet-Saulnier a non-international armed conflict is an armed conflict whose 
theatre of combat is the territory of a state, and is a conflict between the state‟s armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or organized armed groups, which, under the 
guidance of a responsible command, utilize a part of the state‟s territory to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations.77 
 
Of course, these types of conflicts are all too frequent in modern times. But they are 
not new; they have taken place since antiquity and are regulated in national law. 
Today even international humanitarian law is applicable to them. This is an evolution, 
for initially international humanitarian law proposed the regulation of conduct and 
damage caused during interstate war rather than conflict within the territory of a State. 
Internal conflict was regarded as an essentially domestic matter and was not subject to 
international conventions. For instance, the provisions of the Hague Conventions 
(1899 and 1907) are exclusively applicable to international armed conflict.78 
 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute makes reference to non-international armed conflict. 
However, this concept seems not well regulated in international law. For instance the 
provisions related to internal armed conflict in the Geneva Conventions at their 
common article 3 and their Additional Protocol II of 1977 (article 1) have prompted 
criticism.  
 
James, who is a brilliant defender of a single definition of armed conflict, makes the 
following observation about these provisions: 
 
More intricate anomalies are myriad even in instances of overlap between the two 
systems. For example, while common Article 3 prevents a combatant from being 
                                                 
76 Ibidem 9-10. 
77 F Bouchet-Saulnier Dictionnaire pratique du droit humanitaire 2 ed (2000) 92-93.  
78 J G Stewart (note 71 above; 316-317). 
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tortured, it does not prevent him or her from being executed for treason …. The 
uncomfortable overlap was also reinforced by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC Statute), which perpetuates the cumbersome international/non-
international legal dichotomy. The Statute limits the grave breaches regime to 
international conflicts … and, despite similarities … the serious violations provisions 
of common Article 3 that are applicable in „armed conflicts not of an international 
character‟ are both different and less comprehensive than their international 
counterparts.79  
 
In fact there is seemingly no serious reason for different laws to regulate international 
armed conflict and internal armed conflict. For international humanitarian law to be 
applied, the qualification of a situation of warfare as international or non-international 
is strict.80 Hence this situation may lead to limitations on the applicability of certain 
important provisions of laws of armed conflict. 
 
As noted above, the value of a dichotomist classification of conflict is debatable, for 
an internal conflict can be internationalized. There are other more complex types of 
conflict, which exhibit internal and external aspects. 
 
For Pietro Verri81 three situations can lead to the internationalization of an armed 
conflict: 
a) when the state whose territory there is an insurrection admits the belligerent 
status of the insurgents;  
b) if the armed forces of one or several foreign states intervene, each to support 
respectively one of the parties in conflict; and  
c) The armed forces of two foreign states intervene, each to support one party in 
conflict.  
 
Therefore internalized armed conflict refers to internal armed violence, which 
escalates to an international level due to several internationalization factors as 
demonstrated above. Among the most clear cases of internationalization of an armed 
                                                 
79 J G Stewart (note 71 above; 321). 
80 J G Stewart (note 71above; 316)  
81 P Verri Dictionnaire de droit international des conflits armés (1988) 37-38. See also Tadic Case 
(note 63 above; 84). 
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conflict in the past decades, has been NATO`s involvement in the war between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1999 and the 
involvement of several African82 countries in the DRC war theatre during the second 
war of 1998-2003.83 
 
It is also noteworthy84 that when the UN forces take part in an armed conflict, it may 
be considered as international and subject to international humanitarian law. Relating 
to the criminal responsibility and prosecution of members of a UN force before a 
Criminal Court, the analysis provided by Du Plessis85and Stephen is insightful and 
pose a serious question: “Who guard the guards?”  
 
2.1.4 Characteristics of armed conflict 
 
Notwithstanding the developments noted above, it is necessary to clarify the intrinsic 
elements that distinguish an armed conflict from other violent movements in order to 
lay the basis for an analysis in Chapter 4 of the concept of war crimes.  
 
According to article 1 (1) and (2) of Protocol II of the Geneva Convention, the 
Protocol “shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature as not 
being armed conflicts”. 
 
The aim of the protocol is to protect victims from the scourge of hostility between 
States‟ “armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups 
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations .…”. 
 
From the above, it is clear that all use of armed force cannot qualify as armed conflict.  
 
In jurisprudence, a close consideration of the decision of the ICTY might be useful. 
                                                 
82 Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia. 
83 J G Stewart (note 71 above; 315). 
84 T Farer (note 73 above; 72). 
85 M du Plessis & S Peté Who guards the guards? (2006) ISS Monograph available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/121FULL.PDF, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
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In the Tadic case for instance, the Chamber of Appeal indicates that:  
 
We find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends 
beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, 
in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, 
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the 
warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the 
control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.86 
 
This Decision of Appeal Chamber of the ICTY has inspired the consideration of other 
judicial jurisdictions. For instance, in line with that decision, a Decision of the ICC 
Chamber considered that to be defined as an internal armed conflict, the activities of 
an armed band must attain a certain threshold of organisation which can lead to the 
planning and sustainability of operations.87 
 
In this analysis we focus on the characterization of conflict and whether it is of a 
national or international character. As Antonio Cassese points out: “there has been a 
convergence of the two bodies on international law with the result that internal strife 
is now governed to a large extent by the rules and principles which had traditionally 
only applied to international conflicts”.88 
 
The above analysis leads to the following conclusion on the characterisation of the 
armed conflict: to have an armed conflict there must exist a certain number of criteria, 
which can be mainly summarised in two characteristics:  
 organised parties or groups; and  
 a degree or intensity of armed conflict. 
 
                                                 
86 N Tadic case (note 63 above; para 70).  
87 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case (note 65 above; para 233). 
88 J G Stewart (note 71 above; 322). 
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Commenting on these criteria, the report of the Use of Force Committee notes that, 
historically, armed conflicts have been characterized by several elements, but 
organisation and intensity remain the most distinctive differences between an armed 
conflict and other violent situations, such as incidents, border clashes, internal 
disturbances, tensions and riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, banditry, 
unorganised and short-lived insurrections or terrorist activities and civil unrest, and 
single acts of terrorism.89  
 
Regardless of its definition there is no doubt that war is inhuman and if humans could 
behave as Homo Sapiens instead of as Lupus, the money allocated to costly military90 
budgets could be channelled to development projects for the welfare of humankind. 
Unfortunately armed conflict is still raging in several places91 in the world today, with 
numerous, horrific consequences. 
 
2.2 Armed conflicts in the DRC 
 
War has not spared the DRC. The history of the country is marked by numerous 
violent and armed conflicts during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial and/or 
neocolonial periods. 
 
Notwithstanding the DRC having gained its independence from Belgium on 30 June 
1960, more than half a century later, it is infamous for its numerous bloody armed 
conflicts. Although the Congo is endowed with all kinds of natural resources and 
riches, its inhabitants remain among the poorest on the planet and are victims of 
various destructive, multifaceted crises. The collapse of the DRC‟s political system is 
due to decades of mismanagement, corruption, and lack of social cohesion and 
economic development.92 
                                                 
89 Use of Force Committee (note 53 above; 28). 
90 G Harris „Studying conflict, violence and peace in African universities‟ available at 
http://www.icon.org.za/documents/seminar_papers/Studying%20conflict,%20violence%20and%20pea
ce%20...%20Oct%202008.pdf, accessed on10 July 2011; S P Magee & T G Massoud „Openness and 
internal conflict‟ (2011) in Journal of Peace Research 59, 60 available at http://jpr.sagepub.com/, 
accessed on 4 June 2011. 
91 Since the beginning of this century, Africa has been shaken by numerous armed conflicts, including 
Cote d`Ivoire, Somalia, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.  
92 E Kisiangani „Conflict in the Democratic of the Congo: political and profit interests‟(2009) (2) 
Conflict Trends 38; see also E M‟Bokolo „Apport des universités à la résolution des crises politiques en 
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Analyzing the origins of the Congo war, McCalpin93 observes that the root of 
Congolese interethnic violence can be traced back to the fifteenth century when the 
people of the Kongo Kingdom met Europeans, especially the Portuguese navigators. 
This contact with Western world “laid the basis for a fragmented society shaped by 
the complexities of ethnic divisions and dependent economic relations. Rivalries 
developed along the trading posts, and some ethnic groups were afforded more access 
to trade than others”.94 
 
Bokongo95 notes that in 1482 a young Portuguese captain Diego Cao, discovered the 
mighty river, which he named Congo, the name of the small kingdom located at its 
mouth. The Portuguese engaged in the slave trade, selling African people in America. 
This was the first exploitation of the Congo‟s resources. Bokongo adds that the 
Congo‟s natural resources have always ignited wars and lust. However that wealth has 
never benefited the Congolese, but rather foreign companies and tyrants.  
 
After the Portuguese, the rule of Belgium‟s King Leopold II (1885-1908) was the 
worst. Instead of promoting civilization as he had promised western governments in 
November 1884 at the Berlin Conference, he committed numerous atrocities. About 
10 million people were exterminated, a truly forgotten holocaust, or what one author 
calls “Congolocide”.96  
 
Bobb comments that although the Belgian Government (1908-1960) intervened with 
“avowed intentions to improve human rights abuses in the Congo, the harsh labor 
laws persisted until the 1920s and numerous rebellions, eternally put down, were 
recorded”.97 An immensely wealthy country, Congo has attracted the attention and 
interest of its neighbors and many others states across the world, from the Portuguese 
                                                                                                                                            
République démocratique du Congo‟ (2007) in Elections, paix et développement en République 
Démocratique du Congo 11-22 ; Schatzberg, M. The dialectics of oppression in Zaïre  (1988)passim.  
93 J O McCalpin „Historicity of crisis: the origins of the Congo war‟ in J F Clark (ed) The African 
stakes of the Congo war (2002) 33-34. 
94 J O McCalpin (Note 93 above; 34). 
95 J Bokongo (note 92 above) for more on Congo history, read also I Ndaywel Histoire générale du 
Congo: de l’héritage ancien à la République Démocratique du Congo (1998) passim. 
96 S Bula-Bula L‟ambigüité de l’humanité en droit international (1999) 14; A Hochschild King 
Leopold’s Ghost: a tale of greed, terror, and heroism in Colonial Africa (1999) 3, 225-234.  
97 F Scott Bobb  Historical Dictionary of Zaire (1988) 349. 
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in the 15th century, to Western powers at Berlin, the King of the Belgians, the Belgian 
Government, superpowers, multinational firms etc. 
 
Located in the heart of Africa, the DRC is the second largest country on the continent 
and the 11th biggest in the world with an area of 2 345 000 square kilometers98 of 
territory, roughly the same size as the European Union. Inhabited by an estimated 70 
million people,99 it shares borders with nine countries and possesses enormous natural 
resources. Stakes in this country are high in many respects – politically, geo-
politically, strategically, economically, and in terms of energy (approximately 40 
percent of the world`s hydro-electric potential).100 
 
Instead of a rational exploitation of those resources, for a long period the DRC was 
the theatre for a political fight, which divided it; the failure of the leadership of the 
country and its ethnic diversity exacerbated the divisions. These divisions seem to 
extend beyond the DRC; on a continental level, African leaders were dynamic, but 
were divided during colonization and after independence. Nationalism caused even 
more divisions. Anglophone and Francophone took up opposing positions. Due to a 
lack of agreement between the radicals and the moderates, Congo was placed at the 
mercy of global predators and the capitalist western block on the one hand, and the 
Communism Eastern bloc on the other.101  
 
The long crisis in the DRC reached its height during the recent two wars (1996-97, 
and 1998-2002) whose consequences are estimated as the worst since World War 
Two.102 Rather than representing a simple struggle for power, those conflicts are the 
outcome of a long, complex and deterministic process, which was exacerbated by 
                                                 
98 According to the CIA the area of DRC is 2,344,858 sq km available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html, accessed on 28 April 2011. 
See also Whitaker’s Almanack 2011, 798-800. 
99 This number also is approximate. According to some sources it may be more than this, and the 
population could be around 71; see (note 98 above).  
100 H Campbell „Democratisation, citizenship and peace in the Congo‟ in M Baregu (ed) The crisis in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999) 21, 26. 
101 K Masire (note 8 above). See also J F Clark „Causes and consequences of the Congo war‟ in J F 
Clark (ed )The African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 1-3; M du Plessis (note 36 above).  
102C Hemedi dans la note de présentation du livre de L‟ Association Pour la Renaissance des Droits 
Humains au Congo, Cour pénale internationale, 2e éd (2004) 1. 
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several103 regional states and the impact on Africa of the bipolarization104 of the world 
at the international level. 
 
2.2.1 The First War, 1996-97 
 
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a new 
world era. For the African Great Lakes Regions in general and Congo-Zaire in 
particular, the winds of perestroika, which required the democratization of African 
States led to profound transformations.105 
 
Western fear of the extension of Soviet influence in Africa fell away and therefore 
there was no reason to support Mobutu‟s costly and useless dictatorship in the region. 
The latter was obliged to set up a democratic government and to found his power on 
stable internal structures, which he failed to do during the first transition process 
(1990-1996).106 Rejected by his old western masters, Mobutu become “persona non 
grata” in almost all western countries.107 The ground on which the Mobutu regime 
was built was henceforth shaky. Furthermore, the instabilities and conflicts in its 
neighboring countries of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, and Sudan, threatened the 
Congo‟s security on sub-regional level.  
 
In fact, the advent of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 is one of the most important 
factors which explains, historically, the cause of war in the Eastern part of the Congo 
and other neighboring countries. During the past decades the African Great Lakes 
                                                 
103P Biyoya Makutu „Le role des acteurs externes dans les conflits en République Démocratique du 
Congo‟ in Elections, Paix et Développement en République Démocratique du Congo (2007) 89: 89-
94); Analyzing the context of this war, Young recalled the famous remark of Frantz Fanon: “Africa has 
the shape of a pistol, with Congo-Kinshasa resembling the trigger housing”. See C Young 
„Contextualising Congo conflicts: order and disorder in postcolonial Africa‟ (2002) in J F Clark (ed) 
The African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 13-29; L Callige „Les deux guerres du Congo et leurs 
conséquences géopolitiques‟ (1999) n7 L’Observateur des Nations Unies 8 ;F Reynjens La guerre des 
grands lacs: alliances mouvantes et conflits extraterritoriaux en Afrique centrale (1999) passim 
104 P Biyoya Makutu (note 103 above). 
105 Responding to international political changes, in his historical democratization speech of 24 April 
1990, Mobutu announced numerous institutional transformations see V Lunda-Bululu Conduire la 
premiere transition au Congo-Zaire (2003) 13-15; J A Carty „Changing models of the international 
system‟ in W E Butler (ed) Perestroika and international law (1990) 13 ,17. 
106 H Campbell (note 100 above: 21-27); V Lunda-Bululu (note 105 above: 17, 247); L Devlin Chief of 
Station, Congo: fighting the cold war in a hot zone (2007) 266-267. 
107 J F Clark (note 101 above; 3); T R Essolomwa Nkoy La fin d’un zombie (2005) 116-117. 
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Region has been subjected to political struggles leading to many deaths,108 divisions 
that never happened elsewhere in the recent history of the African continent. 
 
Protected by the French,109 officials of the Kigali regime got away with genocide; in 
the meantime genocidal killing was continuing even against Tutsi employees of the 
French Embassy. French police allowed genocidal forces to escape, crossing the 
Congo's borders and providing financial and military support to help them regroup 
again in Rwanda. Taking advantage of the Congo‟s hospitality, from refugee camps 
where they were installed in Kivu, they began to organize themselves, to fight the 
Tutsi regime in Kigali. As described by Nzongola-Ntalaja, “For two years and half, 
the Mobutu Kengo regime and the international community watched and did nothing 
to stop this, while the UN and donor community continued to be more preoccupied 
with feeding the refugees, rather than trying to remove the killers among them and 
find a lasting solution to the whole crisis”.110 
 
One aspect of war which affected Africa in general and Congo in particular, was that 
civilian populations were displaced111 or migrated from their home country to another, 
often without any means of subsistence, provoking a humanitarian catastrophe. The 
Mobutu regime opened the Congolese borders on humanitarian grounds to roughly 
2,000,000 people, amongst them armed groups without requiring its French ally to 
disarm them or to put any serious security measures in place in the country. 
 
Was it safe to play the humanitarian card with an armed group? Or was it a poisoned 
gift from the international community?112 
 
It is clear that the Mobutu regime committed a number of errors both at an internal 
level (no elections six years after transition, numerous abuses, corruption of the army, 
                                                 
108 Considering the immense human cost of conflict in the Great Lakes Region, Young notes at least 
200,000 lives lost in Burundi since 1993, 800,000 in Rwanda plus 300,000 Hutu refugees slaughtered 
in Congo in 1997 and more than a million in DRC since 1998. See C Young (note 103 above; 13-14). 
109 Operation turquoise 1994: humanitarian intervention approved by UN led by French forces (June-
August) in Rwanda after the genocide. This French intervention was criticized as unhelpful – see G 
Nzongola-Ntalaja The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: a people’s history (2003) 224. 
110 G Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 215-224). 
111 J Murison „The politics of refugees and internally displaced persons in the Congo war‟ in J F Clark 
(ed) The African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 225-229; O Sichone „Refugees and migration in 
Africa‟ (1999) in M Baregu (ed) The crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 73-75. 
112 Read Essolomwa‟s interesting comments (note 107 above; 116-118).  
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the failed CNS = Conférence Nationale Souveraine = Sovereign National 
Conference:)113 and external level (corruption of its intelligence and security services, 
porous borders which offered entry to Angolan, Sudanese and Ugandan Burundian 
rebels). However the most fatal was to offer its support to Ex-FAR, amongst whom 
were the interahamwe (translated as those who work together), a militia largely 
considered responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.  
 
The armed conflict in 1996 in the Eastern DRC put an end to Mobutu who was 
weakened by disease and his incapacity to satisfy the will of his Western patrons. 
Backed by the US-proclaimed „new breed‟ of African leaders, L D Kabila114 led the 
rebellion that overthrew Mobutu in 1997.115 A last attempt to save the Mobutu regime 
on the part of its old friend, the French Government, was stymied by Anglo-American 
action.116 
 
The war in the Eastern territory eventually extended to the whole DRC. After a couple 
of months, Mobutu fled and his corrupt regime collapsed, surprisingly without much 
resistance. Some saw this conflict as a Banyamulenge war.117 The statement by the 
then provincial authorities118 which required Banyamulenge community members, 
estimated at around 300 000, to leave Zaire within a week is regarded as the event that 
                                                 
113 G Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 192-193).  
114 Since the assassination of Lumumba on 17 January 1961, Kabila led different rebellions in the 
Eastern part of the Congo. In order to survive he ran small businesses in neighboring countries. See A 
Mbata „The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the protection of rights under the 
African Charter‟ (2003) African Human Rights Law Journal 235, 236.  
115 A Mbata (note 114 above). 
116 Convinced by the French of concerns relating to the war in Zaire and the need to send a 
multinational force, Koffi Anan faced opposition from America and Britain in the UN Security Council 
meeting held on 10 and 11 March 1997. See T R Essolomwa Nkoy (note 107 above; 161). 
117 T R Essolomwa (note 107 above; 141). The term Banyamulenge was first used in 1976 by Gisaro 
Muhoza as a designation for Tutsi warrior farmers of Rwandan origin (banyarwanda) who migrated to 
certain parts of DRC at different periods of time. The expression was drawn from a small Congolese 
village Mulenge, a locality of the Kigoma group in collectivité-Chefferie of Bafuliru, in the territory of 
Uvira, District of South, Province of South Kivu where the traditional authority of Bafuliro had 
installed some of them in 1921. The Banyamulenge are Tutsi farmers and warriors; most of their young 
people in exile have received military training in Uganda and enlisted in the ARR. See T Ngoy (note 8 
above; 132-133). From time to time in the history of Congo there have been clashes between the 
Banyamulenge and other indigenous tribes such the Babembe and others. However the Congo has more 
than 200 ethnic groups which have all been subjected to tension and fighting. Interethnic conflict in the 
DRC is instrumental to politicians who use it to advance their own political agenda at the expense of 
the population. See N Obotela Rashidi „Ethnicité et géopolitique identitaire en République 
démocratique du Congo‟in Elections, Paix et Développement en  République Démocratique du Congo 
(2007) 37-46; O Ndeshyo Rurihose „Préface‟ in Hakiza Rukatsi, B. L`intégration des immigres au 
Zaïre le cas de personnes originaires du Rwanda (2004) 11-13. 
118  The Deputy Governor of the South Kivu Province Lwabanji. 
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triggered the escalation of the violence. Instead of leaving, the Banyamulenge decided 
to resist, and counter attack. They directed their assault against the Lemera Hospital 
on 10 October 1996 in South Kivu. Together with Kabila, they took up arms under the 
auspices of the armed movement under the umbrella body, the Alliance of Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL).119  
 
From 21 October 1996, these armed forces advanced rapidly and reached important 
and strategic regions. Several villages, cities, towns and provinces120 fell into the 
hands of the rebels. In a short period of time they reached Kindu, situated 
approximately 320 kilometers from the rebellion‟s starting point, and finally attained 
Kinshasa, about 2 000 kilometers further on, to realize their ultimate goal.121  
 
However, a simple internal Banyamulenge rebellion does not explain how and where 
the rebels could get the human, financial, technical, logistic means to run and win 
such a war so easily. Moreover, even if the Banyamulenge theories122 are correct, it 
appears that Banyamulenge became a pretext, which was instrumentalized for an 
external end. It served to mask an external invasion. 
 
Therefore, it was clear that, supported by certain western and African countries 
Rwanda and Uganda had evaded an independent country, Zaire.123 Even though they 
denied this at first, they admitted124 later to having sent military troops into Zaire, but 
claimed that this was due to the need to ensure security on the Congo‟s eastern 
                                                 
119 AFDL (or ADFL Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre comprised 
primarily four opposition forces, Kabila (PRP) Parti Pour la Révolution du Peuple, The Conseil de la 
Résistance pour la Démocratie (CRD) led by A K Ngandu, The Mouvement Révolutionnaire pour la 
libération du Zaire (MRLZ) led by Masasu Nindaga, and the Alliance Démocratique des peuples 
(ADP) led by Deogratias Bugera. However K C Dunn observes that the rebels were actually a loose 
alliance of several opposition forces which were largely orchestrated by the Kagame regime in 
Rwanda. See K C Dunn „Lessons of the father, passed down to the son‟ in J F Clark (ed) The African 
stakes of the Congo war (2002) 53, 56. 
120 Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Bunia, Walikale, Butembo and Lubero etc see H Solomon, „Recent 
initiatives in addressing gender violence in South Africa: some reflections on the crisis in Zaire‟ (1997) 
available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/Paper_15.pdf, accessed on 05 April 2011.  
121 Ibidem. 
122 T R Essolomwa Nkoy (note 107above; 71, 99 & 122); Kevin C Dunn (note 119 above; 53, 55-56); 
Y Tandon „Globalization & the Great Lakes regional crisis‟ in M Baregu (ed) Crisis in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo 42, 44-45 (42-45). 
123 Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi were directly cited as implicated in this war. However, according to 
H Ngbanda, Chad, Eritrea and  Angola were  also involved (note 4 above; 25); and  P Biyoya adds to 
that list – Tanzania, South  Africa and Zimbabwe (note 103 above; 89). 
124 Kevin C Dunn (note 122 above; 56-57); Sabiti Makara „An assessment of Ugandan foreign policy 
on the DRC‟ in Baregu (ed) Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 125-128. 
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borders. Meanwhile they were at Kinshasa, more than 2 000 kilometres to the west. 
The legal basis of this argument was very weak, as shall be demonstrated. 
 
To others, the war was a liberation war, since it aimed to end the long, oppressive 
Mobutu regime and heal Zaire. This explains the civilian population‟s support and 
low resistance against the older rebel, Kabila. For Essolomwa125 the Eastern War, as it 
was known at the beginning, became a liberation war par la force de chose.  
 
The situation in the former Zaire could be considered one of the best illustrations of 
the current African illness. The Mobutu regime was founded on corruption, 
kleptocracy, nepotism, ethnic violence, foreign interference, a crisis of democracy, 
and mismanagement of the country‟s economic fabric and environment. As noted by 
Solomon, “It is thus important to understand the unfolding crisis in Zairian state: as a 
microcosm reflecting the larger continent‟s problems, understanding Zaire means 
understanding Africa”.126  
 
However this war brought not only so-called liberation, but numerous crises and 
human misery. According to numerous sources, hundreds of thousands of Hutu 
refugees installed in the Eastern Camps of the Congo were massacred.127 
 
The failure to promote the rule of law and the numerous contradictions which 






                                                 
125 T R Essolomwa Nkoy (note 107 above; 5). 
126 H Solomon (note 120 above). 
127 May we heal genocide wound by another genocide? The estimated number killed in this counter 
genocide is more than 200,000. See Young (note 103 above; 13). The Rwandan Patriot Army and its 
western allies created a climate of terror among the Zairian civilian population. Massacres, violence, 
arbitrary executions, humiliation, assassinations, amputations, persecution, and the displacement of 
village populations were the order of the day. Charles Onana in préface H Ngbanda Nzambo Crimes 
organisés en Afrique centrale, révélations sur les réseaux rwandais et occidentaux (2004) 5 
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2.2.2 The Second War, 1998-2002 
 
Fourteen months after the fall of the Mobutu regime, Zaire, renamed the DRC, 
plunged anew in a terrible war for so-called liberation again, this time from the newly 
established dictatorship. 
 
The contentions of the parties can be summarized as follows:128 On one hand the 
supporters of the Kabila regime asserted that there was a Rwandan and Ugandan 
military invasion of the DRC territory. To mask this foreign aggression, the invader 
put in place a puppet rebellion. This invasion and false rebellion derailed the 
democratization process which was on track – it was too early to assess Kabila‟s 
unwillingness to set up democracy; there were no mistakes on Kabila‟s side, which 
could justify such a violent overthrow; the dispute could be resolved peacefully 
instead of resorting to armed violence; the legitimate government must be supported 
to defeat and avoid its removal by force. 
 
On the other hand, Kabila‟s opponents pointed out that the Congolese conflict was 
basically domestic and did not need foreign forces; the conflict was a result of the 
absence of a democratic programme. There was no political freedom. Kabila was a 
totalitarian and the Kabila regime was not democratic but dictatorial; there was a need 
to stop this despotic trend by using all means necessary to topple the regime.129 
 
While the Kabila regime may have failed to implement the recommendations of the 
CNS (1991-1992) regarding political rights,130 and forbad political parties from 
functioning, in regard to international law none of the arguments advanced above can 
justify such deadly war. Symptomatic of this is that, in contrast to the first war, the 
population was in general hostile to the famous war against dictatorship.  
 
                                                 
128 See M Baregu Preface of Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo i-v. 
129 M Baregu (note 128 above). 
130 Although political support was given initially to Kabila‟s rebellion, the leader of the opposition E 
Tsthisekedi wa Mulumba (and historical political party UDPS Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès 
Social) was arrested and exiled to his mother province of Kasai Oriental. Others opposition members 
such as Arthur Z`ahidi Ngoma and Joseph Olengankoy were arrested and sent to jail. 
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As stated by Afoaku the armed conflict, which erupted on 2 August 1998, virtually 
months after the fall of the Mobutu Regime “heralded the beginning of the second war 
of liberation in the DRC, this time against the regime of Laurent Kabila”.131 
 
Kabila‟s former partners, the Banyamulenga, had turned against him, protesting 
against bad governance and the establishment of a banana republic.Supported by 
neighboring countries, notably Rwanda and Uganda, rebels put into place structures 
such as the RCD132 and later MLC133 to organize their struggle.134 
 
According to Nzongola,135 Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi exploited the institutional 
instability and the crisis in the armed forces to “create territorial spheres of interest 
within which they could plunder the Congo „riches‟”.136 But, since Kabila refused to 
support their agenda any longer, they looked to hide their unlawful intervention in the 
DRC by establishing a false rebellion, which would protect their economic and 
security interests in Eastern DRC.137  
 
Some considered that the anti-Kabila rebellion had been artificially created by the 
Rwandan and Ugandan authorities, whose hostility toward Kabila‟s politics was 
exacerbated by an ambiguous understanding of national interests. Furthermore the 
suppression of civil and political rights by the then Kinshasa authorities facilitated the 
                                                 
131 Osita Afoaku „Congo‟s Rebels: their origins, motivations, and strategies‟ in J F Clark (ed) The 
African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 109.  
132 The RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (Congolese Rally for Democracy) had 
been divided into several other rebel movements, namely RCD-National, RCD- Mouvement de 
Libération.  
133 The MLC Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo).  
134 A Mbata (note 114 above; 236-237). 
135 G Nzongola-Ntalaja ( note 109 above; 227). 
136 Ibidem. 
137 Relating to the rationale behind several illegal interventions of Rwanda and Uganda and even 
Burundi in the DRC there are numerous theories: Demographic – those countries are overpopulated, 
their respective Tutsi leaders entertained a dream to build a vast empire Hima-Tutsi in the Great lakes 
region between Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and east of the DRC; Economic – there are no natural 
resources and agriculture is the principal economic activity; Security – a fear of rebel attacks from the 
borders of neighboring countries. For many their lust of DRC natural resources is obvious because their 
armed forces had controlled all the territory of the DRC for several months. Why did they not during 
that time, end the rebellion? Illegal exploitation and plundering of  Congo was manifest. Beyond 
Rwanda and Uganda, this pillage benefited other persons and countries. See M Koyame and J F Clark 
„The economic impact of the Congo war‟ 12-223 and T Longman „The complex reasons for Rwanda‟s 
engagement in Congo‟ 129-141, 144 and J F Clark „Museveni‟s adventure in the Congo war‟ in J F 
Clark (ed) The African stakes of the Congo war (2002) 145-161, 165); T R Essolomwa (note 107 
above; 132-134). 
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advent of opposition, whether armed or non-armed, on a national level.138 Therefore 
instead of simply being military support for a Congolese rebellion to end the Kabila 
regime, the Rwandan and Ugandan intervention in Congo was considered in general 
as truly a conspiracy, which had been conceived several months139 before the 
outbreak of the second war on 2 August 1998. Hence: “Kabila‟s decision in July 1998 
to dismiss the Rwandan contingent of FAC140 thus served as a catalyst to a crisis that 
was already underway”.141  
 
As Nzogola remarks, three factors were instrumental in the Congo aggression. Firstly, 
the eruption of conflict on 2 August 1998 was cleverly depicted as an internal war in 
which neighboring countries were involved on the rebels‟ side merely to secure their 
own borders. Secondly, unconditional Anglo-American support to Rwanda and 
Uganda politics contributed significantly to the indifference of other members of 
international community. Thirdly, “the logic of plunder in the new era of 
globalization, which has to do with the growing tendency of states, Mafia groups, 
offshore banks and transnational mining companies to enrich themselves from 
crises”.142  
 
This resistance of Kabila to any kind of neo-colonialism from his neighboring 
countries and western powers exploded in a tragic, deadly conflict, the worst since the 
Second World War. Numerous actors including, states, non-states, and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental forces were involved. The lust for riches 
would transform the DRC into a theatre of conflict between six armies of African 
countries143 and several armed groups, which would lead to the occupation on 31 
August of virtually 60% of national territory. Mbata writes that “This conflict is 
probably the most important crisis Africa has experienced in its post-colonial history, 
                                                 
138 Osita Afoaku (note 131 above; 109). 
139 According to Nzongola-Ntalaja in February 1998 there were several suspect military activities in 
different countries of the Great Lakes Regions and suspicious contact between some members of 
AFDL and neighboring countries. See G Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 227). 
140 FAC: Forces Armées Congolaises (Congolese Armed Forces). 
141 Osita Afoaku (note 131 above; 109). 
142 Nzongola-Ntalaja  (note 109 above; 227). 
143 According to Mbata, the most recent conflict in the DRC involved several foreign rebel groups 
allegedly based in the DRC and launching attacks against their respective governments. At the climax 
of the conflict, at least seven other African countries had regular troops in the DRC. Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, and Chad lent support to President Kabila, while Rwanda, and Uganda backed the rebels. 
See A Mbata (note 114 above; 237).  
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and one of the most complex and perplexing events that the post-Cold War world has 
seen,” with effects beyond the sub-region to afflict the continent of Africa as a 
whole”.144 
 
Regarding the geo-strategic position of the DRC, the extent of the alliance and its 
implications, some classify this conflict as the first African world war.145 In addition 
this armed conflict has been labeled as liberation, rectification, internal, international, 
mixed, imperialistic, hegemonic, irredentist, opportunistic, economic, and invasion.146 
 
Examining the recent armed conflict in Congo, Mamdani concluded that it was purely 
and simply aggression147 which was the source of all kinds of crime and violations of 
the law. There is no doubt that the nexus between war and the law is one of the most 
internal contradictions of humankind. 
 
Whatever the causes, the results of that horrible war were dramatic and unacceptable. 
 
2.2.3 The outcomes and consequences of wars in the DRC 
 
The unjust wars in the DRC had dramatic and incalculable consequences. 
 
These included the deaths of several millions Congolese caused directly or indirectly 
by conflict, environmental pollution and destruction, the systematic looting of 
numerous natural resources, the pillage and demolition of basic and economic 
infrastructure, an escalation of a culture of hatred and violence, and political 
instability and insecurity. Obviously it is not possible here to assess all aspects of the 
„first African World War‟, in terms of short, medium and long term (in time and 
space) aspects. Such endeavor may require a new special study.  
                                                 
144 A Mbata (note114 above; 237); D W Nabudere „The continental nature of the conflict in the DRC‟ 
in M Baregu (ed) Crisis in the Republic Democratic of Congo (1999) 79-81. 
145 Y Bangura „Comments on regional security and the war in Congo‟, in M Baregu (ed) Crisis in the 
Republic Democratic of Congo (1999) (10); A Mbata (note 114 above). 
146 Analyzing the role of external actors in conflict in DRC P Biyoya observed that the Congo has been 
the theatre for numerous armed conflicts and local, regional, international and world political 
conflicts(note 103 above;89);  M Baregu „The DRC war and the Second Scramble for Africa‟ in M 
Baregu (ed) Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999; 36-41). 
147 M Mamdani „From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ in M Baregu Crisis in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1999) 45-48. 
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However the following extract148 of the testimony on the suffering and despair 
relating to the humanitarian crisis in the Congo given on 17 May 2001 before the 
Subcommittee on International Operations and Humans Rights of the Committee on 
International Relations of US House of Representatives is insightful: 
 
A few reports by international agencies have documented the extent of this 
humanitarian disaster. In a recently released report following a survey of death rates 
in Eastern Congo, the International Rescue Committee concludes that the death rate 
due to the conflict in Eastern Congo is “shockingly high”. It estimates the number of 
excess deaths since the beginning of current war at 2.5 million, of which 350,000 
were deaths since the beginning of the current war at 2.5 million, of which 350,000 
were deaths directly resulting from the violence. A UN official, Ms Caroline 
McAskie of the Office of Humanitarian Coordination stated during a meeting of the 
UN Security Council that about 16 million people, or about a third of the DRC‟s total 
population, are directly affected and impacted by fighting. 
 
Among some of the most atrocious consequences of this war on the civilian 
population are:  
 
A series of massacres occurred, among which the massacre at Kasika is most often 
talked about (1 099 casualties, all civilians). Other massacres have been committed in 
Makobola, Lusenda, Kilungutwe, Kamituga and Katogota.  
 
Internal displacement of the civilian population: for instance, entire villages are 
displaced and continually in motion between Bukavu and Kindu, fleeing from the 
terror of war. By our estimates, at least 1.5 million Congolese are internally displaced 
as a result of the war.  
 
Far from their houses and fields, the civilian population dispersed in the dense 
equatorial forest are left without food, medicines, drinking water, and exposed to all 
sorts of epidemic outbursts and inclement weather conditions. 
 
                                                 
148 J B Bahala „Suffering and despair: humanitarian crisis in the Congo‟ available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa72638.000/hfa72638_0f.htm, accessed on 10 July 
2011. 
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The war has occasioned the crumbling of the educational system, with extremely 
high school dropout rates, and these youths being recruited into militias, and other 
armed groups.  
 
As confirmed by Congressman Frank Wolf who visited the region in January 2001, 
the situation of women is particularly precarious. “Women live in fear. Soldiers – 
regardless of whom they owe allegiance to – often treat them as prey. I heard horrific 
stories of rape, abuse and torture. Women are being raped in front of their husbands 
and children. One woman had her hands cut off after being raped; she now has a 
child she cannot care for. We were told that just two days before I arrived in Bukavu, 
a woman was raped in the marketplace at 10 a.m. and no one intervened”. 
 
As a result of this widespread use of sexual violence, the spread of AIDS is a real 
concern, especially since it is said that 70% of soldiers fighting in Congo are HIV 
positive and have been accused of raping women indiscriminately.149 Congolese 
human rights groups have documented hundreds of cases of rape perpetrated by 
soldiers. 
 
Human Rights Watch even reported on a case of a Congolese woman being raped 
and forced to stand in a pit full of water in which a dead infant (foetus) was already 
floating from another woman who had miscarried earlier during her torture. 
 
In a recent article analyzing the chaotic situation resulting from the wars in the DRC, 
Kristof150 notes that the indifference of the international community is questionable, 
considering the repugnance which greeted events such as the Holocaust, that caused 
the brutal killing of six million Jews. No one could imagine that another holocaust or 
similar massacres might be tolerated. The atrocities perpetrated during the recent 
conflict in the Congo are in many respects comparable with and even worse than151 
the Holocaust. “A peer-reviewed study put the Congo war‟s death toll at 5.4 million 
as of April 2007 and rising at 45,000 a month. That would leave the total today, after 
a dozen years, at 6.9 million”.152 
                                                 
149 T Ngoy notes how rape by HIV positive soldiers was used as weapon against Congolese women to 
propagate disease (Note 8 above; 179).  
150 N D Kristof (note 14 above). 
151 Considering the time frame and the number killed. 
152 “What those numbers don‟t capture is the way Congo has become the world capital of rape, torture 
and mutilation” see N D Kristof (note 14 above). 
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It is unbelievable that those events took place under the eye of the international 
community, which did little to prevent the Congo war from gaining a world record in 
terms of atrocities.153 
 
Prendergast notes that the Congolese war is estimated to have led to the deaths of 
three million people since 1996. No conflict since World War Two has produced as 
many casualties.154 
 
This had led some155 to wonder if lust and greed for Congo minerals resources may be 
what underlies such a massive killing of Congolese people. Exploitation156 of those 
riches could enhance the development of many countries across and beyond the 
African continent. Instead of orthodox exploitation, there is an endless cycle of 
conflicts, which are internationally renowned for their gross and systematic breach of 
the rule of law. 
 
2.3 Breaches of the rule of law 
 
There have been grave violations of national as well as international law by the 
different parties. Grotius157 observed that: “Peace is glorious and advantageous, when 
we give it in our Prosperity; it is better and safer, than a hoped-for Victory. For [we] 
must consider, that the success of War … is uncertain”. War and the law are naturally 
contradictory. If the law can regulate war, it is merely to reduce its negative effects, 
for war by nature is lawless. This is why, in accordance with international modern 
law, war must be outlawed anytime and everywhere. 
 
                                                 
153 See N D Kristof and Jewish Rabbis (note 14 above). According to a US medical report 1,100 
women are raped every day. For more read France 24 International News „1,100 women raped every 
day‟ (11 May 2011) available at http://www.france24.com/en/20110511-thousand-1100-women-raped-
every-day-american-public-health-report-un-democratic-republic-congo, accessed on 10 June 2011. 
154 A Jolie & J Prendergast (note 42 above). 
155 Charles Onana (note 127 above); C Braeckman Les nouveaux prédateurs: politiques des puissances 
en Afrique centrale (2003) passim. 
156 Memorandum of Congolese priests to the UN in J-P Fofe Djofia Malewa La Cour Pénale 
Internationale: une institution nécessaire aux pays des Grands Lacs Africains (2006) 98-99. 
157 H Grotius (note 49 above) Book III 1641. 
 40 
In the DRC, the violations of law caused by those armed conflicts fueled by numerous 
actors (local, regional international) were a daily reality. 
 
At a national level, several pertinent provisions of constitutional, criminal, civil, 
economical and social law were widely violated. Mbata158 notes that the conflict 
resulted in the violation of almost all the rights in the African Charter. 
 
On the international level there was violation of international law and its different 
branches, notably human rights and international humanitarian law. 
 
 
2.3.1 Breaches of the core principles of international law 
 
One of most important characteristics of international law is its conventional aspect, 
however it is founded on a certain core of norms regarded as imperative (yus cogens) 
for all states. Amongst these sacrosanct principles of the law of nations are:  
 co-operation;  
 pacific settlement of disputes;  
 non-resource to force;  
 non-interference in the domestic affairs of a state; and 
 respect of territorial integrity.159 
 
Those responsible for the conflict in the Congo seem to have ignored these principles, 
which everybody is presumed to know.  
 
An analysis of the first war (1996-97) under the lens of international law reveals a 
flagrant violation of international law. 
 
The wide engagement on Zairian territory of armies of foreign countries was obvious. 
At first, it was hidden behind rebellion but later the presence of non-invited armies in 
the DRC was incontestable. The authors of the war took advantage of internal 
                                                 
158 A Mbata (note 114 above). 
159 See articles 1 & 2 of Kellog-Briand Pact of 1929; Preamble and Article 2 (1)(3)(4) of the UN 
Charter, article 4 (b) (e) (f) (g) (i) (p) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 
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opposition to foment an aggressive war on behalf of a puppet rebellion. Therefore the 
integrity of the territory of a sovereign member of the UN was violated under the 
screen of an indifferent and politicized international community without any public 
condemnation or any official denunciation, even from the UN.160  
 
That this was an act of aggression is clear. When the war erupted in 1996, Kabila did 
not appear to have his own independent, well-oiled resistance movement, which could 
deliver a plan for the political liberation of the entire country. The process which led 
him to take power was handled from outside. Most ordinary Congolese citizens didn‟t 
comprehend the different forces operating at regional level. The creation of the AFDL 
after the eruption of the war illustrates the involvement of external forces.161 
 
General Kagame himself has admitted and boasted about the important role Rwanda 
played in the 1996-97 war.162 
 
Essolomwa noted that the war was perceived initially and correctly as a Tutsi plot, as 
well as external aggression on the part of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda supported by 
the Western powers.163 
 
Even though internal opposition might have existed, external aggression played a 
significant role. There is a tendency in the countries of Great Lakes Region to 
consider that “their internal problems are generated by external interference. 
However, what has occurred in the Congo is an invasion not just a case of 
interference”.164 
 
The eruption of another war (1998-2002) of liberation or rectification a few months 
later clearly demonstrated the strategies of aggression and the unlawful nature of 
those wars.  
 
                                                 
160 T Ngoy (note 8 above; 173). 
161 G Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 225). He notes that the AFDL was created on 18 October 
1996 at Lemera in South Kivu, roughly two months after the beginning of the attack from Rwanda. 
162 G Nzongola-Ntalaja (note 109 above; 226). 
163 T R Essolomwa (note 107 above; 5). 
164 M Mamdani (note 147 above; 45-47). 
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Analyzing the complex reasons for Rwanda‟s engagement during the Second Congo 
War, Timothy Longman remarked on the sense of entitlement and invincibility, which 
marked the Rwandan military intervention. The blinding triumphalism within 
members of the RPF staff affected even Tutsi perceptions. Arrogance spurred the RPF 
to action, which resulted in horrendous consequences and fuelled the “anti-Tutsi 
sentiments, as well as for other Congolese who have supported the two rebellions. 
This arrogance of power also contributed to the eventual break between Rwanda and 
Uganda, as ultimately RPF leaders could not usurp the role of puppet master that they 
rightly saw as their own”.165 
 
Rwanda and Uganda argued that their motive was security of their borders. However, 
this argument cannot be advanced endlessly for, as Bahala166 notes, during the first 
war the Rwandan forces took control of all the Congo‟s territory, so that they could 
secure their borders if they really wanted to.  
 
The legal argument of right of hot pursuit upon which Rwandan and Ugandan military 
intervention in the DRC was supposedly based is very debatable in international law 
and cannot justify such repetitive cross-border raids. Indeed the right of hot pursuit is 
related to law of the sea and not on the land. Article 111 (1) of the United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 states: “The hot pursuit of a 
foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State 
have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that 
State”. Arising from the violation of laws in maritime zones, the coastal States may 
rightly pursue and arrest that ship on the high seas. As Mbata asserts, the Rwanda and 
Uganda‟s use of „right of hot pursuit‟ was unfortunate and a misuse of the term.167 
Dugard concludes that the right of “hot pursuit on land is not recognized by 
international law. If a state wishes to justify cross-border raids, it must do so in terms 
of the right of self-defence or possibly, reasonable reprisal action”.168 There is no use 
in analyzing in-depth reprisals because their illegality in international law is clear.  
 
                                                 
165 T Longman „The complex reasons for Rwanda‟s engagement in Congo‟ in J F Clark (ed The African 
stakes of the Congo war (2002) 129-139. 
166 J B Bahala (note 148 above). 
167 A Mbata (note 114 above; 241). 
168 J Dugard et al. (note 48 above; 511). 
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As for the self-defence argument, or even so called „anticipatory self-defence‟, none 
of those arguments can “be used to justify the occupation of the Congolese territory, 
the exploitation of the Congolese natural resources, the commission of gross human 
rights violations and the establishment of a puppet government in Kinshasa under the 
false pretences of helping the Congolese people to establish democracy”.169 
 
Indeed, with regards to the state of war in the DRC the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1234 on 9 April 1999, in which it made a distinction between invited 
powers and non-invited powers and deplored the fact that combat was still going on. 
The Resolution proclaimed that the presence of foreign states‟ armed forces in the 
DRC was incompatible with the principle of the UN Charter and requested those 
states to remove their forces, which were non-invited. 
 
This UN Resolution did not use the term „aggression‟ to describe military action on 
the part of foreign armies against the DRC. However, the recognition that this was 
aggression was implicit in the Resolution. The use of foreign armies against the 
territorial integrity of a politically independent country was a flagrant violation of 
article 2 (2)-(4) of the UN Charter. Although the Security Council did not clearly 
recognize the aggression in terms of article 39 Chapter VII of the Charter, it remains 
evident that the element of aggression cannot be denied if we consider the relevant 
provisions of Resolution 3314 of the UN Assembly General of 14 December 1974. 
Among the acts that this Resolution considered acts of aggression is the use by a State 
of its armed forces against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political 
independence of another state or in any other manner incompatible with the UN 
Charter. 
 
The crime of aggression committed in the DRC by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi‟s 
armed forces is obvious. 
 
                                                 
169 A Mbata (note 114 above; 241). 
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This was confirmed in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court in its 
recent decision relating to the DRC v Uganda case (ICJ, 2005), in which the Court 
condemned Uganda for its illegal military activity in the DRC.170  
 
Aggression is a crime against peace and there is no doubt that it is the mother of all 
crimes. The collateral consequences of this illegal use of force are numerous and 
include inter alia grave violations of human right and international human rights law. 
2.3.2 Breaches of human rights 
 
In general, the situation regarding human rights in Africa is of great concern. In the 
DRC it was made worse by neocolonialism, the long Mobutu dictatorship and the two 
wars under discussion.  
 
During the conflict, the civilian population was systematically submitted to atrocious 
acts and perilous situations in violation of their human rights. 
 
Indeed, although international human rights law guarantees the protection of the rights 
of all people, everywhere at all times, most of the provisions of humans rights 
conventions were violated by different protagonists in the territory under their control. 
 
Individual as well as collective rights were violated. Civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights have been denied to the population of the DRC. Fundamental rights 
to life, to food, housing, health, freedom, justice, peace, development, and to a good 
environment were all trodden on. In terms of who was responsible for this state of 
affairs, many violations may be attributed to Government, RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-
ML, and UPC.171 
 
                                                 
170 See DRC v Uganda case (ICJ, 2005) 280, 116 available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf, accessed on 24 March 2011. 
171D Kalindye Byanjira Civisme, développement et des droits de l’homme conditions d’instauration 
d’un Etat de droit en République Démocratique du Congo (2003) 18-19; M Sassoli & A Bouvier Un 
droit dans la guerre? Vol. 2 (2003) 1698-1699. 
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The situation of women and children was extremely grave. Women and children 
belong to a special category of vulnerable people and a number of Conventions 
recommend their protection.172 
 
Women were regarded as prey and were terribly abused.173 Without any distinction in 
terms of age tens of thousands of women were raped and are still being raped by 
members of the different armed forces. Those rapes resulted in numerous cases of 
fistulae and the dissemination of sexual transmitted infections. The violence used 
against women in Congo took a particular form, as it was used as war weapon; this 
meant that women were double victims of the war.174 
 
Children were killed, while others were abandoned in the streets without any kind of 
protection and assistance, deprived of their right to fundamental education, and worst 
still, enlisted in the armed forces.175 
 
Relating to this situation, the “Inventory made by UN of the most serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the 
DRC between March 1993 and June 2003” is very insightful. The Report noted 782 
cases, of which the team was able to verify 71% (563),176 which were confirmed 
quasi-entirely.177 While the violence was particularly intense in the eastern part of the 
country, several incidents occurred in the west, north and south involving the arbitrary 
detention and summary execution of several people, pillaging and looting (e.g. in 
Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Kinshasa, Kisangani, Anthropophagy).178 
 
The Mapping Report concluded that this period was 
 
                                                 
172 J G Gardam & M J Jarvis  Women, armed conflict and international law (2001) 53-87, 135-175. 
173 S Kirchner (note 13 above). 
174 L Banza Mbombo & C Hemedi Bayolo Conflits armes en R.D. Congo: violences sexuelles contre 
les femme,crimes sans châtiment 2001-2004 (2004) 24, 25. 
175 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 324-332). 
176 For several reasons, including difficulty in gaining access to the place where the crime was 
committed, time constraints, and lack of testimonies, 29% (219) incidents were not covered. Mapping 
Report 45. 
177 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 44). 
178 L Banza Mbombo & C Hemedi Bayolo (note 174 above; 28-39). 
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... one of the most tragic chapters in the recent history of  the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), if not the whole of Africa. Indeed, the decade was marked by a string 
of major political crises, wars and multiple ethnic and religious conflicts that brought 
about the deaths of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people. Very few 
Congolese and foreign civilians living on the territory of the DRC managed to escape 
the violence, and were victims of murder, maiming, rape, forced displacement, 
pillage, destruction of property or economic and social rights violations.179  
 
Numerous other crimes were perpetrated directly by armed forces against the non-
combatant population and civilian installations during the hostilities in flagrant 
violation of the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols. 
 
 
2.3.3 Breaches of international humanitarian law (war crimes) 
 
The laws on international human rights must be respected at all times. Furthermore, 
during warfare all the parties to the conflict are specifically bound to scrupulously 
respect the rule of international humanitarian law as proclaimed in the Geneva 
Conventions and established in international custom, state practice and the decisions 
of judicial bodies. 
 
During the conflicts in the DRC, little effort was made by the fighting forces to 
protect non-combatants and to distinguish civilians from the military, as required by 
international humanitarian law.  
 
Several of the acts perpetrated can be classified as war crimes. 
 
For instance, it is reported that following incident took place: During the mobilization 
of the Uvira population, on 9 September 1996, in order to force the Tutsis from the 
former Zaire territory, a certain number of people, especially of Tutsi extract, namely 
the Banyamulenge were arrested by Mobutu‟s FAZ. Army members pillaged 
numerous civil and private institutions such as local churches and NGOs. The same 
                                                 
179 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 48). 
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army, in collaboration with young people, is accused of having executed 15 
Banyamulenge at the beginning of October 1996, in a village called Sange.180 
 
Far away from Uvira, in Kinshasa ill treatment was observed against people from 
Rwanda, especially the Tutsi, during October 1996, while students were 
demonstrating against the Rwandans presence in the former Zaire.181  
 
At Lemera, in South Kivu, on 6 October 1996, the Banyamulenge rebels attacked a 
hospital and randomly killed around 30 people. Several civilians and soldiers who 
were hospitalized lost their lives. On 1 and 2 November 1998 in the neighboring area 
of Burundi Border, the coalition of armed forces consisting of AFDL, APR, and FAB 
carried out indiscriminate killing at Ndunda. Roughly 250 people were killed, mostly 
refugees and civilians.182 
 
On 22 April 1997, AFDL/APR units allegedly opened fire indiscriminately on the 
Biaro refugee camp, killing close to 100 people, including women and children. 
The soldiers then went in pursuit of those who had managed to escape into the 
forest, killing an unknown number of them. They also requisitioned a bulldozer 
from a Kisangani-based logging company to dig mass graves. Witnesses saw 
AFDL/APR units transporting wood in trucks. This wood was then used to build 
pyres and burn the bodies.183 
 
Several others act in violation of law and the customs of war were committed, which 
will long remain in the memory of the Congolese people, such as the killing of the 
Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Christophe Munzihirwa on 29 October 1997; the 
attack on the Inga hydro electric power plan by armed forces and the power station in 
Bas-Congo on August 1998; the massacre of hundreds of military at Kavumu on 4 
                                                 
180 UNOHCRH  (note 3 above; 73 and 75). 
181 Ibidem 77. 
182 Ibidem 75 and 83. According to the same sources, on the night of 25 to 26 October 1996, 
AFDL/APR soldiers bombarded the Kibumba camp with heavy weapons, allegedly killing an unknown 
number of refugees and destroying the camp‟s hospital. Around 194,000 refugees fled Kibumba and 
headed towards the Mugunga camp. 
183 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 109, 207, 224). These sources indicate further  that, in January 1997, 
AFDL/APR units killed at least thirty Rwandan and Burundian refugees, mostly with knives, on the 
Bukavu to Walungu road, around 16 kilometres from the city of Bukavu. The victims had been arrested 
as part of a mopping up operation. Before killing the victims, the soldiers often tortured and maimed 
them.  
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August 1998; the massacres at Kasika of more than 1300 people on 23 august 1998; at 
Makobola of at least 800 people in December 1999; the killing of several thousand 
Hema and Lendu in 2000; the indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population 
at Goma, Kisangani, Libenge, Uvira, and Zongo, which resulted in numerous deaths; 
violence against women and rape; and the enlistment of children in the armed 
forces.184 
 
There were gross and systematic violations of Conventions on the protection of 
children.  
 
All of these war crimes perpetrated against an innocent population are unacceptable 




It is regrettable that the OAU did not do enough to prevent the wars in the DRC.185 It 
is also obvious that grave crimes were committed on DRC territory during the wars 
and that these constituted a serious threat to peace and security, not only in the region 
but in the world as a whole. Thus the necessity of justice being seen to be done, is 
extremely important. 
 
Prior to analyzing what kind of justice can be pursued at an international level, it is 
pertinent to first examine what kind of justice can be delivered at the national level.  
                                                 
184 A Bulambo Katambu Mourir au Kivu: du génocide tutsi aux massacres dans l’Est du Congo-RDC 
(2001) 88-97; Migabo Kalere, Génocide au Congo? analyse des massacres des populations civiles 
(2002) 1-42; Médecins sans Frontières RD Congo, silence on meurt: témoignages (2002) 5-78; T Ngoy 
(note 8 above; 178-184); M Sassoli & A Bouvier (note 171 above; 1700-1701); L Banza Mbombo & C 
Hemedi Bayolo (note 174 above; 24-59). 
185 M Du Plessis (note 36 above; 546, 549). 
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Chapter 3: The jurisdiction of the Congolese judiciary to try 
war crimes 
 
“Historically, the prosecution of war crimes was generally restricted to the vanquished …. 
National justice systems have often proven themselves to be incapable of being balanced and 
impartial in such cases” (W A Schabas An introduction to International Criminal Court 2 ed 1). 
 
 
In the light of the numerous international crimes perpetrated in the DRC, which 
remain unpunished, this chapter examines the jurisdiction of the Congolese judiciary. 
An overview of the Congolese judicial machinery is provided, which sheds light on its 
organization, functioning and modus operandi, which will enable its merits and 
weakness to be assessed in terms of efficiency in the prosecution of war crimes.  
 
The structure and organization of Congolese judicial system will be presented first, 
followed by an examination of the jurisdiction and procedure to prosecute war crimes. 
Finally, the effectiveness of the Congolese judiciary in the fight against impunity for 
war crimes perpetrated in the country will be assessed.  
 
3.1 Origin and organization of the Congolese judicial system  
 
The judiciary as an institution is not a recent development in the DRC. Its origins can 
be traced back to pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial times. 
 
The pre-colonial period was characterized, essentially, by customary law.186 However, 
some written sources of law had existed centuries before, such as documents related 
to the diplomatic relations established between the Kongo Kingdom and the 
Portuguese and the Vatican (15th, 16th and 17th centuries). It seems, however, that 
                                                 
186 The system was grounded entirely on customs. “Prior to European occupation, the customary law of 
the Bantus consisted of a mixture of legislative enactments by the native rulers,of traditional tribal 
usages, and rules coming from decisions by natives tribunals.” J H Crabb The legal system of Congo-
Kinshasa (1970) 24. 
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writing was used more to communicate with Europe than to codify local customs for 
judicial purposes.187 
 
There was a distinction between the judicial jurisdiction and the political function 
even if not to the same degree as the well known principle of separation of powers of 
Charles de Secondat.188 Judges were appointed according to inter alia, their level of 
wisdom and credibility in society. The jurisdiction of tribunals was limited189 
depending on the human structures (clan, tribe, kingdom, empire). 
 
According to Crabb, “Where the tribal unit was cohesive, especially to the point of 
functioning as kingdoms and empires, systems of appeal existed, creating as many as 
four levels of courts”.190 
 
On their arrival the Europeans did not remove the traditional legal system they found; 
they kept it to manage the indigenous areas. 
 
But in preserving the customary law, the Europeans subordinated it to their own legal 
systems, which they added and superimposed on the country. Apart from minor and 
local considerations, the “public law” in the continental sense was entirely European, 
and customary law had little scope outside its traditional “private law” categories.191 
 
Apart from the customary law system in place, the advent of colonization (Leopold II 
1885-1908 and after this, Belgium 1908-60) brought the (new) written law to the 
Congo. The Congolese legal system was dualistic, a mixture of, on the one hand, 
customary law192 or indigenous law for the local population, and on the other hand 
                                                 
187 E Wamba dia Wamba „Relations Diplomatiques Du Royaume Kongo: Lecons A Tire‟ available at 
http://kimpavitapress.org/2009/02/relations-diplomatiques-du-royaume-kongo-lecons-a-tirer/, 
accessed on 28 May 2011; Mbelelo Ya Mpiko „L‟Écrit et son impact dans la communication 
interculturelle au Royaume Kongo au xviie siècle: le cas du catéchisme kikongo de 1624 (2004) 18e‟ 
Colloque international de bibliologie de l'Association internationale de Bibliologie available at 
http://www.aib.ulb.ac.be/colloques/2004-kinshasa/fulltext/12.pdf, accessed on 17 May 2011. 
188 Montesquieu De l`esprit des lois (1748) Deuxième Partie (1748) Livre XI a XI 53 available at 
http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/montesquieu/de_esprit_des_lois/partie_2/de_esprit_des_lois_2.ht
ml, accessed on 10 June 2011. 
189 J H Crabb (note 186 above; 24-24). 
190 Ibidem 25. 
191 Ibidem 27. 
192 See for instance, article1 of Ordinance of General Administrator of Congo of 14 May 1886 
regarding principles to apply in judicial decisions in Codes Larcier 262. 
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written law or European law for Europeans and others people assimilated with them. 
This situation continued until independence in 1960. After independence, alongside 
the new Constitution,193 Royal Decrees, ordinances, and legislative measures like 
Statutes and Acts were not abrogated and were still applicable. Although there is a 
strong legacy of written law and its institutions in the post-independence period, 
customary law has not disappeared from the Congolese judicial system. 
 
In article 207 (1) (2) of the Constitution of the Third Republic, the authority of the 
traditional194 customs is recognized, insofar as they do not contradict the Constitution, 
legislation, public policy and good conduct.  
 
While some efforts have been made to unify written and customary law, the influence 
and impact of the latter has declined195 as a consequence of Europeanization. For the 
purposes of this research project, it is deemed more appropriate to consider the 
Congolese written law (which can be classed as a Roman Dutch system).196 
 
It is worth noting that, “The techniques and institutions of the European or written law 
provide the form and direction for the legal systems as a whole of … society”.197 
There is a primacy of written law. 
 
3.1.1 The judicial apparatus  
 
Article 68 of the Constitution relating to the organization of powers in the DRC cites 
the courts and tribunals as part of the institutions of the Republic.198  
 
                                                 
193 Loi Fondamentale of May 19,1960 on the Structures and the Institutions in the Congo.  
194 See E Boshab Pouvoir et droit coutumiers à l`épreuve du temps (2007) passim. 
195 This does not mean that the customary law system which is different from customs is less important 
or condemned to perish, for the system is immutable but is adaptable to new trends in society and its 
decisions might be reported in written form to allow for its conservation and greater accessibility. See J 
H Crabb (note 186 above; 20-21); E Boshab (note 194 above). 
196 J H Crabb divides Africa into two categories, the former British area under Anglo-American Law 
(British variant) and the rest of the African countries under a civil law system. The written law applied 
in Congo was inspired by Belgian and Napoleonic French law J H Crabb( note 186 above; 30). 
197 J H Crabb (note 186 above; 29). 
198 See also part 3 of the Exposé des motifs of the Constitution  
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Indeed, the Congolese justice system, as provided in article 149 of the Constitution, is 
a complex judicial machinery whose critical mission is to render justice throughout 
the national territory on behalf of the Congolese people.199 
 
The judiciary is the guarantor of individual freedom and fundamental rights. When 
they exercise their function, judges are submitted under law as the only authority.200 
The political authorities are not allowed to interfere in the jurisdiction of a judicial 
magistrate to settle disputes or to oppose the execution of a justice decision. This 
applies equally to interference from members of Parliament. Hence any law, which 
aims to intervene in the course of judicial proceedings, is null and void.201  
 
The Statute of Magistrates is fixed by law202 and is managed by the Superior Judicial 
Council.203 
 
In accordance with article 149 (1) of the Constitution, the judicial power is 
independent of the legislative and executive powers. It devolves upon the following 
courts: the Constitutional Court, the Cassation Court, the State Counsel, the High 
Military Court, and the civil and military Courts and Tribunals. Since the revision of 
the Constitution of 20 January 2011, prosecutors appointed to all these jurisdictions 
are no longer permitted to exercise judicial power.204 This is the novel shape of the 
judiciary in the Congo ushered in by the current constitution, on 18 February 2006. 
                                                 
199 But the Decisions, Judgments and Ordinances of the Courts and Tribunals are executed in the name 
of the President of the Republic (article 149 of the Constitution). 
200 Article 150 of the Constitution. 
201 Article 151 of the Constitution. 
202 According to article 150 para 3 of the Constitution, the organic law regulates the magistrates‟ 
statute, see, Loi organique numéro 06/020 of 10 October 2006 relating to the magistrates‟ statute. 
203 Article 152 para 1 and 6 of the Constitution . The Superior Judicial Council is regulated by a 
statute. See, Loi organique numéro 08/013 of 05 August 2008 relating to the organization and 
functioning of the Superior Judicial Council. Article 152 of the Constitution provides that the Superior 
Judicial Council is composed of: 1. President of Constitutional Court; 2. Attorney General before the 
Constitutional Court; 3. First President of the Cassation Court; 4. Attorney General before the 
Cassation Court; 5. First President of State Council; 6. Attorney General before the State Council; 7. 
First President of High military court; 8. Judge advocate General before the High Military Court; 9. 
First President of Court of Appeal; 10. Attorneys General before the Court of Appeal; 11. First 
Presidents of Administrative Courts of Review; 12. Attorneys General before the Administrative 
Courts of Review; 13. First Presidents Military Court; 14. Superior Military prosecutors; 15. Two 
magistrates sitting in respect of each Court of Appeal , elected for a mandate of three years by other 
magistrates; 16. Two magistrates standing or prosecutor before the Appeal Court , elected for a 
mandate of three years by other magistrates; 17. One magistrate sitting for each military Court; and 18. 
One magistrate standing for each military Court. 
204 See the revision of article 149 of the Constitution of 20 January 2011. 
 53 
Contrary to the former constitutional provision there is no longer a system of courts, 
including one Supreme Court of Justice, a Court of Review, and Military Courts and 
Tribunals.205 
 
Currently there are, on the one hand, the jurisdictions of the „judicial‟ order and, on 
the other hand, the jurisdictions relating to the administrative order. 
 
The latter consists of a hierarchy as follows: A State Council located in the capital 
city (Kinshasa), an Administrative Court for each province206 and the administrative 
tribunals. Those jurisdictions are competent to settle administrative disputes.207 
 
In conformity with article 153 of the Constitution, the first order of jurisdiction is 
under the control of the Cassation Court and consists of civil and military 
jurisdictions. They apply duly ratified international treaties, laws, acts of 
administrative authority and customs, insofar as the latter conform to the laws and to 
the public policy of the State. The organization, functioning and the competences of 
jurisdictions of the judiciary order are determined by an organic law.208 
 
The Congolese judiciary is organized by the Code on Organization and Jurisdiction of 
the Judiciary of 31 March 1982.209 This provides for different levels of jurisdiction in 
the judicial system in the DRC. Thus, according to their degree of competence these 
are civil jurisdiction, the tribunal of peace, the tribunal of first instance, the court of 
review (appeal) and at the top, the Cassation Court.210 
                                                 
205See  article 148 (1) of the Transitional Constitution in DRC of 4 April 2003.  
206 Apart from Kinshasa, currently only 10 provinces are operational in the DRC, although there is a 
constitutional proposal to divided Congo territory in 25 provinces. See article 2 of the Constitution. 
207 See articles 154 and 155 of the Constitution. Most of these judiciary reforms introduced by the 
current constitution remain literal and are not yet applicable. Thus, the old judicial jurisdiction still 
exists. For instance, the jurisdiction of the State Council is actually exercised by the Supreme Court of 
Justice in its Administrative Division. 
208 Article 153 (6) of  the Constitution.  
209 The Code on organization and jurisdiction of the judiciary in Congo as created on 31 March 1982 by 
Ordonnance-Loi 82-020 of 31 March 1982 in Codes Larcier T I (2003) 262-273. This code is however 
outdated and needs to be adjusted to reflect the current judiciary reform in DRC. A new code has been 
proposed. For doctrinal commentary see Bayona-Ba-Meya „Initiation judiciaire‟1998 in Revue 
Interdisciplinaire Lukuni Lwa Yuma 9-18; P Akele Adau Le citoyen justicier, la justice privée dans 
l’Etat de droit (2002) passim; G Ngbanda Te Boyiko Précis d`organization et de competence 
judiciaries (2005) passim; D Zongwe, F Butedi & P M Clement „The legal system and research of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): an overview‟ available at 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Democratic_Republic_Congo1.htm, accessed on 10 June 2011.  
210 Articles 21, 31,  36 and 51 of the Congolese Code on Organization and Jurisdiction of Judiciary. 
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Relating to the concern of the present thesis, which is war crimes, this study focuses 
on the tribunals‟ statutory competence to exercise their jurisdictions to prosecute these 
crimes.  
 
A close examination of national criminal law211 reveals that in the DRC military 
jurisdictions remain the only competent jurisdiction to try war crimes.212 Hence, this 
research project specifically considers the military Courts and Tribunals as provided 
for in the Congolese judicial system. 
 
However it is important to note prima facie that, military jurisdictions are normally 
designed to try crimes committed by members of the Army and members of the 
National Police.213 In the criminal military code, another category made up of 
members of the national services namely the bâtisseurs de la nation is mentioned.214 
 
This jurisdiction of military justice is, however, problematic, because war crimes can 
be perpetrated not only by soldiers, but also by many others civilians involved in war 
at several levels and whose responsibility may be obvious in the occurrence of 
atrocities.  
 
The prosecution of these civilians for war crimes by a military court could be 
unconstitutional according to article 156 (1) and 19 (1) of the Constitution; for 
military justice will run the risk of violating the principle of natural justice for 
civilians. 
 
The prosecution of certain categories of war criminal (civilian) before a military 
tribunal might lead to irregularities. They should instead be brought before the civil 
justice authorities, except during a war or when the President of the Republic 
                                                 
211 See Ordinary Criminal Code created by Décret of 30 January 1940. In Codes Larcier T II (2003), 1-
23; Military Criminal Code created by Loi 024-2002 of 18 November 2002 in Codes Larcier T II 
(2003) 42- 60. 
212 Article 173 of the Military Criminal Code. 
213 Article 156 (1)  of the Constitution. 
214 Article 106 of Judiciary Military Code created by Loi 023-2002 of 18 November 2002 in Codes 
Lacier T I (2003) 393-421. 
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proclaims a state of siege or emergency.215 But even this situation can be perilous in 
terms of human rights. Hence, there is a need to reform the Congolese judicial system. 
 
According to the national legislation in the DRC, the jurisdictions competent to try 
international crimes in general and war crimes in particular remain the military 
Courts.216 
 
In conformity with articles 6, 12, 18, 21 and 23 of the judicial military code in the 
DRC, military justice is rendered by the High Military Court; the Military Courts and 
Operational Military Courts; the Military Tribunals of Garrison; and the Police 




The Congolese judiciary is made up of magistrates. The magisrature is split into two 
categories: judges (magistrature assise = sitting judges) and the Prosecutor 
(magistrature debout = standing judges). The last are organized in Parquet217 for civil 
magistrates, and in auditorat = Office of Judge Advocate for military magistrates. 
They are attached to each jurisdiction from the Police Military Tribunal to the High 
Military Court.218 However, according to article 17 (2) of Congolese Code on the 
organization and jurisdiction of judiciary, judges may exercise functions as both judge 
and prosecutor in the Tribunal of Peace. For a good understanding of the structure of 
military justice, it is important to consider the common Congolese judiciary, because 
certain general principles applicable in the military Court are drawn from the common 
Congolese code on the organization and jurisdiction of judiciary. This is asserted in 
article 2 (2) of the Judiciary Military Code.  
                                                 
215 Such a decision must result from an Ordinance deliberated in the Ministries Council and be 
submitted to the Constitutional Court for perusal of its constitutionality (article 45 of the Constitution). 
This decision may suspend the competence of common tribunals and courts to adjudicate certain 
crimes in all or part of the national territory for a period of time, and confer such competence on 
military jurisdictions (article 156 of the Constitution). 
216 According to article 161 of the Military Criminal Code, military judges are competent to try those 
responsible of crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  
217 The French word Parquet referred to the place where the Prosecutor was installed during a trial in 
France in ancient times see C Kabati Ntamulenga „La problématique de l`intervention du parquet dans 
le recouvrement de la créance‟(2009) 61, 68 in Paroles de Justice Revue Annuelle de Doctrine  
218 Articles 10 (3), 17 (1), 20 (2), 22 (3), 26, 40, 41 and 42 of the Judiciary Military Code. 
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Military judiciary personnel are constituted of magistrates, agents (functionaries) of 
judiciary order and agents of the judiciary police attached to the office of the 
Prosecutor. They have a military status.219  
 
Military magistrates can be listed as follows, for sitting military magistrates: 
First president, president and advisors of the High Military Court; first president, 
president and advisors of the Military Courts and the Military Operational Court; and 
presidents and judges of the Military Tribunal of Police. And for standing magistrates: 
Judge Advocate General of the armed forces; first general advocates of the armed 
forces; and general advocates of the armed forces; military superior prosecutors; 
general military advocates; substitutes of military superior prosecutors; prosecutors, 
first substitutes and substitutes of prosecutors.220 
 
Magistrates play a crucial role in the distribution of justice. To function effectively, 
they are dispatched at different levels of the judicial structure. Apart from magistrates, 
other officials make a significant contribution; amongst these are (greffiers = clerks), 
registrars, inspectors, judicial officers, police and other administrative personnel 
(huissiers = bailiffs), experts.221  
 
The interaction of all these agents with magistrates contributes to the functioning of 
justice. Although they are not members of the judiciary, barristers play a noble role in 
the better administration of justice. They are organized in a Bar Council at each 
Review Court and in a National Council Bar at national level.222 When they appear 
before the military justice system, the accused are assisted by registered barristers or 
                                                 
219 Article 2 of the Judiciary Military Code . 
220 Article 1 (2) of the Judiciary Military Code. 
221 Articles 53-64 of the Military Judiciary Code. A 2010 study provided statistics on military justice 
personnel as follows: Judges 112, Prosecutors 232, judicial police inspectors 265, Registrars 92, 
Secretaries 66, Bailiffs 44 with a total of 881. However this number needs to be updated due to the 
recent recruitment of new magistrates, which will hopefully resolve the problem of the shortage of 
magistrates in the Congo. See, M Wetsh‟okonda Koso „Democratic Republic of Congo military justice 
and human rights: an urgent need to complete reforms‟ (2010) 61-62 available at 
http://afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_DRC-MilitaryJustice_full_EN.pdf, accessed on 24 
March 2011. 
222 See article 4 of Ordonnance-Loi 79-028 of 28 September 1979 relating to bar organisation and body 
of défenseurs judiciaires  in Code Larcier VI (2003) 308, 318. 
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défenseurs judiciaries or military officials approved by the president of the 
jurisdiction.223 
 
The military tribunals and courts are tasked with prosecuting and convicting 
individuals who have infringed the military criminal code in conformity with article 
39 book II. Among others crimes, which are punishable in terms of this code are 
crimes of genocide, and war crimes.224 
 
In the DRC the military jurisdiction is organized according to degree of competence 
as described below.  
 
3.1.2.1 High Military Court  
 
The Court comprises two or several Chambers, which may be composed of five 
members amongst which are two career magistrates or three in the case of an appeal. 
The jurisdiction of the Court is extended to the entire national territory.225 
 
This Court adjudicates in the first and last resort certain categories of high-ranking 
military and police officers, military magistrates, and other high-ranking personnel 
who are officers in the Congolese army.226 It is the jurisdiction of appeal for decisions 
rendered in a Military Court. The decision of the High Military Court is not 
susceptible to appeal but rather opposition, as provided for in ordinary jurisdictions.227  
 
This High Military Court can correct or rectify material errors contained in its 
decisions. However in a case where they violate the Constitution, an application for 
recourse may be lodged against them before the Constitutional Court. The latter is not 
yet established; hence the current Supreme Court of Justice might be able to 
                                                 
223 Article 61 (1) of the Military Judiciary Code . 
224 Article 161 of the Military Criminal Code . 
225 Article 10 (1) (2) (5); article 6 (2) of the Military Judiciary Code . 
226 Article 120 (a) (b) (c) of the Military Judiciary Code . 
227 Article 224 of the Military Judiciary Code and Articles 88-95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
created by the Décret of 6 August 1959 in Codes Larcier VI (2003) 288-299. 
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provisionally adjudicate constitutional matters. In such a case, all sections228 of the 
Court sit in a joint session to examine constitutional issues.229 
 
The ordinary seat of this high court is based in Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC. 
However, in certain circumstances it can be deployed elsewhere in the territory. This 
is determined by the Head of State. The Court may hold mobile chambers in 
operational zones during period of war.230 
 
3.1.2.2 Military Court  
 
There are one or two Military Court(s) for each province, plus the city of Kinshasa, 
which doubles as the capital of the country and a province231.  
 
The High Military Court has two or several chambers. It is made up of five members, 
of whom two are career magistrates. The jurisdiction of the Court is provincial. It is 
an appeal jurisdiction of decisions rendered by the Military Tribunal of Garrison.232 
 
The seat of the Court is located in a provincial capital in the same venue as the 
headquarters of the military region. The President of the Republic may, however, 
move it to another place and in certain exceptional conditions; the Minister of 
Defense may decide to do so.233 
 
3.1.2.3 Operational Military Court 
 
When there is danger to the nation due to insurrection, rebellion, a threat of  war or 
actual war, the Operational Military Court is established, which accompanies the 
troops within the operational war zone. 
                                                 
228 There are three sections: Section judiciaire (article 155), Section administrative (article 158), 
Section de legislation 159 (319-273). 
229 Article 83 (3) of the Military Judiciary Code; Article 160 (1) of the Code on Organization and 
Jurisdiction of the Judiciary; article 131-135 of Ordonnance-LOI 82-017 of 31 March 1982 relating to 
the procedure before the Supreme Court of Justice in Codes Larcier vol I (2003) 319-335. 
230 Article 7 (1) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
231 It is considered not only a city but also a province. 
232 Article 16 (1)  and article 278 (2) and article12 (1) of the Military judiciary code. 
233 Article 12 (2) of the Military judiciary Code . 
 59 
 
The Court is composed of five members, of whom at least one must be a career 
magistrate.234  
 
The implementation of this jurisdiction is undertaken by the President of the 
Republic, who determines the operational zones.235 
 
The Operational Military Court prosecutes all crimes committed by the military, even 
beyond their territorial jurisdiction.  
 
3.1.2.4 Military Tribunal of Garrison 
 
Within each district, city, garrison or military base there are one or several Military 
Tribunals of Garrison. These tribunals prosecute at first resort, certain military 
officers. It is the jurisdiction of appeal against judgements of the Police Military 
Tribunal. Its composition is the same as the Operational Military Court.236 Its seat 
may be located in the capital of the district or in the city where the staff of the 
garrison are located, or any other place determined by the President of the 
Republic.237 
 
3.1.2.5 Military Tribunal of Police 
 
The Military Tribunal of Police is situated at the base of the pyramid of the military 
judiciary in the DRC. It is competent to prosecute in general, low-ranking soldiers. 
The jurisdiction of this tribunal is located in the same area as the Tribunal of Garrison. 
It is made up of one career magistrate, plus two others members who need not 
necessarily be magistrates.238  
 
                                                 
234 Article 18 (1) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
235 Article 18 (2) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
236 Articles 21 (1) and 22 (2) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
237 Article 2 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
238 Articles 23 and 24 (1) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
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3.1.2.6 Judge Advocate‟s Department  
 
As indicated above almost all the principles of the ordinary judiciary apply to the 
military system of justice.  
 
Hence at each level of those jurisdictions, there are magistrates, judges, and 
prosecutors (Ministère Public). 
 
The latter assure the protection of public policy and play a crucial role by actively 
prosecuting criminals before the Court, where he/she ensures the application of the 
law and penalties against those found responsible for crimes. If they are found guilty, 
the Prosecutor is also responsible for carrying out the penalty imposed on the criminal 
by the Court.239 It is important to note that victims of crimes (or civil parties) may 
intervene in penal proceedings to claim reparations for damages as a result of the 
crime. 
 
3.1.2.7 Judge Advocate General of the Army Forces 
 
The function of Prosecutor is exercised before the High Military Court by the Judge 
Advocate General of the Army‟s Forces, who is the chief of all the magistrates acting 
as prosecutors before the Military Courts. He/she may exercise his/her functions in 
every military jurisdiction established in the national territory. All the other military 
magistrates act under his/her orders and control.240 The Judge Advocate General 
executes the decisions of the High Military Court; he/she reports to the Minister of 
Defence on necessary measures for the good administration of justice and/or 
safeguarding defence interests. The Minister of Defence has the right to give 
instructions to military magistrates relating to the prosecution proceedings.241 
 
                                                 
239 Articles 40 and 41 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
240 Articles 42 and 43 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
241 Articles 45, 46, and 47 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
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3.1.2.8 Superior Military Prosecutor  
 
A Superior Military Prosecutor is established at each Military Court and acts under 
the supervision and the control of the Judge Advocate General. He/she exercises the 
function of prosecutor before the Military Court and all other judicial institutions 
under its jurisdiction.242 
 
3.1.2.9 Military Prosecutor 
 
Under the order of the Superior Military Prosecutor, the function of prosecution is 
assumed before the Military Tribunal of Garrison by the Military Prosecutor. The 
latter also exercises the function of prosecutor before the jurisdiction of the Military 
Tribunal of Police, where he/she is represented by his/her first substitute or 
substitute.243 
 
Alongside military magistrates, there are registrars or clerks, who help to write and 




The military judiciary through its different degrees of jurisdiction outlined above 
exercises its competence in the whole national territory of the DRC to prosecute and 
judge infringements as provided for and defined in the Military Criminal Code.  
 
Beyond infractions of a military nature they may also try soldiers responsible for 
diverse crimes or violations of the Ordinary Criminal Code.244 
 
Military Courts are also competent to interpret and ascertain the legality of some 
executive acts, when procedure requires it. However they are unable to judge issues 
                                                 
242 Article 48 (1) (2) (3) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
243 Article s  51(1) (2) 52 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
244 Article 76 of the Military Criminal Code. 
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relating to unconstitutionality and are not competent to pursue disciplinary action, 
which is left to the military authorities.245 
 
When no military persons are liable for infractions defined in the Military Criminal 
Code, the military jurisdiction are competent towards authors, co-authors, and 
accomplices, except if there is a special derogation.246  
 
If a crime which falls within the jurisdiction of the Congolese judiciary is committed 
abroad but one of its characteristic elements have been committed within the territory 
of the DRC, the Congolese Courts may be competent to try those responsible for such 
a crime, which is regarded as committed in the national territory.247 The Congolese 
territory encompasses its maritime space and air space. 
 
When a crime is perpetrated in the DRC, the Military Tribunal where the crime has 
been committed and/or where the criminal is arrested is competent to judge the 
suspect. But if the latter has committed an infraction at several different places, only 
one tribunal shall exercise its jurisdiction. If the same ranking Courts are seized of the 
matter and may exercise their territorial jurisdiction at the same time , the court which 
is first seized of the matter will be preferred.248 
 
The military judiciary exercises its jurisdiction essentially in terms of the military 
such as police and batisseurs de la nation and in certain conditions, civilians. 
 
To determine the competent jurisdiction, criteria such as military status, military 
ranking or grade are considered during the commission of crimes and during the 
prosecution before the Court.249 
 
For instance, the High Military Court is competent to judge: General officers of army 
forces, members of the National Police and National Service of the same rank, 
military magistrates, members of the High Military Court, members of the Office of 
                                                 
245 Article 76 (2) and 78 of the Military Criminal Code. 
246 Article 79 of the Military Criminal Code. 
247 Articles 100 and 97 of the Military Criminal Code.  
248 Article 98 (1) (2) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
249 Articles 104, 106 and 115 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
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the Judge Advocate General, members of the Military Courts as well as members of 
the Operational Military Court and their respective prosecutors.250 
 
As for the Military Court, it is competent to try superior officers of the Congolese 
Army, members of the National Police and National Service of same rank, high 
functionaries of the Defense Ministry, of the National Police, of National Service and 
services affiliated to it, military magistrates of Tribunals of Garrison and their 
respective prosecutors.251  
 
Members of the forces mentioned above and ranked lower than major may be tried by 
the Military Tribunal of Garrison. The Police Military Tribunal may judge only  
members of the armed forces of a lower rank than major who committed 
infringements for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for one year.252  
 
While the Congolese judiciary is competent to punish numerous military infractions 
in general, including some international crimes such as the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, this study focuses on the prosecution of war crimes 
committed in the DRC.  
 
3.2 Prosecution of war crimes 
 
As demonstrated above, the consequences of the wars in the DRC were the 
commission of numerous horrendous crimes. In terms of the nature, characteristics, 
and the scope of these crimes, there is an urgent necessity to prosecute those 
responsible. In terms of both national legislation and international conventions ratified 
by the DRC such crimes cannot go unpunished.253 
                                                 
250 Article 120 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
251 Article 121 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
252 Article 122 of the Military judiciary Code. 
253 The DRC has ratified numerous international conventions, which impose an obligation to prosecute 
crimes. The most often cited of those conventions and their dates of ratification are: Accord de 
coopération judiciaire entre la République démocratique du Congo et le Bureau du Procureur de la 
Cour pénale internationale (Judicial cooperation agreement between the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court), 6 October 2004; 
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 3 June 1982; Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 30 March 2001; African 
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The next section analyzes Congolese legislation, examining how war crimes are 
defined and how the proceedings to prosecute such crimes are organized. 
 
3.2.1 Definition of war crimes  
 
The legal definition as well as expert comments will be considered in this analysis. 
 
3.2.1.1 Legal definition 
 
The DRC has ratified the Rome Statute on the ICC, which provides a broad definition 
of war crimes in its article 8. The draft of the integration of this convention into the 
Congolese legislation has not yet been adopted by Parliament. However the current 
Military Criminal Code defines war crimes as “all offences against the laws of the 
republic committed during the war and which are not justified by the laws and 
customs of war”.254 This definition is generic; a skeleton which leaves many lacunae, 
compared with the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity, defined in the same 
Code in articles 164 and 165. Furthermore, the definition of crimes against humanity 
is to a certain extent debatable for its constituent elements seem to match better with 
the definition of war crimes than crimes against humanity, to the point that it appears 
that the crimes have been confused with each other.255  
                                                                                                                                            
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, 20 July 1987. Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the International Criminal Court ,3 July 2007; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 March 1996; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic 
in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 31 May 1972; Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 31 May 1962; Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 28 September 1990; First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 24 February 1961; Fourth Geneva Convention 
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 24 February 1961; Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, 12 
November 2001; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 11 April 2002. See M 
Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above; 26 49-50); V Lunda-Bululu V „Les juridiction congolaises et 
l‟application des conventions internationales relatives aux droits de l‟homme‟ in Salmon, A. Droit du 
pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: Mélange offerts à Jean Salmon( 2007) passim; P Akele Adau & A Sita 
Muila Akele Les crimes contre l’humanité en droit congolais (1999) 14-16. 
254  Article 173 of the Military Criminal Code. 
255 See articles 165 to 172 of the Military Criminal Code for more details relating to the definition of 
crimes against humanity. See also M Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above; 49-50). Except for some 
proposals, so far there  is no domestic legislation for  integration of the Rome Statute into the 
Congolese legal system. Regarding domestic legislation, South Africa seems a good example in Africa. 
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It is clear that this definition needs to be improved in order to be applied by the courts. 
Amongst the criticisms are the absence of sentences for the crimes dealt with by the 
Code and “we should also emphasize that among other lacunae, the war crime of 
forced recruitment of children, for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is being prosecuted 
before the ICC, is not included in the Military criminal Code”.256 
 
3.2.1.2 Doctrinal considerations  
 
There is, unfortunately a paucity of commentary relating to the definition of war 
crimes in respect of Congolese criminal law. Furthermore, there are numerous 
difficulties and imperfections in the Congolese criminal law, especially the military 
criminal law, which regulates war crimes. The rare comments that are available direct 
their comments at war crimes as defined in the Rome Statute rather than in national 
legislation.257  
 
According to article 215 of the Constitution, international treaties prevail over 
national legislation if they are duly concluded and published. Considering that the 
Congolese system is silent on many issues, the tendency to refer to international law 
is justified.258 However, while it seems necessary to domesticate the Rome Statute in 
national legislation to allow for suitable prosecution, so far there is no law of 
integration of the Rome Statute in the Congolese legal system, which could 
harmonize different legislation at a national level. 
3.2.2 Procedure 
 
First and foremost it is important to recognize that it is not easy to analyze the 
criminal military procedure required by military justice to prosecute war crimes in a 
few pages. However, the following section provides broad guidelines on how this 
system of justice operates. Except for some peculiarities related to the military 
                                                                                                                                            
Read M. S. Du Plessis „South Africa‟s International Criminal Court Act: countering genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity‟ (2008) available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER173.PDF, 
accessed on 28 April 2010. 
256 Ibidem 50.  
257 L Mutata Luaba  Traité de crimes internationaux (2008) 274-351. 
258 D Zongwe F Butedi & P M Clement (note 209 above). 
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character of this kind of trial, the procedure before the military courts is based roughly 
on the same principles as procedure before the ordinary courts. 
 
In the DRC, the criminal process in the prosecution of war crimes as with military 
crimes in general constitutes three stages of procedure: preliminary investigation, 
preparatory instruction and instruction before the Court. However, there is overlap 
between the first and the second steps so that it is more practical to examine both in 
the same rubric.  
3.2.2.1. The preparatory instruction 
 
This step is led or carried out by Magistrate or the Public Prosecutor. Its instruction 
may be preceded by the preliminary investigation of police officers, who operate 
under its order and supervision. During the preliminary investigation, the Police 
Judicial Officer looks for evidence of offences in the place where the crimes were 
committed. He/she investigates the means used to commit the crime, and seeks to find 
out more about the criminal, and, if he/she is hidden, how to arrest him/her. 
 
The superior prosecutor may give written instructions to Military Police Judicial 
Officer to undertake an investigation even at night in a military installation or other 
places. Common Police Judicial Officers are competent in certain conditions to 
ascertain military crimes committed in their respective territorial jurisdiction.259  
 
They may also receive claims and denunciation from victims, or interested parties. 
Where necessary, they can arrest suspects where there is evidence of flagrant 
violations.260 Non-military suspects arrested because the charge of criminality against 
them was serious and obvious, must without delay be presented to the judicial 
authority competent to launch proceedings. When Judicial Officers of Police arrest a 
suspect, they must in accordance with ordinary criminal procedure code state in their 
report the dates, and hours of the beginning and the end of such detention measures.261  
 
                                                 
259 Article 139 and 140 of  the Military Judiciary Code. 
260 Article 145 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
261 Articles 158 and 155 of the Military judiciary Code .See also Code of Criminal Procedure of 6 
August 1959 by the Décret of 6 August 1959 in Codes Larcier Vol I (2003)288-299. 
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A suspect may not be detained for more than two days without being brought before 
the magistrate competent to instruct the case.262 The report on the outcome of the 
investigation is presented to the Prosecutor, who will determine whether the evidence 
against the suspect is sufficient to pursue prosecution. 
 
The opinion of the Judge Advocate General is required by the Minister of Justice or 
Defense during wartime, in respect to all decisions related to the outcome of the 
eventual prosecution.263 
 
When the Magistrate decides to prosecute as a result of the police report he/she 
received, a complaint, a denunciation or at his/her own initiative (when he/she was 
witness to a crime) he/she informs the commander of the Unit the suspect is attached 
to. 
 
An order to prosecute can also come from the Defense Ministry. This order cannot be 
appealed and is given by the Judge Advocate General of Army Forces.264 
 
The prosecutor is not bound by the investigation of the Police Judicial Officer. He/she 
can directly interview the suspect and interrogate him/her. 
 
Depending on the attitude (collaboration or resistance) of the suspect and the 
seriousness of charge against the suspect, the prosecutor can issue an invitation or a 
warrant of arrest (mandat de comparution, mandat d `amener or mandate d`arrêt).  
 
Any warrant must precisely specify the suspect‟s identity and bear the date and 
signature of the magistrate who has issued it as well as the seal of the office. Further 
infraction and their legal basis must be mentioned. The Commandant of the Unit that 
the suspect is attached to must be notified. Warrants are applicable in all the national 
territory of the Republic and are reinforced (executed) in all circumstances by Public 
Force agents in conformity with ordinary criminal procedure.265 
                                                 
262 Articles 146, 148 and 149 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
263 Article 162 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
264 Articles 164 and 165 of the Military Judiciary Code. 




The procedure launched by the Prosecutor at this stage is essentially secret266 and 
inquisitorial. But the right to defense of the suspect is constitutionally guaranteed, 
even if they are not often respected.267 After preparatory instruction, the Instructor 
Magistrate can release the suspect if it appears that there is no infraction, transfer the 
case to the civilian judiciary, or confirm the charge and then send the file to the 
Prosecutor (auditeur) who will seize the military court. 
 
The indictment of the presumed perpetrator of the crime by the Court may be required 
by the Standing Magistrate him/herself, the Commandant, the Ministry of Defense or 
the victim (the civil party, which may claimed reparations for damages). During the 
prosecution before the Court the charges against the defendant are supported by the 
Public Prosecutor (Ministère Public). The prosecution of war crimes and other 
international crimes cannot be dismissed because of long delays; war criminals are 
subject to trial at any moment without limitation.268 
 
3.2.2.2 Instruction before the Court 
 
This part of the procedure is crucial in the criminal process. The judge may be seized 
directly by the plaintiff, by the Prosecutor and sometimes by the defendant if he/she 
accepts to stand voluntarily before the court in a case of which he/she had not been 
previously and regularly notified.269 
 
The commencement of the trial is characterized by the verification of rules of form, 
the jurisdiction of the Court, the regularity of the seize, and the quality of parties by 
the composition of members of the bench. After this they proceed to the instruction of 
the case under examination. Parties are allowed to argue the exception relating to 
form before examination of the matters in depth. They may ask the Prosecutor for 
                                                 
266 Article 132 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
267 Article 19 (4) of the Constitution. 
268 Article 204 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
269 Article 216 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
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further270 preparatory instruction; they hear public accusations, witnesses, and the 
prosecutor who requires the application of law in its written form (requisitoire). 
 
All debates during the hearing are recorded by the greffier (registrar).271 The victim 
may intervene in the process at any time as a civil party and claim reparations for 
damages. After instruction, the judge deliberates and votes regarding the case, and 
what sentence to apply. 
 
The judgment must be signed jointly by the chair of the Court and the registrar. It is 
written by a professional Magistrate affiliated to the jurisdiction. He/she indicates the 
names of the judges and judge assessors (who are not professional or career 
magistrates) who adjudicated the case. The name of prosecutor and the registrar, as 
well as the full identity of the different parties and their advocates must be recorded. 
Judgment must be motivated and the charges against the accused must be listed. A 
summary of procedure and the deposition of adverse parties must also be provided.272 
 
When the Court pronounces acquittal, it immediately releases the accused if they were 
detained. But if the accused is found guilty, there is the possibility that he/she may 
accept and acquiesce to his/her indictment or otherwise opt for recourse and appeal.  
 
Two kinds of recourse can be distinguished: the ordinary recourse and the 
extraordinary one. 
 
The ordinary recourse is composed of appeal and opposition and the extraordinary is 
made up of annulations (cancellation) and revision (review).  
 
3.2.2.2.1 The ordinary recourse 
 
This recourse essentially comprises appeal and opposition as provided for in the 
Military Judiciary Code. The Code asserts that, except for decisions of the Military 
                                                 
270 Article 219 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
271 Article 273 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
272 Articles 274 and 275 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
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Operational Court, the decisions and judgments of the military court and tribunals are 
susceptible to opposition and appeal.273 
 
The opposition is an option offered to the accused that was absent from the court 
during the debate and found guilty in abstentia. It can be exercised within five days 
after the notification of the verdict of the Court. The appeal is the right offered to the 
accused to exercise recourse against judgment before the immediate superior 
jurisdiction within five days after the pronouncement of Judgment when the other 
party has been notified.274 
 
3.2.2.2.2 The extraordinary recourse 
 
The judgment and decision of the Military Court and Tribunal are subjected to 
annulation and review. Those recourses are also not applicable to decisions rendered 
by the military operational court.  
 
For annulation, an interested party or prosecutor may within five days after the day of 
their notification, require the annulations of decisions and judgments rendered by the 
Court and tribunal. The High Military Court annulates a decision that is not rendered 
in accordance with the law. Violation of the rules may consist of: 1) incompetence; 2) 
abuse of power by the military jurisdiction; 3) wrong application or false 
interpretation of the law; 4) non-conformity with the law; and 5) violation of the 
prescribed forms, which inobservance is sanctioned by nullity.275 
 
A review may be required against the decisions rendered by any Court whatever its 
jurisdiction. Therefore, any party prosecuted for crime in the military jurisdiction may 
exercise this resource when: 1) after a condemnation there is a new fact which may 
establish the innocence of the condemned; 2) after a condemnation a new judicial 
decision for the same criminal fact, is contradictory and provides evidence that the 
accused is not guilty; 3) after the condemnation for homicide, new evidence is 
presented that demonstrates that the person presumed dead is alive; and 4) one of the 
                                                 
273 Article 276 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
274 Article s277 and 278 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
275 Articles 280 and 281 of the Military Judiciary Code. 
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witnesses have been previously heard, prosecuted and indicted for making false 
accusations against the accused.276  
 
The next section highlights the Military Courts‟ activities in the DRC. 
 
3.2.3 Some judicial decisions 
 
International crimes, especially war crimes as defined above, pose a real threat to 
peace and security. The perpetration of these crimes on a high scale in the DRC has 
negatively affected the society up until today, underlining the need to effectively try 
the perpetrators of these crimes through an efficient justice system.  
 
Given the fact that the military criminal code is imperfect there is a real need to 
reform and adjust it. However, to allow impunity to prevail just because there is a lack 
of clear definition, and because the military criminal code is imperfect, is 
unacceptable. Magistrates must make efforts to check national or international law for 
relevant legal provisions that may be applied. The ambiguities in the law are 
challenging in the DRC, as the legality of offences is crucial to allow judges to try 
criminals. 
 
It is highly regrettable that from 1972 until 2003 there was no prosecution of the 
perpetrators of war crimes, notwithstanding the gross violations of human rights, and 
the mass atrocities crimes committed during the Mobutu dictatorship.277 
 
Nonetheless, as the Report of the Mapping Team notes: 
 
It cannot be denied that the DRC has a legal and jurisdictional framework that can curb 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide, both by criminalising 
these acts in national law, and by virtue of the fact that the DRC has ratified the most 
important Conventions concerning human rights and international humanitarian law.278  
 
                                                 
276 Article 310 (1) (2) (3) (4) of the Military Judiciary Code. 
277 UNOHCRH (note 3 above) 411. 
278 Ibidem. 
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Ever since the entry into force of the new Military Criminal Code of 18 November 
2003 and as a result of the reform, which commenced in 2003, there have been very 
rare cases of279 prosecution for international crimes in general and for war crimes in 
particular.  
 
Although Congolese courts have rendered some decisions, none amongst these can 
really be cited as the prosecution of war crimes. There are a number of criticisms of 
the way the four cases that are most often cited as the first steps towards justice 
against impunity in the DRC have been conducted.280 
 
3.2.3.1 The Ankoro case 
 
This case is related to crimes committed in Katanga at Ankoro from 10 to 22 
November 2002 during clashes between the Congolese army and the Mayi-Mayi,281 
which resulted in the killing of numerous innocent civilians, looting, and the 
destruction of public and private property. The soldiers involved were arrested and 
tried. Curiously of the seven alleged suspects, six were acquitted and only one was 
convicted of murder and arson and sentenced to just a few months imprisonment. The 
shift from the application of the military code to ordinary codes, as well as the 
decision to release the six other persons indicted is really questionable in this case. 
Therefore this case can hardly be regarded as a reference in terms of decisions.282 
 
3.2.3.2 The Khawa case  
 
In this case, Khawa Panga Mandro Ives of the Party for Unity and the Safeguarding of 
Congo's Unity was prosecuted for having allegedly committed war crimes at Zumbe 
                                                 
279 The few cases that have been prosecuted were essentially the result of pressure exerted by NGOs 
and thanks to the MONUC, which provided the necessary logistic and material means for the 
transportation of magistrates. See UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 398); M Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 255 
above; 12). 
280 M Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 255 above; 12); UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 410); CAD „La répression 
des crimes internationaux par les juridictions congolaises‟ 71-72 available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CAD_LaRepressiondesCrimes_Dec2010.pdf, accessed on 10 May 
2011. 
281 See M Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above; 50). 
282 See Ankoro Case, RP n 01/2003 and RP 02/2004, decision of the Military Court of Katanga of 20 
December 2004; UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 396). 
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village in the Ituri District, Orientale Province (DRC) on 15 and 16 October 2002, for 
having burnt and destroyed a school, hospital, and Catholic as well as Protestant 
churches at Zumbe.283 
 
Khawa had been tried and sentenced for war crimes. In his decision of 2 August 2006, 
the judge had directly applied the provisions of article 8 (2) (b) XX & 77 of the Rome 
Statute.284 The plea and reasoning made by the bench in this case is very courageous 
and technically interesting as it may inspire other judges to look to how to fight 
impunity for war crimes beyond the Congolese legal framework only. However it is 
regrettable that the effective execution of this Decision was blocked or paralysed by 
several appeals and complicated by incestuous relationships between the civil and 
military judiciary.285  
 
3.2.3.3 The Milobs case 
 
Although it is related to war crimes committed after 2002, this case is interesting for 
the way the judge adjudicated by looking in international law, notably conventions 
and jurisprudence to find legislation to prosecute alleged war crimes perpetrated at 
Mongwalu in Ituri District, Orientale Province, by members of Militia 
(Integrationistes Front of Nationalists) who tortured and killed two MONUC Military 
Peacekeepers in May 2003.286 Although the accused were found guilty of war crimes 
in accordance with article 8 of the Rome Statute on 19 February 2007, the Decision 
seemed less elaborated in respect of legal criteria for the protection of UN personnel 




                                                 
283 Khawa Case Khawa Case, RP n 039/2006, Judgement of Military Tribunal of Garrison of Ituri of 2 
August 2006.  
284 Ibidem 27. 
285 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 404, 405). 
286 Milobs case RP n 103/2006, Judgement of 19 February 2007 of Military Tribunal of Garrison of 
Ituri, UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 397). 
287 CAD (note 280 above; 60-62). 
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3.2.3.4 The Songo Mboyo case 
 
In the same vain as Milob, this case is related to crimes perpetrated after 2002, more 
precisely acts of violence and looting committed by military personnel because their 
salaries had been stolen. They became angry, attacking civilians and raping several 
women, in the Province of Equateur at Songo Mboyo on 21 and 22 December 2003. 
The reasoning given in the decision of the Military Tribunal on 12 April 2006 to 
sentence those responsible is very insightful and worthwhile.288 This decision 
provides mechanisms for prosecuting international crimes by applying international 
law in a national judiciary to curb impunity for mass atrocities in the DRC.  
 
Wetsh‟okonda Koso notes that “This decision has made case law, several other 
military courts have since referred to it in order to apply the Statute of the ICC 
directly, and thereby remedy its absence in national Congolese law”.289  
 
However, this decision was not perfect. Although a courageous will to fight impunity 
for crime was demonstrated, the qualification of those acts of violence as crimes 
against humanity in this decision was criticised and was considered too vague.290 
Furthermore the prosecution was hampered by delays and worst of all: “of the 78 
presumed perpetrators originally identified by MONUC, only six were sentenced, and 
these individuals later escaped”.291 
 
In spite of this interesting decision the effectiveness of the prosecution of international 
crimes remains a serious challenge for the Congolese judiciary. At this point in time 
there can be little hope that gross crimes in general and war crimes in particular 
committed between 1996 and 2002  in the DRC could be prosecuted.  
 
Even though numerous international crimes were committed between March 1993 and 
June 2003 in the DRC as documented in the UN Report of Mapping “military 
                                                 
288 Songo Mboyo case RP n 084/2005, Judgement of 12 April 2006 of Military Tribunal of Garrison of 
Mbandaka. 
289 Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above; 51). 
290 CAD (note 280 above; 48-49). 
291 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 398). 
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tribunals only dealt with two that were classified as war crimes, one of which ended in 




This overview of the Congolese judicial machinery reveals that the political crisis in 
the Congo has been extended to all institutions. Because of the terrible conflicts the 
country endured, the population was subjected to grave atrocities and violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law. Virtually none of those numerous 
war crimes committed during the wars have been prosecuted so far. With the 
exception of the few cases of prosecution indicated above, most of those responsible 
for crimes committed during the armed conflicts in 1996-98 and 1998-2002 remain 
free. Some even occupy official positions in society, without any fear of justice, 
which is considered completely under the control of politicians. The result is the 
highest degree of impunity and the recurrence of gross crimes. The Congolese justice 
system remains in a state of collapse. This has been caused by several factors, such as 
the judiciary‟s lack of independence and political interference in its activities, lack of 
financial and material resources, corruption and the need for the training of 
magistrates, and the absence of relevant and adequate criminal legislation293 (some of 
those causes will be considered in depth in Chapter 5 below). To conclude, there is a 
need for mega judicial reform. It is fair to describe Congolese justice as a construction 
site.  
 
The failure of the Congolese judiciary to try war crimes is clear. Hence the fight 
against impunity for war crimes in the DRC constitutes a big challenge for 
international justice. The following chapter examines the extent to which the 
International Criminal Court can help to fight against impunity in the DRC.   
 
                                                 
292 see Ankoro case and Milobs case Ibidem 396 and 410. Read also Avocats sans frontières Etude de 
Jurisprudence L`application du Statut de Rome de la Cour Pénale Internationale par les Juridictions 
de la République Démocratique du Congo (2009) available at 
http://www.asf.be/publications/ASF_EtudeJurispr_StatutRome_FR.pdf, accessed on 10 September 
2011. 
293 Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above; 67-72). 
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Chapter 4: The ICC‟s contribution to war crimes trials in 
the DRC  
 
“The opening of the first investigation of the ICC [in the DRC] is a major step forward for 




The creation of the ICC during the Diplomatic Conference held under the auspices of 
UN at Rome from 16 June to 17 July 1998 was considered a milestone in the long 
history of the establishment of a permanent international criminal justice system.295 
Many regard it as one of great institutional achievements of the twentieth century 
since the creation of the UN.296 It was a veritable revolutionary step forward from 
other international criminal jurisdictions – from the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal, to the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.  
 
This chapter analyzes to what extent the ICC might contribute to prosecuting war 
crimes perpetrated in the DRC. It examines the background to the ICC, its principles, 
its jurisdiction with respect to war crimes in the DRC and examines some cases 
relating to the prosecution of war criminals, which are pending before the Court. 
 
                                                 




n?lan=en-GB, accessed on 17 July 2011 ( the words in brackets are those of the author, they were 
added to emphasis the fact that the first experience of the ICC occurred in the DRC). 
295 K Annan „Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations‟ in M Politi & G Nesi (eds) The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2001) xiii; M Polity „The 
Rome Statute of the ICC: rays of light and some shadows‟ in M Politi & G Nesi (eds) The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2001) 7. 
296 P Kirsh & J T Holmes „The birth of the International Criminal Court: the 1998 Rome Conference‟ in 
O Bekou & R Cryer (eds) The International Criminal Court (2004) 3, 35; W A Schabas An 





As an institution, the ICC has a long history from the inception of the idea297 till its 
concretization. The ICC came into formal existence on 1 July 2002, as a judicial 
apparatus to prosecute serious crimes of concern to the peace and security of 
humankind. In this section the origins of the ICC are outlined and the law applicable 




The phenomenon of crime is as old as human society. Criminologists tend to explain 
this phenomenon in terms of biology298 and consider it the result of the manifestation 
or the expression of living in society.299 A retrospective look at the history of human 
society reveals the commission of many horrendous deeds. Humans have acted as 
wolves to their fellow humans,300 to the extent that they have invented deadly 
weapons to kill others. The power of destruction of humans is exacerbated during 
wartime, when genocide occupies the mind of the warrior. The cruelty of these 
atrocious acts has finally pricked the human conscience. In order to curb these 
criminal tendencies, there have been several attempts to prosecute the authors of mass 
atrocities.301 However, the actual prosecution of crimes of concern to the international 
community commenced only during the twentieth century.302 
 
The past century was marked by negative as well as positive developments. Among 
the negative events were several bloody armed conflicts and two world wars (1914-18 
                                                 
297 M du Plessis „International Criminal Courts, the International Criminal Court, and South Africa`s 
implementation of the Rome Statute‟ in J Dugard International law: a South African perspective 3 ed 
(2005) 174-176. 
298 R Hopkins Burke An Introduction to Criminological Theory 2ed (2005) 55-73. 
299 R Hopkins Burke (note 298 above; 188-193). 
300 N M Songa Traité de droit pénal général Congolais (2007) 2 ed 33-34. 
301 W A Schabas (note 296 above; 1). According D McGoldrick, the earliest international prosecution 
might have taken place in 1268 in connection with Conradin von Hofenstafen who was tried for 
waging aggressive war. See „Criminal trials before international tribunals legality and 
legitimacy‟(2004) in D McGoldrick, Rowe & Donelly  (eds)The Permanent International Criminal 
Court: legal and policy issues 1, 13. 
302 With the creation of the different ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals and the first Permanent 
International Criminal Court. 
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and 1939-45). These wars demonstrated the extent to which war crimes can affect the 
international community at large. Crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes 
against peace were identified as international crimes. Those crimes were a threat to 
peace and human security and inconsistent with the collective conscience. Hence 
Gustav Monnier‟s idea to establish a tribunal, which might exercise its jurisdiction to 
prosecute breaches of humanitarian law, was born.303 The first attempt, to establish a 
tribunal to try World War One war criminals, was almost unsuccessful.304 In the 
meantime the idea of the creation of an International Criminal Tribunal was debated, 
with some feeling that this was premature.305 The renewed atrocities perpetrated 
during the Second World War created the realization that impunity for such crimes 
could no longer be tolerated; this resulted in the establishment of the first306 ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal. 
 
4.1.2 The international military criminal tribunal  
 
Two tribunals were created to prosecute crimes perpetrated during the Second World 
War: the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and later the Tribunal for the Far East. 
 
4.1.2.1 The International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg 
 
After the defeat of Germany, the Allied powers decided to establish a tribunal to 
punish crimes committed during World War Two by Nazi criminals. The Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg was created by an Agreement 
                                                 
303W A Schabas ( note 296 above; 2). 
304 For instance although the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1929 provided for the constitution of a 
Special Tribunal to try former German Emperor William II, for „a supreme offence against 
international morality and sanctity of treaties‟ consistent with article 227 of the Treaty, he was never 
judged up until the time of his death. See C Van den Wyngaert, G Stessens, & L Janssens International 
criminal law a collection of international and European instruments 2 ed (2000) 53-54; M Du Plessis 
(note 297 above; 174).  
305 The League of Nations regarded the recommendation of Baron Descamps relating to the creation of 
a „high court of international justice‟ as premature. In 1937 the attempt to create such a tribunal by a 
Treaty failed to get the required number of ratifications from States. See W A Schabas (Note 296 
above; 5). 
306 The expression is borrowed from Cyril Laucci who considers that ad hoc international jurisdictions 
can be divided into three generations from the Jurisdiction of Nuremberg to the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, not forgetting the jurisdiction created by the UN Security council see C Laucci „Projet de 
Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone: vers une troisième génération de juridictions pénales 
internationals?‟ (2000) (9) in L’Observateur des Nations Unies 195-196. 
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signed in London on 8 August 1945.307 The Agreement provided for the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal to be exercised for the “trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European axis countries”, which had committed crimes against peace, 
war crimes,308 and crimes against humanity309 in conformity with article 6 (a) (b) (c). 
The provisions of this Charter provided for three international crimes. In accordance 
with articles 2 and 14 of the Treaty, judges and prosecutors were appointed to the 
tribunal to represent each initial member signatory. They appointed four in total. 
 
The International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg focused on the trial of 24 high-
ranking Nazi officials accused of war crimes. Other, low-ranking Nazi war criminals 
appeared before the Courts in the states where they were alleged to have committed 
the crimes. On 1 October 1946, the Tribunal rendered its decision as follows: three 
were acquitted, 12 sentenced to death, three sentenced to life imprisonment, and a 
range of prison terms from 10 to 20 years was imposed on four others. During the 
course of the trial one of the accused committed suicide, while another was declared 
unfit to stand trial.310 
 
4.1.2.2 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo) 
 
As with Germany, Japan was defeated and surrendered to the Allied Powers. The 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Japan, General Douglass MacArthur 
established an International Military Tribunal in Tokyo in terms of the Charter of 19 
                                                 
307 This agreement was signed initially by: UK, United States of America, France, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (see article 1 of the Accord) and later by others states. In total, 19 States signed, 
including Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay ,Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
and Yugoslavia. See C Van den Wyngaert, G Stessens, & L Janssens (note 304 above; 55-61); K 
Kittichaisaree International criminal law (2001;18). 
308 This Treaty defines war in article 6 (b) as violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor for any purpose 
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons 
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity (56). It is clear that this disposition 
referred to the 1929 Geneva conventions relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict and the 
1907 Hague Convention Relating to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. However these 
instruments didn‟t refer to the possibility of the application of criminal sanctions. For more see K 
Kittichaisaree (note 307 above) 18-19.  
309 Ibidem. 
310 K Kittichaisaree (note 307 above; 18); D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) (note301 above; 
18). 
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January 1946.311 The bench of the jurisdiction consisted of 11 judges “from the names 
submitted by the Signatories312 to the Instruments of Surrender” and the Counsel who 
acted as Prosecutor.313 
 
As with the Nuremberg Tribunal, the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, according to article 
5 (a) (b) (c) of the Act, was exerted to prosecute crimes against peace, conventional 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, war crimes were limited to 
“violations of the laws or customs of war”.  
 
While the Tribunal categorized three types of crimes, it only tried the first type. The 
other two types of crimes were left to national military Courts of interested States to 
prosecute.314  
 
This tribunal was largely inspired by the first, with which its shares some features. 
Both had the merit of exposing the individuals responsible for gross and serious 
crimes perpetrated during the war on behalf of sovereign states. The Tribunals 
represented the victory of humanitarian principles over State interests. These 
Tribunals laid the groundwork for future international criminal justice institutions. 
However, it is obvious that the justice exercised at Nuremberg was not perfect. The 
war was fought between two sides. Clearly, it was not only the Germans and Japanese 
who committed criminal acts. Many have criticized these Tribunals as representing 
the victors‟ revenge against the vanquished parties.315 
 
For example, Japan was not permitted to accuse the US before the Tokyo Tribunal of 
the US‟ dropping of atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or to accuse the Soviet 
Union of violating the neutrality agreement of 13 April 1941.316 Furthermore, the 
sacrosanct principle of the legality of crimes and punishment in the administration of 
                                                 
311 Ibidem 20. 
312 US, Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand and the Soviet 
Union, India and the Philippines. See K Kittichaisaree ( note 307 above; 19). 
313 See article 2 and article 8 of the Act in C Van den Wyngaert, G Stessens, & L Janssens (note 304 
above) 63-67 and K Kittichaisaree (note 304 above; 19). 
314 Apart from Hideki Tojo, the former Japanese Primer Minister, the tribunal prosecuted 24 others. 
Two defendants died during the trial and one was declared mentally unfit to stand trial. K 
Kittichaisaree (note 307 above; 19). 
315 D D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) (note 301 above; 10, 15). 
316 K Kittichaisaree (note 307 above; 19). 
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criminal justice was not respected. There was prosecution ex post facto, as the 
punishment of crimes as defined in those statutes was not established in international 
law at that time.317 To correct those weaknesses efforts318 have been made in the UN 
legal framework to ensure the punishment of such odious crimes in the future. The 
need for the creation of an International Criminal Tribunal was asserted, but its 
realization was blocked by the Cold War.319 
 
The perpetration of gross crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to the 
establishment, respectively, of the International Criminal Tribunal ad hoc for 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal ad hoc for Rwanda, considered by 
some as second generation international criminal tribunals after Nuremberg and 
Tokyo.320  
 
4.1.3 The International Criminal tribunals of the second generation 
 
Two second generation tribunals were created at the end of the past century. 
4.1.3.1 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
 
The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed several violent clashes and gross 
and systematic violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.  
 
To address crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during armed conflicts, which 
took place from1991, the United Nations decided to create a criminal jurisdiction to 
confront impunity for gross violations of human rights in Eastern Europe. On 25 May 
1993, the UN Security Council voted in Resolution 827321 for the establishment of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.  
 
                                                 
317 „Justice Pal, the Indian Judge of the Tokyo Tribunal, would have acquitted all the defendants on the 
grounds that there had been no individual criminal responsibility under international law‟. See K 
Kittichaisaree (note 307 above; 18 and 20). 
318 What counts is the ex post endorsement of the „Principles of international law recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the Tribunal‟ unanimously adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 95 (1) on 11 December 1946. K Kittichaisaree (note 307 above; 20). 
319 P Kirsch & J T Homes (note 1 above; 3-4). 
320 See C Laucci (note 306 above). 
321 See C Van den Wyngaert, G Stessens, & L Janssens (note 304 above; 73). This Resolution of 25 
May 1993 was amended on 13 May 1998.  
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The Tribunal exercised its jurisdiction to prosecute war crimes,322 the crime of 
genocide323 and crimes against humanity324 committed in the territory of “the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since 1 January 1991”.325 The organs of the 
Tribunal consist of three Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor, 
and a Registry.326  
 
This comment by McGoldrick regarding the Tribunal, is salutary: 
 
The most general critique aimed at the ICTY (and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda) is an indirect one. This is that the international community only established it to salve 
its conscience for its failure to act to stop the „ethnic cleansing‟ which had taken place.327  
 
In other words, instead of creating a Tribunal, the international community could 
have paid heed to the crisis in Yugoslavia earlier on and applied preventive 
measures to avoid a human disaster. 
 
4.1.3.2 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
After the eruption of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and public condemnation of 
inaction on the part of the UN, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 955 on 8 
November 1994 for the establishment of an International Penal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute Rwandan citizens responsible for 
genocide,328 crimes against humanity,329 and violations of international humanitarian 
law (or war crimes)330 perpetrated “between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 
during armed conflict in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring countries”.331  
 
                                                 
322 Instead of expressly using the term „war crimes‟, the statute used the expression „all grave breaches 
of the Geneva convention of 1949, and the violations of laws or customs of war‟ (article 2 and article 
3). 
323 Article 4 of the Statute of IPTY. 
324 Article 5 of the Statute of IPTY. 
325 Article 8 of the Statute of IPTY. 
326 Article 11 (a) (b) (c) of the Statute of IPTY. 
327 D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) (note301 above; 9, 24). 
328 Article 2 (1) of the Statute of IPTR. 
329 Article 3 of the Statute of IPTR. 
330 Article 4 of the Statute of IPTR. It is obvious in the context of Rwanda, that it was armed conflict of 
no international character.  
331 Article 2 of the Statute of IPTR. 
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This Statute closely resembles the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, with which it shares the same Appeal Chamber and Prosecutor. 
 
These jurisdictions have rendered some important judgments, amongst them the Tadic 
case for Yugoslavia and the Akeyasu case for Rwanda. However most of the cases are 
moving slowly and the Tribunals are very costly ($100 million a year budgeted for 
Rwanda).332 Accordingly, UN Security Council Resolutions 1503 of August 2003 and 
1534 of 26 March 2004, called on this tribunal “to take all possible measures to 
complete investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first 
instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010”.333 However in 2009, 
when the UN Security Council considered the Tribunal‟s report, it appeared that 
strategically this jurisdiction could not complete its activities in 2010. Hence, the 
Security Council extended the terms of the different judges, to allow them to complete 
the cases they were working on.334 
 
These tribunals are not perfect335 but they are without any doubt better than the first 
generation of international ad hoc Tribunals. In contrast with the former, which were 
created by the Allied forces, the latter were created by the UN Security Council. As 
such, they are subsidiary organs of the UN.  
 
Issues relating to the legality of ad hoc international tribunals were raised and 
answered in the Tadic case.336 Notions relating to the definition of certain offences, 
such as war crimes and crimes against humanity are well refined, thanks to those 
jurisdictions. It is clear that they have benefited from the experiences of the 
International Military Tribunals and the work of the International Law Commission, 
which worked on the definition of serious crimes of concern to the international 
community from the end of World War Two. There was also a Commission set up by 
                                                 
332 D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) (Note 301 above; 10, 40). 
333 Statute of ICTR (56) available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf, 
accessed on 10 July 2011. 
334 Ibidem  56-57. 
335 Most of the proof has been in the form of testimony which is sensitive to administrate and has raised 
serious debate regarding their administration in the ICTR. For instance, it is not clear why most of the 
criminals are only from the Hutu group, while the Tutsi group were also part of the armed conflict and 
in the case of the ICTY why most of criminal from Serbia and Croatia are Muslim. See C Onana,  Les 
Secret de la Justice internationale enquêtes truquées sur le génocide rwandais  (2005) passim 
336 In the Tadic Case  (note 63 above; para 9-22). 
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the UN General Assembly for the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal 
competent to prosecute such crimes.337 
 
Those commissions put forward a proposal for the draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Tribunal in 1952 and for the Code on Grave Crimes, or “Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind”338 in 1954. Because of the Cold War, this 
impetus for international justice raised after World War Two waned. Some of the 
work continued, however, such as the definition of aggressive crimes by the UN 
General Assembly in 1973, the resumption of the work of the International Law 
Commission relating to the code of crime in 1981 and provisional adoption of a draft 
Code of Crime by the International Law Commission in 1991.339 
 
Work relating to the draft of the Statute of International Tribunal resumed in 1989 in 
the International Law Commission, which made its first presentation in 1992, 
presented the draft to the UN in 1993, and completed its work in 1994. In 1996, the 
commission adopted the Code of Crime against the Peace and Security of Mankind.340 
 
The framework and tools for the creation of an international criminal jurisdiction were 
in progress, under the auspices of the UN General Assembly. The ad hoc committee 
and later the preparatory committee established by the General Assembly put forward 
proposals upon which States‟ negotiations during the conference relating to the 
creation of the Institution could be based.341 To create the Court, a Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries was convened in Rome on 25 June 1998.342 
 
After intense negotiations, the Rome Statute was adopted on 17 July, with 120 States 
voting in favor, seven against and 21 abstaining.343 Notwithstanding the opposition of 
                                                 
337 W A Schabas (note above; 8); W S Schabas „The International Criminal Court: the secret of its 
success‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer The International Criminal Court (2004) 69-70. 
338 Ibidem 9. 
339 Ibidem. 
340 Ibidem 10; P Kirsch & J T Holmes  (note 1 above; 3-5). 
341 A Bos „The Experience of the Preparatory committee‟ in M Politi & G Nesi (eds) The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2001) 17-27. 
342 W A Schabas (note 296 above; 15). 
343 Mauro Politi „The Rome Statute of the ICC: rays of light and some shadows‟ (2002) in M Politi & G 
Nesi (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity 7, 9. 
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powerful countries such as the USA, China, and Israel,344 the Statute was adopted and 
on 11 April 2002 the required threshold of sixtieth ratification was attained to make 
the Court operational.345 The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
 
4.1.4 Definition, seat and applicable law  
 
As demonstrated above, the establishment of the ICC has been the result of a long 
process of struggle against impunity by the international community. The realization 
of such endeavor has been broadly considered as a “Historic Step”346 of the 
international community in the quest for international criminal justice.  
 
Indeed, the ICC is the first permanent Court competent to prosecute crimes of concern 
to the international community. In contrast with the International Court of Justice, 
which adjudicates only disputes between States, the International Criminal Court aims 
to prosecute individuals. Compared with the temporary, ad hoc tribunal, the ICC is 
permanent and is not limited or confined to one case or one state. Furthermore the 
ICC is not a subsidiary organ of the UN.  
 
In common with many other judicial institutions the seat of the ICC is The Hague, in 
the Netherlands, which is its Host State by virtue of a headquarters agreement.347  
 
However, as provided in article 3 (3) of the Rome Statute “the Court may sit 
elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable”.  
 
In accordance with article 21 (1) of its Statute, the ICC applies,  
                                                 
344 D McGoldrick „Political and regal Responses to the ICC‟ in D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly 
(eds) The permanent International Criminal Court: legal and policy issues (2004) 389, 400-441. 
345 M Du Plessis (note 297 above; 174, 177.)  
346 D McGoldrick „The legal and Political significance of a permanent International Criminal Court‟ 
(2004) in D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) The permanent International Criminal Court: 
legal and policy issues (2004) 453, 472, 478. See Headquarters Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the Host State. 
346 See Headquarters Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the Host State. ICC-
BD/04-01-08 of  1 March 2008 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/99A82721-ED93-
4088-B84D7B8ADA4DD062/280775/ICCBD040108ENG1.pdf, accessed on 20 June 2011  
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 firstly, the Rome Statute Element of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;348 secondly, the Court may apply international conventions, 
different principles and rules established in international law; and 
 thirdly, the Court may apply, when necessary, general principles of law drawn 
from the national laws of legal systems worldwide except if they contradict the 
Statute, or if they are not consistent with laws, norms or standards recognized 
internationally. 
 
In line with conventional law, the Court may apply or refer in its decisions to case law 
or judicial precedents, which may be its previous decisions or the decisions of other 
judicial bodies such as the ad hoc international criminal tribunal.349 
 
However it is worth noting that any interpretation of these sources of law must be 
done in conformity with human rights, with no discrimination on the grounds of “age, 
race, color, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, wealth, birth or other status”.350  
 
4.1.5 Contribution of the Rome Statute to reforming the international criminal 
justice system 
 
The ICC altogether with the ICTY, ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
constitute the main institutions of the international criminal justice. However contrary 
to the ad hoc jurisdiction, the ICC is permanent and is the embodiment of current 
developments in international criminal law.351 The principles of irrelevance of official 
capacity, the lack of immunity, individual responsibility, and participation of victims 
in the proceedings were integrated into the Rome Statute.  
 
                                                 
348 For more details about the nature of this instrument read S A Fernández de Gurmendi & H Friman 
„The rules of procedure and evidence of the International Criminal Court‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer The 
International Criminal Court (2004) 387-390. 
349 Article 21 (2) of the Rome Statute. 
350 Article 21 (3)of the Rome Statute; Edwards, GE. “International human rights law challenges to the 
new International Criminal Court: the search and seizure right to privacy” (2001) (26) Yale Journal of 
International Law 323-412. 
351 M Cherif Bassiouni „International criminal justice in the age of globalization‟ in International 
Criminal Law: Quo Vadis? (2004) 79;T  Steele, The contribution of the statute of the ICC to the 
enforcement of international law in the light of the experience of the ICTY (2002) South African 
Yearbook of International Law  ( 27)1-61. 
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4.1.5.1 Irrelevance of official capacity and lack of immunity  
 
Amongst the revolutionary principles in international law codified in the Rome 
Statute are the irrelevance of official capacity and lack of immunity. All those 
responsible for the crimes, which fall under the jurisdiction of ICC as defined in the 
Rome Statute shall be prosecuted indiscriminately and equally. Therefore, Heads of 
States, members of Executive organs or legislative chambers or any other person 
occupying a public position can no longer hide behind their official capacity to escape 
prosecution.352  
 
Of course those principles are not new; they were applied in prosecutions launched by 
the different ad hoc International Tribunals. However their integration into the Rome 
Statute was very important because they could now be applied permanently. There is, 
however, much debate in international law relating to official capacity and 
immunity.353  
 
4.1.5.2 Rights of the victims and the accused  
 
In the Rome Statue, the standards relating to the protection of both victims and the 
accused reflect a sense of equity. 
 
Firstly, victims may intervene before the Court during the hearing.354 The Statute 
provides different measures to ensure their protection and to make sure that they 
receive assistance. The Registrar has, among others roles, to deal with matters 
                                                 
352 Article 27 (1) (2). 
353 Yerodia Case concerning the Arrest of Warrant of 11 April 2000, DRC v Belgium (ICJ, Judgment of 
14 February 2002 ) para 62-71 available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf, accessed 
on 12 September 2011; L Reydams Universal jurisdiction: international and municipal legal 
perspectives (2005) 227-231; S Bula-Bula (2004) Les immunités pénales et l`inviolabilité du ministre 
des affaires étrangères en droit international passim, Regarding different delicate issues which may be 
raised by the application of immunities read S Wirth „Immunities, related problems, and article 98 of 
the Rome Statute‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer (eds) The International Criminal Court (2004) 329-458. 
354 Read E Haslam Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court: a triumph of hope ever 
Experience?‟ In: D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) The Permanent International Criminal 
Court legal and policy issues 315, 320; K R Gray „Evidence Before the ICC‟ in D McGoldrick, P J 
Rowe & E Donelly (eds) The permanent International Criminal court: legal and policy issues (2004) 
287-302; W A Schabas „The place of victims in international criminal law‟ in International Criminal 
Law: Quo Vadis? (2004)505.  
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regarding victims; there is even a special Unit in this respect.355 This is very different 
from the International Court of Justice, where a victim cannot intervene. 
 
Hence the decision of the Court takes into account the damage caused to the victim to 
whom it allocates reparations. The notion that national legislation or international law 
could prejudice the guarantee of rights to victims should be avoided.356 According to 
article 1 (2) of the Statute “The Court may make an order directly against a convicted 
person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”. Furthermore, article 79 (1) provides for 
the creation of a Trust Fund for the benefit of victims and their families. This is an 
important contribution of the Rome Statute to reforming international criminal justice. 
Justice as exercised by the ICC is not only preventive and repressive357 but also 
restorative.  
 
As for the accused, several important principles relating to the guarantee of a fair trial 
are assured. The Statute requires the application of the principle of presumption of 
innocence; in case of any doubt, the interpretation of the law by the Court shall be 
made in favor of the accused and the prosecutor has the burden to prove that the 
accused is guilty.358 “Therefore in order to convict the accused, the Court must be 
convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt”.359 While the right to 
be tried in due time is asserted in article 67 (1) (c), there are, unfortunately, sometimes 
long procedural delays and case overloads, which compromise this principle.360 
 
4.1.5.3 Codification of international law 
 
The Rome Statute contributed to the long overdue process of the codification of 
international law in general and international criminal law in particular. Several 
                                                 
355 Article 43 (6). 
356 Article 27 (6). 
357 O Triffterer „The Preventive and the Repressive Function of the International Criminal Court‟ in M 
Politi & G Nesi The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court A challenge to impunity (2001) 
137-140. 
358 Article 66 (1) (2). 
359 Article 66 (3). 
360 None of the cases before the ICC have so far been adjudicated. The case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
for instance, has been awaiting judgement since March 2006!  
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sacrosanct principles of criminal law were integrated, such as the legality of crime and 
sanction (which requires the definition by the law of an offence and its specific 
punishment prior to perpetration of the crime); non-retroactivity; a case which has not 
yet been treated cannot be re-opened or ne bis idem; those responsible for crimes must 
be prosecuted individually;361 and that the accused are presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. Immunity cannot be granted due to the official capacity of the accused. 
Factors such as age, mental state, error, and the power of individuals are considered to 
indict or not those presumed responsible for the perpetration of crimes.362 Many other 
important principles are set out in the 128 different articles, which are not appropriate 
to reproduce here. In brief, the Rome Statute constitutes a large step forward in the 
codification of the principles of international criminal law.363  
 
4.2 Functioning and procedures 
 
As a judicial body the ICC is constituted of different organs to ensure that it operates 
smoothly. The composition of the Court will be outlined so as to highlight the 
interaction between the different sections. 
 
According to article 34 of the Rome Statute, the Court shall be composed of the 
Presidency, an Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division, the Office 
of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.364 
 
The Presidency is composed of a President and two Vice-Presidents who are elected 
by the absolute majority of their peer judges. The administration of the Court is, 
except for the Office of the Prosecutor, the responsibility of the Presidency. The 
                                                 
361 G Conetti „State‟s crime and individuals‟ crimes: what relationship?‟ in M Politi & G Nesi The 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2001) 131, 133.  
362 Articles 20, 22,23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33 of the Rome Statute. 
363 T Weigend „The harmonization of general principles of criminal law: the status and jurisprudence of 
the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC: an overview‟ in International Criminal Law: Quo Vadis? (2004) 419-435; 
Arsanjani, M. “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” (1999) (35) (1) American 
Journal of international Law 22, passim 
364 One of these organs, according to article 112 is the Assembly of States Parties which plays an 
important role in the appointment of judges and prosecutors. It also intervenes in procedures for the 
amendment of the Rome Statute, the adoption of ICC regulations and „to recommend measures against 
States not complying with their obligations under the statute‟. I Cameron „Jurisdiction and 
admissibility issues under the ICC Statute‟ in D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) The 
permanent International Criminal Court legal and policy issues (2004) 5. 
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Presidency collaborates with the Prosecutor to deal with “all matters of mutual 
concern”.365  
 
In conformity with article 39 (1) (2) of the Rome Statute, the Court is structured in 
divisions and chambers comprising judges as follows:  
 the Appeals Chamber, composed of five judges, including the President, who 
also comprise the Appeals Division;  
 the Trial Chamber, whose three judges are part of the Trial Division which is 
constituted of at least six judges;  
 the Pre-Trial Chamber, where one or three judges of the Pre-Trial Division 
might be competent to act; and  
 the Pre-Trial Division is comprised of at least six judges. 
In other words, the judicial activities are really exercised by Chambers, which can be 
increased at Pre-Trial and Trial level. 
 
Beside the Chambers, there is the Office of the Prosecutor .The latter is headed by the 
Prosecutor who is assisted by a number of Deputy Prosecutors and is elected by the 
Assembly of States Parties. He/she is independent and exercises his/her function 
before the Court as an independent organ. All referrals and necessary information or 
details relating to crimes as provided in the Rome Statute are referred to this office to 
be examined, investigated and eventually prosecuted before the Court. The Prosecutor 
may appoint advisors with specific skills to assist him/her to fulfill his tasks, for 
instance on violence relating to gender and children‟s issues.366 Another structure, 
which plays an important role in the administration of the ICC, is the Registry. The 
Registry handles non-judicial administrative matters. It is directed by the Registrar 
who is elected by the judges upon the recommendation of The Assembly of States 
Parties. He/she is considered “the principal administrative officer of the Court” and as 
such the President of Court has some authority over him/her.367  
 
The different personnel of those organs and most staff of the Court are elected or 
appointed on the basis of competence, integrity, and equity, representing different 
                                                 
365 Article 38 (4) of the Rome Statute. 
366 Article 42 (2) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) of the Rome Statute.  
367 Article 43 (1) (2) of the Rome Statute. 
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parts of the world. To prosecute a case, the Court requires the interaction of all of 
these organs, which work separately but with close collaboration.  
 
When serious crimes within the jurisdiction of ICC are alleged to have been 
committed in the territory of state parties or by a national of a State Party, the 
Prosecutor shall prosecute. The procedure is applied as follows.  
 
Having received information from States, NGOs, individuals368 or other reliable 
sources that is delivered to the ICC office, the Prosecutor may open an investigation 
into these alleged crimes to establish more information on the perpetrators of such 
crimes.369 When its investigations are concluded, the Prosecutor may ask the Court to 
indict those alleged to be responsible for these crimes of concern to the international 
community.370  
 
The Court must verify if its jurisdiction can be exercised satisfactorily. Certain 
conditions must be fulfilled before the commencement of an investigation in the 
territory of a State. A State may refer a case to the Office of the Prosecutor, or the 
Prosecutor may launch an investigation in the State in question, on his/her own 
initiative371 by exercising the ICC‟s jurisdiction propio motu in accordance with 
article 15 of the Rome Statute (1).372 
                                                 
368 L Mekhemar „The status of the individual in the Statute of the International Criminal Court‟ in M 
Politi & G Nesi The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2001) 
123, 125. 
369 “Neither referrals, whether by a State Party or the UN Security Council, nor private 
communications automatically „trigger‟ the powers of the Prosecutor. In all cases the OTP must first 
conduct an analysis of information in order to determine whether the statutory threshold to start an 
investigation is met: there must be „a reasonable basis to proceed‟”, ICC Communications and 
Referrals  available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Referals+and+communications/, accessed on 02 August 
2011. 
370 Article 15 (2)  of the Rome Statute. 
371 S A Fernandez de Gurmendi „The Role of the Prosecutor‟ in M Politi & G Nesi The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2001) 55.  
372 „To date, there have been three state referrals from the governments of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, two referrals from the United Nations Security 
Council regarding the situation in Darfur and the situation in Libya, and one investigation propio motu 
regarding the situation in Kenya (the Côte d‟Ivoire will be the second situation of investigation propio 
motu considering the process under way since Ivorian authorities have accepted the ICC‟s jurisdiction 
in 2003 and 2010 and the authorisation of investigation by the ICC in 2011). The Office has also 
received over 8733 communications since July 2002 from more than 140 countries, with the majority 
of those communications coming from individuals in the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Russia and France available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Referals+and+communications/, accessed on 02 August 
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If the State in question is not party to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor and the Court 
may not have jurisdiction. In such a case there are two situations that can allow the 
Court to apply its jurisdiction to adjudicate the case: where the case is referred by the 
UN Security Council, and where the State voluntarily accepts the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
 
According to article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute, the UN may decide to act under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter by referring the case to the ICC. 
 
Currently there are two cases before the ICC that were referred by the UN Security 
Council: the Case of Darfur and the Case of Libya. 
 
Although this is a way to fight impunity for crimes committed in the territory of a 
non-member State, it is limiting, as it cannot be applied to all non-member States. For 
instance, it seems impossible to use this procedure against nationals of certain 
powerful countries, like the US, China or Russia, because they may use their veto 
vote to block such action. Referral by the UN Security Council is therefore subject to 
the risk of politicization,373 or the application of double standards. In their current 
form, some UN organs appear to function in an anachronistic manner and need to be 
reformed to allow the ICC to operate in a democratic, rather than a Cold War, spirit. 
 
A non-member State Party374 can accept the jurisdiction of the ICC, in terms of article 
12 (3) of the Rome Statute, which provides that “that State may, by declaration lodged 
with the registrar, accept the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Court with respect to 
                                                                                                                                            
2011;MH Arsanjani  & WM Reisman  “The Law-in-Action of the International Criminal Court” 
(2005)(99)(317) American Journal of International Law 385,passim.   
373 R Cryer & N D White „The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: who‟s feeling 
threatened? In O Bekou & R Cryer (eds) The International Criminal Court (2004) 495-521; D Sarooshi 
„The peace and justice paradox : the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council‟ in D 
McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) The permanent International Criminal Court: legal and 
policy issues (2004) 95-97; Security Council referral confirms ICC as a critical international institution 
(2 March 2011) available at http://mg.co.za/article/2011-03-02-security-council-referral-confirms-icc-
as-a-critical-international-institution accessed on 07 May 2011; A Louw „Africa should work with, not 
against, the ICC in resolving the Libyan crisis‟ (21 July 2011) available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1323, accessed on 27 July 2011. 
374 D Akande „The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over nationals of non-Parties: legal 
basis and limits‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer The International Criminal Court (2004) 225-227. 
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the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any 
delay or exception”. 
 
However, despite the Prosecutor acting in conformity with article 19 (1) of the Rome 
Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court is not automatic. This article states that “the 
Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it .The 
Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case”. But how does 
the Court determine its jurisdiction?  
 
4.3 The jurisdiction of the ICC  
 
In conformity with the requirements of the Statute, the Court has jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons responsible for serious crimes perpetrated in the territory of party 
States or by a national of a State Party. However, it should be noted that the Court‟s 
jurisdiction is complementary to nationals Tribunals. This means that it is only 
competent to intervene if there is no efficient prosecution at national level.375 
 
4.3.1 The principle of complementarity 
 
The principle of complementarity is of the utmost importance in procedure before the 
ICC, to determine whether or not the Court should exercise its jurisdiction. 
 
Indeed this principle is asserted in paragraph 10 of the preamble to the Rome Statute, 
which affirms, “that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”. Therefore the jurisdiction 
of the Court does not have primacy over national jurisdictions, which remain 
competent to prosecute criminals responsible for grave crimes. This principle 
differentiates the jurisdiction of the ICC from the jurisdiction of the ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunal that has concurrent primacy over national 
jurisdictions. During the negotiations between the Plenipotentiaries at the Diplomatic 
Conference at Rome, States reached consensus that the International Court should not 
                                                 
375 J T Holmes „Complementarity: national courts versus the ICC‟ (2004) in O Bekou & R Cryer The 
International Criminal Court 667; Charney, JI. “International Criminal Law and the role of domestic 
courts” (2001) 95 (1) American Journal of International Law 144 ,171.  
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exercise universal jurisdiction, as this was regarded as a threat to their sovereignty, 
given that justice is an attribute of sovereignty.376  
 
This principle may be regarded as strategic, as it could stimulate the exercise of 
criminal justice on a national level, which may contribute significantly to dealing with 
impunity for serious crimes.377 The target is those responsible for atrocities, whose 
punishment might be a deterrent to other potential criminals. The deterrence effect of 
the ICC is a very important contribution to the perception of justice worldwide. 
However, some analysts regard the application by the ICC of positive 
complementarity as not ideal; they are of the opinion that proactive complementarity 
could be more useful.378  
 
The following section considers the conditions of admissibility of a case when the 
Court may exercise its complementary jurisdiction. 
 
4.3.2 The admissibility of a case 
 
The Court must examine all cases brought before it to determine if all preliminary 
necessary conditions were met and that there is jurisdiction for the case. When the 
Prosecutor intends to investigate a situation referred to its office by a State Party or in 
virtue of its power propio motu consistent with article 15 (1) of the Rome Statute, 
he/she must firstly “notify all States Parties and those States of which taking into 
account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crimes concerned”. Depending on the sensitivity of the case, the information given to 
States in the notification may be limited. In so doing, the Prosecutor verifies if there is 
any prosecution at national level or if any State intends to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction to try the alleged criminal. After the notification, a State is given one 
month to “inform the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or 
others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes 
referred to in article 5 of the Statute”. Hence, except in the case of a contrary opinion 
                                                 
376 H-P Kaul & C Kreb „Jurisdiction and cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
principles and compromises‟ (2004) in O Bekou & R Cryer The International Criminal Court 191-195. 
377 O Triffterer (note 357 above). 
378 W W Burke-White (note 1 above). 
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on the part of the Court, under certain conditions a State may demand that the 
Prosecutor defer to it, and allow it to deal with alleged criminals under its jurisdiction. 
In such a case, the Prosecutor would follow up on progress with the State, and he/she 
can review the decision to defer six months after or at any time if there is real doubt 
concerning the willingness or the capacity of the State to investigate. The State may, 
however appeal against the decision of the Prosecutor or Pre-trial Chamber; and, vice-
versa, the Prosecutor may also appeal. However, when the Prosecutor consents to 
defer a case to a State, the latter shall inform the Prosecutor when necessary on the 
progress of the investigation. This may be open “to review by the Prosecutor six 
months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant 
change of circumstances based on the State‟s unwillingness” (article 18 (3)). 
 
Indeed, as the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary, the knowledge of the State of 
investigation and prosecution processes at a national level is fundamental to 
determine whether or not the national jurisdiction is competent to try criminals where 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC appear to have been committed. 
 
4.3.3 Determining whether a case is inadmissible 
 
The ICC may not investigate and has no jurisdiction in a case that has not yet been 
investigated by competent State national jurisdictions, even if the investigation by the 
national jurisdictions leads to the decision not to charge the suspect. However, the 
Court will remain competent according to article 17 (a) if the “State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”, except where the 
person has already been sentenced for the same crime or if the threshold of the alleged 
crime is not high enough. 
 
What are the determining criteria that are considered to determine lack of will or State 
incapacity to bring alleged criminals to justice in a given case? 
 
According to article 17 (b), the Court is not competent where a case has been 
investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or 
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unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned.379 
 
Notwithstanding the principles of international law relating to a fair process, 
according to article 17 (2) (a) (b) (c) of the Rome Statute, it can be considered that 
there is no will on the national level when a) the perpetrator is prosecuted simply to 
prevent the ICC proceeding and to allow the alleged criminal to escape sentencing; b) 
the state delays proceedings without good cause; and c) the State fails to launch 
proceedings against the suspect.380 
 
A State may be considered incapacitated when “due to a total or substantial collapse 
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings”.381 
 
Although a national jurisdiction may be weakened by several factors such as political 
interference, corruption, lack of personnel and incompetence, it is important to note 
that often its partial or general collapse is due to war or armed conflict. This seems to 
be the case in the DRC, where a long institutional crisis has been exacerbated by 
several grave armed conflicts recently.  
 
In conformity with the Rome Statute, the right to challenge either the jurisdiction of 
the ICC or the admissibility of a case before it is guaranteed under certain conditions 
to any accused, Party State or non-Party State. Before adjudicating a case, the Court is 
required to scrutinize the extent to which its jurisdiction may be applicable to the 
case. When the Court exercises its jurisdiction, different issues must be considered, 
such as questions relating to subject matter, the territory, and the person.382  
 
Thus the Prosecutor is, in certain cases, required to seek a ruling from the Court 
relating to any question which may raise jurisdiction or admissibility issues.383 
                                                 
379 Article 17 (b) of the Rome Statute. 
380 Article 17 (2) (a) (b) (c) of the Rome Statute. 
381 Article 17 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
382 Article 19(2) (a) (b) (c) of the Rome Statute. 
383 Article 19 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
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4.3.4 Jurisdiction ratione loci  
 
Although the Court aims to prosecute crimes of international concern, unfortunately, 
it does not have the universal jurisdiction that could have been one of its strongest 
tools to eradicate the culture of impunity that has plagued the welfare of humankind. 
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited to the territory of State Parties to the Rome 
Statute, although a non-Party State may accept the jurisdiction of the Court as well. 
Indeed, according to the article 12 of the Statute “the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction towards a State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred 
or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of 
that vessel or aircraft”.  
 
The jurisdiction of the Court is therefore confined to the territory of a State Party. It 
cannot prosecute crimes committed in the territory of non-State Party without the 
prior consent of such a State to this process. However, according to article 13 (b) of 
the Statute the Court may not require the acquiescence of a State when the situation is 
“referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations”.384  
 
4.3.5 Jurisdiction ratione personae 
 
The Court has jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for crime within its 
jurisdiction that is committed by a national of a State Party. However if a national of 
non-State Party commits crime on the territory of a State Party or a perpetrator of 
such a crime is found in such a territory, he/she can be prosecuted. Criminals who are 
nationals of non-Party States to the Rome Statute are therefore unable to move to 
other countries. However, it is important to note that the bilateral accord385 signed 
between the US and different countries to prevent the prosecution of their nationals in 
                                                 
384 E Wilmshurst „The International Criminal Court: the role of the Security Council‟ in M Politi & G 
Nesi (eds) in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: a challenge to impunity (2004) 39-
41. 
385 Based on article 98 (b) of the Rome Statute. 
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other countries appears to be an affirmation of impunity and as such should be 
denounced.386  
 
4.3.6 Jurisdiction ratione materiae  
 
The Court has jurisdiction to try criminals responsible for international crimes, which, 
according to article 5 of the Rome Statute, are the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression.387 
 
A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the 
Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5 and article 12 (1) of the Rome 
Statute. However, apart from these crimes, the ICC also has jurisdiction over other 
offences relating to the administration of justice provided in articles 70 and 71 of the 
Rome Statute and Rules 162-169 and 172 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
 
                                                 
386 D McGoldrick „Political and Legal Responses to the ICC‟ in D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly 
(eds) The permanent International Criminal Court: legal and policy issues (2004) 390, 423. 
387 It is very regrettable that the crime of aggression cannot be punished right now by the ICC because 
of a lack of definition in the Rome Statute, although this crime had been defined in article 6 (a) of the 
Agreement signed at London on 8 August 1945 related to the Statute of the Tribunal of Nuremberg, 
half century ago and in the Resolution of the Assembly General of the UN of 14 December 1974. 
Considering that the crime of aggression is a source of all other grave crimes and noting the 
proliferation of aggressive wars in the world, the definition of the crime of aggression should be a 
priority, if states were looking to truly promote the rule of law during the negotiations related to the 
draft of the ICC Statute during the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiary in Rome. A few years 
after the adoption of the Rome Statute, the DRC (1998) was the victim of a war of aggression (see 
Chapter 2). The recent US war in Iraq (2003) illustrates the continuation of the crime of aggression in 
the twenty first century. See Richard Norton-Taylor, Called to account: the indictment of Anthony 
Charles Lynton Blair for the crime of aggression against Iraq – a hearing (2007) 89; J Dugard (note 48 
above; 518-520); E A Lewis „War Law: understanding international law and armed conflict‟ (2007) 
(48) (1) in Harvard International Law Journal 293-306. However relating to the crime of aggression as 
provided in article 5 (2) 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute, a Conference for the revision of the Statute 
was held in Uganda from 31 May to 11 June 2010. With respect to the definition of this crime, the 
Court will have jurisdiction over it possibly by 2017, as it is expected that the amendment adopted by 
States Parties will enter into force in 2017. See D D Ntanda Nsereko „The International Criminal Court: 
an overview of the basic features and recent developments‟ – public lecture held on 10 May 2011 at the 
Faculty of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal; A Stemmet „All‟s well that ends postponed: the 
definition of the crime of aggression at the Rome Statute Review in Kampala‟ (2010) (19) (1) African 
Security Review 3-13 available at 
http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/220331_751317867_930197203.pdf, accessed on 10 April 2011. 
Read also N Weisbord „Prosecuting aggression‟ 2008 (49) (162) Harvard International Law Journal 
161, 219-220 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/hilj49&id=1&size=2&collection=journal
s&index=journals/hilj, accessed on 10 Jan 2011. 
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4.3.6.1 The crime of genocide  
 
The term „genocide‟388 was used to described atrocities committed by the Nazis 
during World War Two, with the intention of eliminating various human groups, 
especially the Jews. The crime was later regulated in the International Convention on 
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide of 9 October 1948. Different ad hoc 
international criminal jurisdictions have prosecuted this crime, which is also 
integrated in the Rome Statute.  
 
According to article 6 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) of the Rome Statute the crime of genocide is 
committed when an individual commits one or a certain number of acts aimed at the 
destruction of a specific group. Amongst these acts are:  
 killing members of the group; 
 causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
 imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and 
 forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
The intention of the perpetrator must be to partially or totally destroy the group,389 
which can be of an ethnic, national, racial, or religious character. 
 
Although the act is committed against one or several individuals, the ultimate victim 
of the crime of genocide is not the individual, but the group itself. The individual is 
targeted because he/she is a member of the group. Therefore “membership in such 
                                                 
388 Etymologically the word derives from Greek genos = race, nation, tribe and Latin cide = killing 
which means, then, literally killing of a human group. This term was coined by R Lemkin „Genocide as 
crime under International Law‟1947 (41) in AJIL 147 available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?public=false&handle=hein.journals/ajil41&men_hide=false&
men_tab=citnav&collection=journals&page=145, accessed on 10 January 2011; C Byron „The crime 
of genocide‟ in D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) The permanent International Criminal 
Court: legal and policy issues (2004) 143.  
389 “The intention must be to destroy a group „in whole or in part‟. Genocide can thus be committed 
through the destruction of a large number of the group (a qualitative attempt at destruction) or the 
destruction of a limited number of the group who are targeted because of the potential impact of their 
destruction on the survival of the group as a whole (a qualitative attempt at destruction)”. The 
destruction can be demonstrated by considering the method, the gravity and the scope of destruction M 
du Plessis (note 297 above; 182). 
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groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong to it 
automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner”.390 
 
The term „group‟ refers to stable groups, and does not include groups of a political, 
economic or cultural character.391 The view of the drafters of the Rome Statute was 
that the aim was to prevent physical destruction of a group, which did not embrace 
cultural destruction.392 
 
As noted by Ambos, “The crime of genocide protects the group as a social, supra-
individual entity, it protects the „group as such‟, while the ordinary criminal law 
protects the rights and legal interests of individuals”.393 
 
Genocide is a crime against humanity,394 which is characterized by a special mental 
element395 on the part of the perpetrator who wants to destroy in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group.  
 
4.3.6.2 Crimes against humanity 
 
The term „crimes against humanity‟ can be traced back to the past.396 The expression 
was used for the first time in its contemporary sense in 1915 to describe massacres 
committed by Turkish forces against their own Greek and Armenian subjects during 
World War  One.397  
 
Although these atrocities were firmly denounced by the Allied powers, those 
responsible for these crimes were not punished because the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920, 
which provided for prosecution, was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne 
                                                 
390 Prosecutor v Akeyesu (note 63 above; para 511); M du Plessis (note 297 above; 181). 
391 K Ambos „Selected issues regarding the core crimes in international criminal law‟ International 
Criminal: Quo Vadis? (2004) 219, 220-221. 
392 M Du Plessis (note 297 above; 174, 181). 
393 K Ambos (note 391 above; 241).  
394 M Du Plessis (note 297 above; 181). 
395 Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic Case No. IT-95-10-A, ICTY (Appeal), 5 July 2001, para 66 available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/acjug/en/jel-aj010705.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2011; O Triffterer 
„Genocide, its particular intent to destroy in whole or part the group as such‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer 
(eds) The International Criminal Court (2004) 101-106. 
396 D Robinson „Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer 
(eds) The International Criminal Court (2004) 111, 112-113. 
397 M Du Plessis (note 297above; 182). 
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“which contained a „Declaration of Amnesty‟ for all offences committed between 1 
August 1914 and 20 November 1922”.398 A few decades later, the term was used 
again to condemn crimes committed by Nazi war criminals during World War Two. 
Crimes against humanity were amongst three crimes provided for in the Statute of the 
International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, although there was 
criticism of the legality of the measures taken by those Tribunals. Crimes against 
humanity were later integrated in the ad hoc tribunal created by the UN Security 
Council during the last decade of the previous century. Finally they were refined in 
the Rome Statute. 
 
In accordance with 7 (1) (a)-(k) of this Statute, crimes against humanity are 
committed under certain specific conditions through the commission of one of the 
following acts: 1) Murder; 2) Extermination; 3) Enslavement; 4) Deportation or 
forcible transfer of the population; 5) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; 6) Torture; 7) 
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 8) Persecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious; 9) Enforced disappearance of persons; 10) The crime of apartheid; 11) 
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.  
 
To be considered as crimes against humanity and not ordinary crime or other types of 
crime, the act must be performed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”.399 Three 
elements should be taken into account: the context (widespread or systematic attack) 
of the commission of the act; the mental element or specific intent (with knowledge of 
the attack); and who the act is perpetrated against (civilian population). 
 
It is important to note that crimes against humanity do not only take place during 
armed conflict; they can be perpetrated even during periods of peace. Proof of a 
                                                 
398 France, Russia and United Kingdom. 
399 Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
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discriminatory motive (national political, ethnic, racial, religious) on the grounds of 
which the crime was committed has been eliminated.  
 
4.3.6.3 War crimes 
 
Since this dissertation focuses on the fight against impunity for war crimes 
perpetrated in the DRC, those crimes are considered in-depth. This section begins 
with notions related to the term and its definition as provided for in the Rome Statute.  
 
4.3.6.3.1 Notion  
 
The first pre-condition for the perpetration of war crimes is the existence of armed 
conflict. Armed conflict is defined in Chapter 2 above.  
 
War crimes are amongst the oldest offence in the history of humankind, so that 
“throughout history, and in common parlance, the term „war crime‟ has a number of 
meanings”.400 The prosecution of those responsible for war crimes has been organized 
in domestic law for a long time.401 Indeed the first prosecution organized in 
international law was related to war crimes committed during World War One by 
German soldiers. They were convicted for “acts in violation of laws and customs of 
war” at Leipzig in the early 1920s, pursuant to arts 228 and 230 of the Treaty of 
Versailles.402  
 
These prosecutions were largely inspired by the 1907 Hague Convention, which was 
not really suitable for the prosecution of individuals. However since the codification 
of war crimes in the Nuremberg Charter of 1945, and in the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and their additional Protocols of 1977, there has been important progress. The 
concept of war has also refined in different Statutes of the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. More recently, the notion has been 
considered in the Rome Statute, which refined the concept.  
                                                 
400 P Rowe „War crimes‟ in D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) Permanent International 
Criminal Court: legal and policy issues (2004) 203; W A Schabas (note 296 above; 51).  
401 T Meron War crimes law comes of age: essays (1998) 1; W A Schabas (note 296 above; 51); M Du 
Plessis (note 297 above; 174, 185).  
402 M Du Plessis (note 297 above; 186); W A Schabas (note 296 above; 52). 
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4.3.6.3.2 Definition of war crimes in the Rome Statute 
 
The definition403 of war crimes in the Rome Statute is very broad. It distinguishes 
between two kinds of armed conflict and two types of norms related to the 
conventions and customs applicable to these conflicts. 
 
As provided in the Rome Statute, in order to be prosecuted, war crimes must reach a 
certain threshold in accordance with article 8 (1), which requires that the crime must 
have been “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crimes”. Moreover as provided in article 30 (1) of the Rome 
Statute the mental element is required. Those responsible for such acts must have 
intent and knowledge when performing them.  
 
In terms of the conventional norms applicable to armed conflict of an international 
character, war crimes are defined in the Rome Statue as grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949. Among specific acts which can be considered as war 
crimes during such armed conflict are: 1) Willful killing; 2) Torture or inhuman 
treatment, including biological experiments; 3) Willfully causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or health; 4) Extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
5) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile power; 6) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of 
the rights of fair and regular trial; 7) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful 
confinement; and 8) Taking of hostages. The act must have been committed against 
persons or property protected under the Conventions.404 
 
                                                 
403 According to P Rowe in general war crimes can be considered as “any breach of international law 
during an armed conflict either between (or among) States or within a state. It can therefore include 
genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva conventions of 1949 and Additional 
Protocol I, 1977, breach of the common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, 1949 and breaches of the 
laws or customs of war (whether incorporated into the Rome Statute 1998 of the International Criminal 
court or not)”. See P Rowe (note 203above). Read also commentary by K D rmann, L Doswald-Beck 
& R Kolb Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Sources and Commentary (2004) passim. 
404 Article 8 (2) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
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Regarding the second type of norms related to laws and customs in respect of 
international warfare the commission of any of the following acts may be considered 
as war crimes;405 9) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as 
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 10) 
Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not 
military objectives; 11) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
missions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are 
entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international 
law of armed conflict; 12) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that 
such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which 
would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military 
advantage anticipated; 13) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, 
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military 
objectives; 14) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or 
no longer having means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; 15) Making 
improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and uniform of 
the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury; 16) The transfer, 
directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population 
into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the 
population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory; 17) Intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and 
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; 18) Subjecting 
persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or to medical 
or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental 
or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and 
which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or persons;19) 
Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; 
20) Declaring that no quarter will be given; 21) Destroying or seizing the enemy's 
                                                 
405 Article 8 (b) those laws customs must be within the „established framework of international law‟.  
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property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war; 22) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of 
law the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile party; 23) Compelling the 
nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their 
own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement 
of the war; 24) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 25) Employing 
poison or poisoned weapons; 26) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices; 27) Employing bullets which expand 
or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does 
not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions; 29) Employing weapons, 
projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in 
violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, 
projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive 
prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in 
accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123; 30) 
Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 31) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions‟ 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 32) Utilizing the presence of a 
civilian or other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces 
immune from military operations; 33) Intentionally directing attacks against 
buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive 
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law; 34) 
Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions; and 35) Conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of 15 years into the national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities. 
 
Protection extended by the Convention is not limited to the civilian population but is 
extended to “personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of 
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the United Nations”.406 Some types of war weapons are prohibited even though others 
(such as nuclear weapons) have not been comprehensively regulated. In this provision 
women and children are provided with particular protection, respectively against 
violence and abuse during warfare.407 
 
In terms of the conventional norms, regarding internal armed conflict, war crimes are 
considered as gross violations in terms of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949. 
 
Thus according to article 8 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute, the commission of one of the 
following acts may constitute war crimes: 1) Violence to life and person, in particular 
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 2) Committing outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 3) Taking of 
hostages; 4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial 
guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable. 
 
However to be regarded as war crimes, the victim of such acts must have not been 
actively involved in warfare. He/she may be a civilian or even a soldier who had 
abandoned the war or cannot fight due to several objective reasons.408  
 
Regarding the norms related to laws and customs applicable in internal armed 
conflict, the perpetration of any of the following acts is considered as war crimes in 
conformity with article 8 (2) (e) of the Rome Statute: 1) Intentionally directing attacks 
against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct 
part in hostilities; 2) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, 
medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the 
Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law; 3) Intentionally directing 
attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a 
humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping missions in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or 
                                                 
406 Article 8 (b) (iii) of the Rome Statute. 
407 Article 8 (b) (xxii), Article 8 (b) (xxvi) of the Rome Statute. 
408 Article 8 (2) (c) of the Rome Statute. 
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civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict; 4) Intentionally 
directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or 
charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and 
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; 5) Pillaging a town 
or place, even when taken by assault; 6) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2; 7) enforced 
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious 
violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions; 8) Conscripting or 
enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups or using them 
to participate actively in hostilities; 9) Ordering the displacement of the civilian 
population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians 
involved or imperative military reasons so demand; 10) Killing or wounding 
treacherously a combatant adversary; 11) Declaring that no quarter will be given; 12) 
Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical 
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither 
justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor 
carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the 
health of such person or persons; and 13) Destroying or seizing the property of an 
adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of the conflict. 
 
In general, this definition is a significant codification of different sources of 
international humanitarian law.409 However, to comply with the principle of legality, 
such comprehensive detailed definition seems justified. There is important progress as 
well as weaknesses in the definition of war crimes outlined above. The incorporation 
of provisions relating to the criminalization of different forms of abuse of children 
and women during armed conflict is definite progress.410 However, this definition is 
not perfect, and other acts, including the use of dangerous war weapons such as 
nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, etc should be criminalized.411 Moreover, the 
                                                 
409 See M Du Plessis 9 (note 297 above; 174, 184). 
410 See M Du Plessis 9 (note 297 above; 174, 189).  
411 A Cassese „The Statute of the International Criminal Court: some preliminary reflections‟ in O 
Bekou & R Cryer (eds) The International Criminal Court (2004) 40, 49. 
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distinction between two kinds of armed conflicts is not adjusted to the current 
evolution of international law.412 
 
4.4 ICC Prosecution of war crimes launched in the DRC 
 
Since the referral of the Congolese situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor has 
investigated several cases, which are in process.  
4.4.1 Referral of Congolese situation to the Prosecutor‟s Office by the Congolese 
authorities 
 
Numerous grave international crimes were perpetrated during the cyclical armed 
conflicts in the DRC. Due to the wars, the country was torn into different parts, which 
were under the control of different embattled parties.413 This de facto partition of the 
country brought about the collapse of State institutions.414 War in the national 
territory was marked by widespread acts of terror against the civilian population. The 
violence continues until today, especially in the eastern part of the Country.415 There 
have been many politics and diplomatic initiatives416 aimed at solving the Congolese 
crisis. These resulted in a global and all-inclusive accord on power sharing in the 
DRC on 17 December 2002 at Pretoria in South Africa. Thanks to the end of the war, 
the Congo was reunited and a Government of National Unity was established. Indeed, 
no one won nor lost the war; all parties took part in national transition institutions 
(2003-2006). But this transition process raised serious questions relating to the fate of 
those who perpetrated serious crimes committed during the war period (1996-97 and 
1998- 2003). The issue of justice in the post-conflict context is and was very sensitive, 
and moreover. At that time the national judiciary was weakened by the general 
                                                 
412 Ibidem 47. 
413 Note 171 above. 
414 T Ngoy (note 8 above; 192-196). 
415 Amnesty International Report 2011. The state of the world’s human rights 123-126 available at 
http://files.amnesty.org/air11/air_2011_full_en.pdf, accessed on 18 May 2011. 
416 See The Lusaka agreement on ceasefire in DRC of July 1999 signed in Lusaka, Zambia; The Sun 
City Accord resulted from the Inter Congolese Dialogue (350 delegates from eight political group 
February-April 2002 Sun City RSA), The Pretoria Agreement of July 2002, The Luanda Agreement 
September 2002, The Global and All inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC December 
2002 in Pretoria RSA and final session on all agreement signed on April 2003 in Sun City/ RSA. See C 
Villa-Vicencio P Nantulya & T Savage Building nations: transitional justice in the African Great 
Lakes Region (2005) 53-54. 
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institutional crisis417 which undermined its function and put it under the control of the 
different parties in power. The country was ruled by a presidency constituted of five 
persons according to the famous Mbeki418 formula for sharing power: one president 
and four vice- presidents,419 – an institutional monster with five heads! This 
presidency organized the historic elections of 2006. 
 
The Office of the ICC Prosecutor had begun to track crimes in the DRC in July 2003, 
particularly in Ituri. After consideration of ICC jurisdiction as provided in the Rome 
Statute and relating to the gravity of crimes perpetrated in DRC, the Prosecutor 
recommended prosecution. In September 2003, the Prosecutor announced to the 
Assembly of State Parties that he was about to open an investigation in DRC, whether 
on the initiative of the ICC using its competence proprio motu (in which case he 
would require authorization of the pre-trial Chamber) or preferably by way of referral 
by the Congolese government.420 This was not good news for the different parties. 
Some were of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the ICC was unnecessary because 
the national jurisdiction could try those crimes.421 However on November 2003 the 
Congolese authorities accepted the proposition and on March 2004 decided (to some 
this decision was instrumental)422 to refer the situation in the DRC to the office of the 
ICC Prosecutor. The latter opened its first investigation in Ituri, which led to the arrest 
and surrender of some war criminals to the ICC. Currently four cases are filed before 
the ICC. 
 
4.4.2 The Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Case 
 
The case will first be presented, then the state of its process will be examined and 
lastly, the case will be assessed.  
                                                 
417 B Kabatu-Suila L’Instabilité institutionnelle, frein au développement (2004) passim. 
418 A Mbata (note 14 above; 249). 
419 See Global and all Inclusive Accord V (1), (A), (B), (C). 
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422 M Du Plessis „International Criminals Court and its work in Africa confronting the myths‟ (2008) 




4.4.2.1 Presentation  
 
Born in Jiba on 29 December 196O, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is a native of the DRC. 
He is from the Ituri District in Oriental Province.423  
 
Alleged founder of the UPC= Union des Patriotes Congolais (the Congolese Patriot 
Union) and the FPLC = Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (Patriotic 
Forces for the Liberation of Congo),424 he is being prosecuted by the ICC for being 
responsible425 for the following war crimes provided for in the Rome Statute: 
“conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national 
armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostility”.426  
 
In concrete terms, he is alleged to have enlisted and conscripted minors into the armed 
groups cited above and involved them in the hostilities between September 2002 and 
June 2003 during the armed conflict of an international character, and between June 
2003 and August 2003 during internal armed conflict.427  
4.4.2.2 State of the process  
 
After the ICC Prosecutor requested for a warrant of arrest against Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo on 12 January 2006, a warrant of arrest was issued on 10 February 2006 by the 
Court, which requested the DRC to ensure the arrest and surrender of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo on 24 February 2006.428 He was arrested on 17 March in DRC and 
finally surrendered to the ICC in The Hague where he is currently in detention.429  
 
                                                 
423 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo No.: ICC-01/04-01/06 issued on 10 
February 2006 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc191959.PDF, accessed on 10 August 
2011. 
424 „Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/, accessed on 10 May 2011. 
425 Under Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
426 See Article 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) or 8 (2) (e) (vii) of the Rome Statute ; Under seal Warrant of arrest for 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (note 423 above). 
427 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the confirmation of charges (note 61 above) para 
410 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF, accessed on 10 June 2011. 
428 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (note 427 above; para 15, 16.)  
429 See Court‟s Detention Center in The Hague Center; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (note 427 
above; para 16). 
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The Chamber heard Lubanga Dyilo‟s case on 20 March 2006. During the hearing “the 
chamber satisfied itself that he had been informed of the crimes which he is alleged to 
have been committed and of his rights. At that hearing, the Chamber announced that 
the confirmation hearing would be held on 27 June 2006”.430 
 
On 2 August, 15 and 20 September, and 4 October 2006, the Chamber rendered four 
decisions on applications concerning redactions and summary evidence filed by the 
Prosecutor pursuant to rule 81 of the Rules.  
 
On 29 January 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed431 charges of war crimes 
against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and on 4 September 2007 the case was filed in the 
Trial Chamber I for hearing.432 However, in order to ensure a fair trial, on 11 May 
2010 the Prosecutor was requested by the Trial Chamber to reveal to Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo the details related to intermediary 143, insofar as he will be under the 
protection of suitable measures.433 
 
After review of those measures and due to implementation delays, finally on 7 July 
2010, given that more protective measures had been taken, the Trial Chamber 
repeated its orders to the Prosecutor to disclose, within half-an-hour the identity of 
intermediary 143 under restrictive conditions which it deems sufficient to protect the 
intermediary. The Prosecutor did not disclose the identity of intermediary 143 within 
this time-limit434 and the Trial Chamber decided to stop proceedings on 8 July.435 A 
few days later on 15 July, The Chamber granted the Prosecutor leave to appeal the 
decision staying proceedings. It also ordered the release of Lubanga Dyilo.436 
However, this decision of the Trial Chamber was reversed on October 2010 by the 
Decision of Appeal Chamber.437 
 
                                                 
430 Ibidem para 17. 
431 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (note 427 above) para 410. 
432 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo No: ICC 01/ 04-01/06 ( Trail Chamber I), 04 September 2007 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc342296.PDF, accessed on 10 June 2011. 
433 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC- 01/ 04-01/06 (Appeals Chamber) 8 October 2010 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc948677.pdf, accessed on 17 July 2011.  
434 Ibidem para (3) 17-20. 
435 Ibidem (3) 24-25; (4) 12. 
436 Ibidem (4) 19-20. 
437 Ibidem (9) 10-11. 
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The Trial has entered its final stages following the hearing of closing statements that 
took place on 25 and 26 August 2011.438 
 
4.4.2.3 Assessment  
 
This is the first trial relating to the DRC; it is therefore of the utmost importance in 
terms of case law for trials to come. Currently the process before the Trial Chamber is 
almost at an end; the different parties have made their pleadings and are waiting for 
the deliberations and judgment of the Trial Chamber.439  
 
4.4.3. The Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Case 
 
The similarity between the Germain Katanga Case and the Mathieu Ngudjolo Case 




In common with Thomas Lubangan Dyilo, German Katanga is a Congolese from the 
Oriental Province. He was born in Mambasa (in Ituri District) on 28 April 1978.440 
Germain Katanga is accused441 under the Rome Statute442 of: 1) “murder as a crime 
against humanity”:443 2) “wilful killing as a war crime”;444 3) “inhumane acts as a 
                                                 




case%20against%20thomas%20lubanga%20dyilo, accessed on 12 September 2011. In fact, according 
to the above ICC press release, „over the course of 220 hearings, the Chamber heard 36 witnesses 
called by the Office of the Prosecutor, including 3 experts, 19 witnesses called by the Defence and 3 
witnesses called by the legal representatives of the victims participating in the proceedings. The 
Chamber also called 4 other experts to testify. The Judges ensured the respect of the rights guaranteed 
by the Rome Statute to each of the parties, including the right to cross-examine the witnesses‟ 
439 Relating to certain stages of this trial read, Chile Eboe-Osuji „Introductory note to International 
Criminal Court; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, changing characterization of crimes after commencement of 
trials‟ (2010) (49) (2) American Society of International Law 474-478. 
440 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga , No.: ICC-01/04-01/07 issued on 2 July 2007, 7 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc349648.PDF, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
441 Ibidem 6. 
442 Article 25 (3) (a) or Article 25 (3) (b). 
443 Article 7 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
444 Article 8 (2) (a) (i) or article 8 (2) (c) (i). 
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crime against humanity”;445 4) “inhumane treatment as a war crime”;446 5) “the war 
crime of using children under fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities”;447 6) 
“sexual slavery as a crime against humanity”;448 7) “sexual slavery as a war crime”;449 
and 8) “the war crime of intentionally directing the attack against the civilian 
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities”.450 
 
Germain Katanga (general of a brigade in the FRDC until his arrest in March 2005) as 
the highest FRPI commander, inter alia planned and lead with other members of the 
FNI & FRPI), the armed attack on February 2003 of Bogoro village, without any 
distinction being made between combatant and non-combatant, or of children (under 
the age required to participate in hostilities),451 which resulted in the murder of 
roughly 200 civilians, sexual abuse or enslavement, looting, civilian injuries, and the 
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of civilians.452  
 
Because the charges against Mathieu Ngudjolo are very similar, they are not repeated 
here; rather he is introduced as an individual. 
 
Mathieu Ngudjolo was born in Bunia, Orientale Province on 8 October 1970. An 
alleged warlord, he is the founder, leader, and the highest commander of FNI. Before 
his arrest on 6 February 2008 he was serving in Bunia as a Colonel in FRDC453 = 
Forces Armées de la République démocratique du Congo: the armed forces of the 
DRC. As with Germain Katanga he is being prosecuted for being responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (see details above related to Germain Katanga). 
 
 
                                                 
445 Article 7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute. 
446 Article 8 (2) (a) (ii) or article 8 (2) (c) (i) of the Rome Statute. 
447 Article 8(2) (b) (xxvi) of Rome Statute or article 8 (2) (e) (vii) of the Rome Statute. 
448 Article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome Statute. 
449 Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) or article 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute. 
450 Article 8 (2) (b) (i) or article 8 (2) (e) (i) of the Rome Statute. 
451 Children under the age of fifteen years as required in Article 8 xxvi of the Rome Statute. 
452 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Germain Katanga (note 438 above) 5. 
453 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, No.: ICC-01/04-02/07 issued on 6 July 
2007, 7 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc453054.PDF, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
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4.4.3.3 State of the process  
 
The Prosecutor requested the issue of warrants of arrests for Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngoudjolo Chui respectively on 22 and 25 June 2007.These were issued by 
the Chamber on 2 July 2007 for Germain Katanga and on 6 July 2007 for Mathieu 
Ngujdolo Chui.454 Germain Katanga was arrested and surrendered on 17 October 
2007 to the ICC, where he was heard by the Chamber for the first time on 22 October 
2007. The Chamber expressed itself satisfied with the steps taken in the process and 
confirmed the hearing on 28 February 2008.455 
 
Mathieu Ngudjolo was arrested in the DRC and surrendered on 6 February 2008 to 
the ICC, where he was heard for the first time on 11 February 2008 and it was 
announced that the confirmation hearing would be held on 21 May 2008.456  
 
Initially filed in two parts, on 10 March 2008, the Chamber decided to join Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo‟s cases and confirmed charges against them on 30 
September 2008.457 They are being charged with being responsible for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. After declining to confirm other charges against them “The 
chamber, unanimously commits Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo to a Trial 





Currently the case is under process before the Trial Chamber. It is necessary to await 
the decision of Chamber before commenting further.459 
 
 
                                                 
454 For commentary, see Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the 
confirmation of charges, No.: ICC-01/04-01/07 of 30 September 2008 para 39 and para 40 available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
455 Ibidem para 42 and para 44. 
456 Ibidem para 45 and para 47. 
457 Ibidem para 48 and para 279. 
458 Ibidem para 279. 
459 A Senier „Introductory note to International Criminal Court: Prosecutor v Katanga and Chui’ in 
American Society of International Law’ (2010) (4) (1) 45-47. 
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4.4.4 The Bosco Ntaganda Case 
 
The case will be firstly presented, following which the state of the process will be 
examined and lastly, the case will be assessed.  
 
4.4.4.1 Presentation  
  
Of Rwandan origin,460 Bosco Ntaganda allegedly worked in different armed groups in 
Ituri and North Kivu as Former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the FPLC 
=Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Cong  (Patriotic Forces for the Liberation 
of Congo) (prior to 8 December 2003), Chief of Staff of FPLC (on 8 December 2003), 
Commander of MRC= Mouvement révolutionnaire du Congo (Congo Revolutionary 
Movement) (2005),461 and Chief of Staff of the CNDP = Congress National pour la 
Defense du Peuple (National Congress for People Defence) (current).462 
 
4.4.4.2 State of the process  
  
A warrant of arrest was requested for Bosco Ntanganda on 12 January 2006.463 He is 
being prosecuted for war crimes committed during the armed conflicts (2002-2003) in 
Ituri. As one of high-ranking Commanders of Staff of the FPLC, where Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo was allegedly the highest Commander, he is being prosecuted on 
almost the same charges as Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Details relating to crimes 
allegedly perpetrated by Bosco Ntaganda are to be found in the case details of 




                                                 
460 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Bosco Ntaganda, No.: ICC-01/04-02/06 issued on 22 August 2006, 
5 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.PDF, accessed on 10 June 2011. 
461 Ibidem. 
462 „Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‟ Available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/, accessed on 10 May 2011. 
463 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Bosco Ntaganda (note 460 above). 
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4.4.4.3 Assessment  
 
Considering the nexus between Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Bosco Ntaganda, it 
should have been possible for the cases to be joined, as in the case of Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo. Unfortunately, the procedure triggered against Bosco 
Ntaganda remains paralyzed, due to political reasons.464 
 
Although a warrant of arrest was issued for Bosco Ntanganda on 22 August 2006, he 
remains free and the Congolese authorities seem to have no intention of arresting him 
or surrendering him to the ICC.465 
 
4.4.5 The Callixte Mbarushimana Case  
 
The case will be firstly presented, following which the state of the process will be 




Rwandan national Callixte Mbarushimana resides in Paris, France. He was born on 24 
July 1963 in Ruhengeri, Northern Province, Republic of Rwanda.466 One of the high-
ranking office bearers responsible for the FDLR= Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for Rwanda Liberation), he served as an 
Executive Secretary of the movement from July 2007 and is alleged to have occupied 
the highest decision-making position after the arrest of the president of the movement 
in November 2009.467 
 
Callixte was being prosecuted468 for war crimes constituting: 1) “attacks against the 
civilian population”;469 2) “acts of destruction of property”;470 3) “acts of murder”;471 
                                                 
464 M Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above; 8, 53, 54). 
465 Ibidem 69, 70. 
466 Under seal Warrant of arrest for Callixte Mbarushimana, No.: ICC-01/04-01/10 issued on 28 
September 2010 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc954979.pdf, accessed on 10 June 
2011. 
467 Ibidem. 
468 Article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute. 
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4) “acts of torture”;472 5) “acts of rape”;473 6) “acts of inhuman treatment and crimes 
against humanity constitute of acts of murder”;474 7) “acts of torture;475 8) “inhuman 
acts”;476 and 9) “acts of prosecution.477 
 
These crimes are alleged to have been committed against the civilian population of 
different villages, including Busheke, Remeka, Pinga, Kipopo, Miriki, Luofu, Kasiki, 
Busurungi, Manje etc in North Kivu and South Kivu in 2009 during armed conflicts 
between the government forces and FDLR troops.478 
 
4.4.5.2 State of the process 
 
On 28 September 2010 the Pre Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest for Callixte 
who was arrested on 11 October 2010 by the French authorities and surrendered to the 
ICC in The Hague, in The Netherlands. The appearance of Callixte before the Court 
was made on 28 January 2011. The hearing of the confirmation of charges initially 
scheduled on July 2011, took place on 16-21 September 2011.479  
On 16 December, the Pre-Trail Chamber declined to confirm charges against Callixte. 
The latter was released on 23 December 2011 from the ICC Custody. 
4.4.5.3 Assessment  
 
The case has been dismissed before the Court. This case reveals that international 
judicial cooperation can play an important role in fighting against the impunity of war 
criminals. The French authorities‟ part in this case should inspire others states 
worldwide. The case revealed also the independence of the Court and the necessity of 
a good administration of evidence by the Prosecutor.   
                                                                                                                                            
469 Article 8 (2) (b) (i) or 8 (2) (e) (i) of the Rome Statute. 
470 Article 8 (2) (a) (iv) or 8 (2) (e) (xii) of the Rome Statute. 
471 Article 8 (2) (c) (i) of the Rome Statute.  
472 Article 8 (2) (c) (i) of the Rome Statute. 
473 Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) or article 8 (2) (e) (vi) of the Rome Statute, and article 7 (1) (g) of the Rome 
Statute. 
474 Article 7 (1) (a) of the Rome Statute. 
475 Article 7 (1) (f) of the Rome Statute. 
476 Article7 (1) (k) of the Rome Statute. 
477 Article7 (1) (h) of the Rome Statute. 
478 See Under seal Warrant of arrest for Callixte Mbarushimana.  
479 Prosecutor v Callixte Mbarushimana ICC-01/04-01/10 available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1009117.pd, accessed on 04 March 2011. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
 
The contribution of the ICC to the fight against impunity for war crimes is 
important480 considering the impetus it has given to confronting different problems 
related to the international criminal justice system, such as immunity and its correlate, 
impunity in the absence of a legitimate and permanent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes 
of international concern. Moreover, the ICC plays an important preventative, 
repressive, and restorative function at international level. Its complementary 
jurisdiction constitutes a serious mechanism to stimulate national justice to actively 
prosecute war criminals. 
 
However, in relation to the Congolese situation, the options offered by the ICC justice 
system seem limited. On the one hand, there was the perpetration of gravest crimes at 
the highest level during the different armed conflicts in the DRC. On the other, due to 
the institutional crisis, national justice is unable to prosecute and refer these cases to 
the ICC. The ICC suffers from a shortage of resources, which limits its ability to deal 
with all cases relating to war criminals in the DRC. This is shown by the small 
number of cases that have come before the ICC since it announced that it would start 
prosecutions in the Congo in 2003.481 It would also appear that the persons who are 
being prosecuted by the ICC are the small fish, while the big fish remain free. The 
jurisdiction of ICC is limited to dealing globally with impunity for war crimes 
committed in DRC.  
                                                 
480 A Cassesse (note 411 above) 67-68. 




n?lan=en-GB, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
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Chapter 5: The limits of the jurisdiction of the ICC and 
challenges to impunity in the DRC  
 
“Neither the legal mandate of the ICC nor the resources available to it are sufficient to allow the 
Court to fulfill the world‟s high expectations.”482 
 
 
The Creation of the ICC raised the hopes and interest of many people who were 
victims of mass atrocities. Many believed that this international judicial organization 
would be able to resolve the problems relating to the perpetration of grave crimes 
worldwide.483 However since it started operations in 2002, the experience of the ICC 
in certain countries, notably the DRC, has not been all smooth sailing.484 The ICC is 
limited to dealing with crimes of international concern on the African continent and 
especially in the DRC,485 due to political, financial, and human factors and issues of a 
jurisdictional character.486 
 
In this chapter, the extent of impunity for war crimes in the DRC as the result of the 
limitations of the ICC‟s jurisdiction is examined, as well as the universal 
jurisdiction‟s contribution to combating unpunished crimes in the DRC. 
 
 
                                                 
482 W W Burke White (note 1 above) 54. 
483 H-P Kaul „Construction site for more justice: the International Criminal Court after two years‟ 
(2005) (99) (317) in American Journal of International Law 370 (370-384). 
484 Amongst the countries where the ICC is active are Central African Republic, Côte d‟Ivoire, Kenya, 
Uganda, Sudan Libya and DRC. So far the experience of the Court in those Countries is not yet 
conclusive. There has been some criticism, including that it appears that the ICC was only created for 
the African continent, M Du Plessis „The International Criminal Court and its work in Africa 
confronting the myths‟ (2008) (ISS paper 173) 1, 2 available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER173.PDF, accessed on 10 May 2011; M Du Plessis „The 
International Criminal Court that Africa wants‟ (2010) (Monograph 172) vii-viii available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Mono172.pdf, accessed on 14 March 2011. Although the Court action 
seems more intensive in the Congo, impunity for crime is still an enormous problem due to several 
factors, M H Arsanji & W M Reisman „The Law-in-action of the International Criminal Court‟(2005) 
(99) (317) in American Journal of International Law (397-399) 385-403.  
485 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; para 1023 to para 1026); H Friman „The Democratic Republic of Congo 
justice in the aftermath of peace?‟ (2001) (10) (3) in African Security Review 11 available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/10No3/Friman.html, accessed on 10 May 2011. 
486 W W Burke White( note 1 above; 54). 
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5.1 Limited jurisdiction ratione temporis 
 
One of the big sources of the limitation of the ICC in general is the fact that it was 
created by a conventional mode which required the willingness and consent of States 
to function.487 Some of the provisions in the Rome Treaty reveal just how far States 
have gone to make sure that their nationals will not be covered by the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction.488 This is due to the fact that, in most cases, war crimes and other serious 
crimes are committed by military troops during actions initiated by the governments 
of their respective States.489 
 
A State‟s criminal responsibility is a very sensitive issue. Although the commission of 
a crime such as aggression can demonstrate State criminality it remains difficult to 
sanction a State, which is a juristic person or a judicial fiction.490 Its penal 
responsibility in the perpetration of crime as such can seem questionable and the 
application of sanctions may be unrealistic. 
 
Hence physical persons who act on behalf of States are often considered responsible 
for State wrongdoing.491 States therefore took precautions to limit the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction during the heated negotiations at the Rome Conference. Apart from the 
limitations on the ICC‟s jurisdiction to try war crimes in article 124, other articles 
limit the Court‟s jurisdiction to deal significantly with all grave crimes committed in 
countries such as the DRC where most of the war crimes were committed several 
years before the advent of the ICC in 2002.492  
 
                                                 
487 Article 11 (1) of the Rome Statute and Article 4 (2) of the Rome Statute. 
488 For instance article 124 allows a State, which becomes a party to the Rome Statute to not accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court over war crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory „for a period of 
seven years after the entry into force of the Statute for the State concerned‟. This has helped to get 
more States to accept the last Rome Statute proposal. However it is obvious that it limits the Court‟s 
jurisdiction and encourages impunity. Read T Graditzky „War crime issues before the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference on the establishment of an International Criminal Court‟ in O Bekou & R Cryer 
The International Criminal Court (2004) 387-390. 
489 E David „Les valeurs, politiques et objectifs du droit pénal international a l‟heure de la 
mondialisation‟ in International Criminal La: Quo Vadis? (2004) 158, 161; D Luban „Lawfare and 
legal ethics in Guantanamo‟ (2008) (60) (6) Stanford Law Review 1981-2026 
490 P Akele Adau & A Sita Muila Akele Les crimes contre l’humanité en droit congolais (1999) 34. 
Read also N M Songa (note 32 above; 250-254). 
491 Ibidem. 




Despite the gravity of the crimes that are provided for in the Rome Statute, according 
to article 11 (1) and (2), the Court shall have jurisdiction only “with respect to crimes 
committed after the entry into force of this Statute”. Moreover if “a State becomes a 
Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its jurisdiction 
only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that 
State”. 
 
The application of this provision to the Congolese case raises the problematic issue of 
the retroactivity of the ICC‟s jurisdiction to try crimes committed before its entry into 
force on 1 July 2002. 
 
Although the DRC ratified493 the Statute before its entry into force, and is not 
concerned by the limitation, which could result from paragraph two of article 12, the 
major obstacle in the Congolese situation is the result of the impossibility of the ICC 
extending its jurisdiction to crimes perpetrated before 2002. Although crimes continue 
to take place, most of the war crimes committed in the DRC were perpetrated between 
1996 and 2002.494  
 
The jurisdiction of ICC is complementary to the national judiciary and will not in any 
way replace the national judiciary. However, the national judiciary has not been able 
to address these matters adequately, so the ICC has intervened although it is limited 
by capacity constraints such as a shortage of material, financial, and human 
resources.495 For instance, since the ICC officially launched its investigation in 2004, 
only five persons are in the process of being prosecuted, with one still at large.496 In 
contrast, a recent UN report relating to various grave crimes perpetrated in the DRC 
before 2003 found 782 cases, of which the team was able to verify 71%.497  
 
                                                 
493 U Mutuale Nkasa La Cour pénale internationale au regard du système judiciaire congolais (2009) 
168. 
494 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; para 125-129). 
495 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; para 1026).  
496 See Chapter 4 above. 
497 UNOHCRH (note 3 above ; para 118). 
 122 
It is clear that even if it could be possible to extend ICC jurisdiction to crimes 
perpetrated before 2002, given its current resources, the ICC would not be able to do 
so. In addition, the ICC is not intended to be an instrument of mass prosecution, but 
rather an instrument of selective prosecution of high profile, powerful, individuals. 
This serves the cause of justice as well as having a certain symbolic and deterrent 
effect. The concern though, is that under the current arrangements, the majority of war 
criminals in the DRC will remain unpunished. This may have a negative impact in 
terms of impunity not only in the DRC but even as far as in the Great Lakes Region. 
Therefore, other mechanisms need to be considered, such as a Special Tribunal for the 




Justice, especially criminal justice, is of the utmost importance in protecting the 
values of society. Not only local and national, but also universal, international values 
need to be protected by providing effective justice, which must be administrated in 
such a way that criminals are deterred.498 The failure of justice to address mass 
atrocities would result in impunity for these crimes, which might encourage the 
repeated, large-scale commission of these grave crimes.499 In the context of the DRC, 
the ongoing crimes which have rendered the country infamous as an international 
capital of killing and rape,500 (and perhaps of impunity) must not be relegated to news 
items, but rather be seen as a real challenge to humankind, whose life, freedom, and 
moral and physical integrity have lost their value. If those responsible for these odious 





                                                 
498 D Kuwali (note 33 above; 48-61); R Ali Shalan (note 33 above; 40-90, 107, 150); N M Songa (note 
29 above; 347).  
499 D Kuwali (note 33 above; 49). 
500 See N D Kristof & Jewish Rabbis (note 14 above). According to a US medical report, 1,100 women 
are raped every day. For more read, „1,100 women raped every day‟ available at 
http://www.france24.com/en/20110511-thousand-1100-women-raped-every-day-american-public-
health-report-un-democratic-republic-congo, accessed on 10 June 2011. 
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5.2 Impunity for war crimes in the DRC 
 
Impunity is not a new concept in the DRC, but has been a tradition since a few years 
after independence in 1960.501 The events in the Congo demonstrate how impunity 
can destroy Statehood. Mismanagement, corruption, and plundering in the case of the 
Congo, was exacerbated by several years of dictatorship, which culminated in wars 
during which there were gross violations of human rights.502 Globally, a culture of 
impunity is caused by political and judicial crises.503 However the threshold of grave 
violations of international humanitarian law seems too high to be neglected and to go 
unpunished. The situation in the DRC should interest not only victims, but also the 
entire world. The Congo case is a challenge to international criminal justice.  
 
5.2.1 Political factors 
 
The current political system in the DRC has its roots in the culture of impunity 
inherited from the Mobutu regime, which ended in successive violent armed conflicts 
(1996-98 and 1998-2003).504 As demonstrated above, the civilian population has been 
subjected to grave atrocities.505 However, those responsible for these crimes have so 
far gone virtually unpunished.506 One of main explanations for the lack of sanctions is 
the way the conflicts were settled. 
 
Negotiations between the warring factions led to some political accords.507 The most 
important accords were the Lusaka Agreement on Ceasefire in DRC (1999) and the 
Global and all Inclusive Accord on Transition in DRC (2003). 
                                                 
501 Luzolo Bambi Lessa „L‟impunité: source des violations graves et répétitives des droits de l‟homme 
en République Démocratique du Congo‟ (2004) Actes de Forum National sur les Droits de l’Homme en 
République Démocratique du Congo 141-152; M Kodi „Corruption and governance in the DRC‟ (2008) 
(ISS Monogroph) (148) 6 Available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/MONO148FULLBACK.PDF, 
accessed on 1 June 2011.  
502 Muzong Kodi (note 501 above). 
503 B Mbiango Kakese „Discours du Premier President de la Cour Suprême de Justice‟(2004) (1) Revue 
Pénale Congolaise 128-136; G-C Kambaji wa Kamabaji & P Musafiri Nalwango (1997) La crise de 
l’université et de la Justice au Congo-Kinshasa en mutation: diagnostic et thérapeutique passim. 
504 See Chapter 2 above. 
505 Ibidem. 
506 See Chapters 3 and 4 above. 
507 See K Masire (note 8 above); M Malan „The UN „month of Africa‟ A push for actual peace efforts 
or a fig leaf on the DRC?‟ (2000) (ISS occasional paper) (44) available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/paper44.pdf, accessed on 19 June 2011; M Malan & H Boshoff „A 90 day 
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The issue of transitional justice has been critical during the rule of the Government of 
National Unity or the Transition Government, 2003-2006. Different options provided 
in those accords for a transitional justice were difficult to apply during that period. 
Considering that war crimes had been committed on both sides during the conflict, it 
was difficult to envisage a judicial solution.508 There was a high risk that the political 
reunification process would be weakened as a result.509  
 
Hence, only extra-judicial mechanisms were applied to deal with certain crimes 
perpetrated during the armed conflict. Amnesty was granted and the Commission for 
Truth and Reconciliation was established.510 
 
The results of those transitional options are not satisfactory, and national 
reconciliation remains a pipedream. The amnesty did not put an end to criminal 
barbarity, which is going on in some locations in the eastern part of the DRC.511  
 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission did not work as well as it did in countries 
such as South Africa.512 Created in 2003, it never got round to hearing cases of gross 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and there is no hope 
that it will do so, as the Commission ended its work in 2007. This means that the truth 
about the crimes committed will never be known, and victims have not granted 
forgiveness.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
plan to bring peace to the DRC? An analysis of the Pretoria agreement of 30 July 2002‟(2002) (ISS 
paper) (61) available http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/PAPER61.PDF, accessed on 19 June 2011; M 
Malan „Renaissance peacekeeping: a Southern African solution to conflict in the DRC‟ (1999) (37) 
available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/paper37.pdf, accessed on 19 June 2011. 
508 According to Chapter 9 (9) 1 of the Lusaka Agreement, the different parties agreed to surrender war 
criminals to the Tribunal for Prosecution. Resolutions of the Inter Congolese Dialogue annexed to the 
Global and all Inclusive Accord on Transition in DRC (2003) provided for the creation of an 
International Tribunal for Congo, whose jurisdiction should be extended to cover crimes committed in 
1960. However, so far none of these provisions have been implemented.  
509 Read R G Teifel Transitional Justice (2000) 213; N Roht-Arriaza „Combating Impunity‟(1995) In: 
N Roht-Arriaza: Impunity and human rights in International law and practice 281. 
510 However, the amnesty provided in Law number 05-023 of 19 December 2005 was limited to war 
facts, political infringements and opinion infringements. War crimes, crimes of genocide and crimes 
against humanity were not included. See article 1 and 2 of the law above. Read also N M Songa (note 
32 above; 424). 
511 Amnesty International (Note 414 above;123-126). 
512 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (note 28 above)17-19, 106-134. 
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Furthermore, the victims have not received reparations and are now living in fear of 
fresh crimes. The situation is complicated by the fact that, due to the lack of justice, 
victims have become perpetrators of crime.513 
 
5.2.2 Judicial factors 
 
The corruption of the political system in DRC did not spare the judiciary, which is 
amongst the most corrupted institutions in the country.514 As noted above, although 
war crimes can be traced back to before 1996 in the DRC, none of these crimes have 
been prosecuted in the past few decades.515 Several factors account for this crisis. 
 
The years of dictatorship and war affected the justice system, which is in an almost 
total state of collapse.516 There is a lot of interference in the decisions of magistrates, 
who are theoretically independent, but completely dominated by the executive power 
in practice.517 Hierarchical structures limit the independence of military magistrates, 
in particular.518 
 
Inadequate budgets,519 a lack of personnel in some areas of the country, and low 
salaries, which expose magistrates to corruption, exacerbate the problems.520 In some 
places magistrates struggle to get to work due to the lack of transportation. The 
physical and material conditions at the courts are poor and are a serious challenge in 
certain areas of the country.521  
 
                                                 
513 Note 27 above. 
514 M Kodi (note 501 above; 32). 
515 See Chapter 3 above. 
516 Matadi Nenga Gamanda, La Question du pouvoir judiciaire en R.D.C.contribution à une théorie de 
réforme, (2001) 164; M Wrong (note 12 above).  
517 E Boshab „Le Conseil national pour l‟unité nationale et la réconciliation, une institution à 
promouvoir dans les institutions africaines pour la prévention des conflits ethniques et la protection des 
minorités: cas du Burundi‟ 2006 in Liber amicorum Marcel Antoine Lihau, 115 ,116; M Wetsh‟okonda 
Koso (note 211 above; 67-72), UNOHCRH (note 3 above; para 955-961). 
518 Ibidem. 
519 Average of 0,6 % of the national budget between 2004 and 2009. Read UNOHCRH (note 3 above) 
para 901-904. 
520 For instance more recently on 30 August 2011, hundreds of Magistrates demonstrated in Kinshasa 
demanding an improvement in their professional and social conditions.  
521 UNOHCRH (note 3 above: para 910-912). 
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As result, people have lost confidence in the justice system.522 Very few of the 
decisions which have been rendered by different Courts can be considered as case 
law. Magistrates need training in general, as well as training in the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes in line with international standards.  
 
5.2.3 The challenges facing the international criminal justice system in dealing 
with war crimes in the DRC  
 
The crimes that have been committed in the Congo are of international concern and 
cannot go unpunished. Although the ICC has attempted to prosecute some alleged war 
criminals, its jurisdiction is limited, as explained above.  
 
Therefore there is a need to explore another judicial solution which could fit with the 
Congolese context, considering the framework, and the time and nature of the crimes 
that have been committed. 
 
5.3 The attempts of the universal jurisdiction system 
 
The perpetration of horrendous crimes during the past century prompted concerns in 
the international arena.523 Attempts to punish grave international crimes were made at 
several levels, including the different ad hoc international tribunals, the ICC and the 
principle of Universality. While the prosecution of war crimes by the ICC has posed 
problems the system of universal jurisdiction, which allows a State to act on behalf of 
the international community, presents a different picture.524 Attempts by national 
                                                 
522 Fofe Djofia Malewa Contribution à la recherche d’un système de justice pénale, plus efficient au 
Zaïre T 1 (1990) (unpublished PhD thesis) 3. 
523 M Du Plessis „The Universal aspirations of the International Criminal Court‟ (2002) (11) (4) in 
African Security Review available at http://www.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/11No4/duPlessis.pdf, accessed 
on 10 May 2011; Phenyo Keiseng Rakate „Towards global justice in the 21st Century?‟ (occasional 
paper 50) (2001) available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/paper50.pdf, accessed on 10 May 2011; 
Vyver, J. “Universal jurisdiction in international criminal law” (1995) (24) South African Yearbook of 
International Law 107 
524 J Dugard et al. ( note 48 above; 157). Read also A J Colangelo „Constitutional limits on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction: terrorism and the intersection of national and international law‟ 2007 (48) 
(1) Harvard International Law Journal 121-188. 
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judges to prosecute war crimes thus far have been criticized.525 However, the principle 
of universality is important, as it may contribute to fighting impunity if it is properly 




The application of the embryonic principle of universality was used to fight the 
impunity of vagabonds, assassins, exiles and robbers, who could not be found, who 
had fled to other territories, or who were continuing with crime.527 
 
The basic principle was judex deprensionis, or the judge of arrest. The judge of place 
of arrest was required to prosecute the criminal in compliance with the principle aut 
dedere, aut punire, to extradite or to punish the offender. The principle of universality 
has evolved and been affirmed throughout history. However the first time that this 
principle was truly admitted in international law was the prosecution of piracy.528 
Some have cited the Lotus529 case as the sole judicial decision relating to the right of a 
state to apply a broad, criminal jurisdiction. 
 
The universal jurisdiction is classified in several types: the co-operative general 
universality principle, the co-operative limited universality principle or principle of 
representation, and the unilateral limited universality principle.530 
 
The co-operative general universality considers the principle, as the national judge 
should apply it, where the suspect is arrested when it is not possible to extradite the 
                                                 
525 L Reydams „Belgium reneges on universality: the 5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of 
International Humanitarian Law‟ (2003) (1) 679-681 in Journal of International Criminal Justice; H 
Kissinger „Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction‟ available at 
www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/28174.html, accessed on 12 June 2011. 
526 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; para 1027-1039); CAD (note 280 above; 15). 
527 L Reydams (note 353 above; 29).  The ground of the right and/or duty of any national judge to 
prosecute those responsible for an international offence regardless of their nationality, the nationality of 
their victim or the place of perpetration of the crime can be traced back to the past .See  N M Songo 
(note 32 above; 113).  
528 N M Songa (note 32 above; 115). 
529 See R O‟Keefe „Universal jurisdiction: clarifying the basic concept‟ (2004) (2) in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 735,736; L Reydams (note 353 above; 11). See also Lotus case 
Judgement available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus.htm, accessed 
on 19 July 2011. 
530 L Reydams (note 353 above; 28). 
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suspect. The co-operative limited universality principle distinguishes between 
domestic and international offences. It applies only to crimes of international concern. 
Finally, the unilateral limited universality principle allows any national judge to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction to try offence of an international character even in 
abstentia.531 
 
While this classification may not be perfect, it illustrates the evolution of the principle 
under analysis, which has been subjected to several criticisms regarding its grounds in 
terms of legality, legitimacy, efficiency, and feasibility.532 
 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the principle of universality is in line with a 
globalized world, in which people travel more easily than in the past, and information 
technology has transformed the world into a global village.533 This means that the 
perpetrators of grave crimes are unlikely to be confined within the territory of one 
State. 
 
This principle is considered by several international organizations, NGOs and human 
rights defendants as an important tool, which may help to fight unpunished grave 
crimes worldwide, and in the DRC in particular.534 
 
What is the legal basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction? Is it consistent with 




                                                 
531 L Reydams (note 353 above; 29-42). 
532 Note 525 above; S Bula-Bula „Senegalese jurisdiciton versus Belgian Universal jurisdiction 
judgement of November 25 2005 of the Court of appeals of Dakar concerning the lack of jurisdiction in 
the extradition of Mr Hissène Habré‟ (2006) 319, 333. 
533 J Seroussi Les Tribunaux de l’humanité les ajustements cognitifs dans la mobilisation pour la 
competence universelle des juges nationaux (2007) (unpublished PhD thesis) University of Paris 
Sorbonne 11-12 available at 
http://www.cess.paris4.sorbonne.fr/dossierpdf/Les%20tribunaux%20de%20l'humanit%E9.pdf, 
accessed on 10 May 2011. 
534 See „Universal jurisdiction’ available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/international-
justice/issues/universal-jurisdiction, accessed on 12 July 2011. 
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5.3.2 Legal basis 
 
As noted above it is not easy to achieve universal agreement on prosecution of 
different offences against the international order. For different reasons relating to 
imperialistic foreign policy, States regard consent to a criminal jurisdiction as a 
serious threat. Hence it is not surprising that until now the universal jurisdiction is not 
grounded on a global convention.535 Although several treaties exist on specific 
offences, extradition, and above all, the commitment of the international community 
to bring to justice to all those responsible for serious violations of human rights,536 “at 
present there is no global convention on criminal jurisdiction, and it seems unlikely 
that such an instrument will be adopted in the near future”.537 
 
According to Dugard, the true universal jurisdiction applies only in the case of crimes 
under customary international law538 and signatory states to multilateral treaties may 
exercise a “type of quasi-universal jurisdiction”.539  
 
Searching for evidence of universal jurisdiction in international Conventions, 
Reydams540 notes that although roughly 100 multilateral treaties relating to crime 
were agreed during the period before World War Two, only three deal in some way or 
another with the principle of universality. However after World War Two, he found 
about 30 international Conventions pertaining to universal jurisdiction. 
 
International offences in respect of which any national judge may exercise universal 
jurisdiction are limited to piracy, slave-trading, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and torture.541 
 
However this list is not exhaustive of what may constitute international crimes in 
terms of international criminal law. In line with the focus of this dissertation, the 
                                                 
535 L Reydams (note 353 above; 16). 
536 Ibidem 17. 
537 Ibidem 16. 
538 J Dugard et al. (note 48 above; 156). 
539 Ibidem157. 
540 L Reydams (note 353 above; 79). 
541 J Dugard et al. (note 48 above; 157). 
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following section will highlight the exercise of criminal jurisdiction relating to war 
crimes.  
 
In terms of article 49 (2)542 of the First Geneva Convention, all States party to the 
Convention shall take necessary measures to avoid war criminals going unpunished. 
States are obliged to try those responsible for grave breaches of that Convention 
regardless of their nationality before their national courts or to extradite them for trial 
in another party State. 
 
Today, most States are party to this Convention. Effective exercise of this jurisdiction 
may help to stop impunity for serious crime all over the world, especially in the DRC. 
This would entail national jurisdictions acting on behalf of the international 
community to protect the human values common to all nations.543 
 
Some are opposed to the principle of universality, arguing that it will lead to a tyranny 
of judges.544 For others, the exercise of universal jurisdiction may contribute 
significantly to the fight against impunity. But to be successful in practice, two 
conditions must be taken into account: reasonableness and non-interference in the 
internal domestic affairs of other States.545 
  
Among the States cited as most likely to be capable in virtue of their municipal law to 
exercise a form of universal jurisdiction are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States of America.546 
 
5.4 Assessment  
 
Notwithstanding the consistence of the principle of universality with world 
development, it is not unanimously admitted in international law. Without the 
cooperation of all States the exercise of this jurisdiction can be very limited.  
                                                 
542 And article 146 of the fourth Geneva Convention as well. 
543 J Dugard et al (note 48 above; 157). 
544 H Kissinger (note 525 above). 
545 L Reydams (note 353 above; 42). 
546 Ibidem (note 353 above; 87-219). 
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Several obstacles may weaken the function of this jurisdiction such as immunity, the 
problem of investigating and reinforcing a warrant of arrest when the criminal process 
was initiated in abstentia, etc. One of the famous cases where this jurisdiction was 
used to try international crimes committed in the DRC is the Yerodia case.547  
 
In this case the Belgian justice system issued an arrest warrant against Yerodia 
Abdulaye Ndombasi on 1 April 2000. Ndombasi was the then Congolese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. He was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
case arose from a dispute between Belgium and the DRC. The latter seized the 
International Court of Justice, which rendered its decision on 14 February 2002, in 
which Belgium was condemned for having violated international law relating to 
immunity of a Foreign Policy Ministry.548  
 
In their joint independent opinion, the majority of the judges including the President 
rejected the exercise of universal jurisdiction in abstentia and warned that such 
arbitrary use of criminal jurisdiction may favors powerful States. Instead of enhancing 
peace and security in the international order it may even be divisive and troublesome! 
Reacting to the judgment of the Court, Belgium abandoned the prosecution and 
abrogated its law on universal jurisdiction.549  
 
For some the ICJ decision marked the end of the principle of universality. Although 
this setback related to a lack of reasonableness in process, there have been other 
successful cases on Europe,550 which encourages the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
                                                 
547 Note 353 above. 
548 Ibidem para 10 ,11, 12, 13. 
549 L Reydams (note 353 above; 228). 
550 Human Rights Watch „Universal jurisdiction in Europe: the state of the art‟ (2006) (18) (5) 1-3 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/06/27/universal-jurisdiction-europe, accessed on 17 
August 2011. Unlike in Europe where there have been some successful cases of application of the 
principle of universality, on the Africa continent the African Union remains resistant to the application 
of universal jurisdiction by European countries against African personalities and recommends to AU 
member states that they exercise such jurisdiction only under certain conditions which take into 
account immunities and friendly international relations and territoriality. See African Union  Report on 
; Decision on the Abuse of Universal jurisdiction DOC.EX.CL/522(XV) available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/COUNCIL_EN_24_30_June_2009_EXECUTIVE_COUNCIL_
FIFTEENTH_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf, accessed on 20 January 2012; S Bula-Bula( note 532 
above) The AU point of view on the principle of universality may have some political merits but it is 
not helpful in dealing with the culture of impunity in Africa.  
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to prosecute those responsible for war crimes in the DRC who may be found in the 
territory, or country, where municipal law enables such jurisdiction. 
 
However, as with the ICC jurisdiction, this jurisdiction is limited in terms of impunity 
in the DRC, considering that the criminal may be a high profile official who may 
claim immunity. Others may prefer to stay at home and not travel to a country where 
they run the risk of being indicted. Furthermore, in Africa, the African Union seems 
unenthusiastic regarding cooperation with, and enforcement of, ICC jurisdiction. Thus 
it is obvious that there is real need to find another judicial solution, which will fit the 
Congolese situation. 




Chapter 6: A plea for the establishment of a special criminal 
tribunal for the DRC  
 
“Nuremberg is the point in the constellation from which all legal discussion of war crimes trials 
proceeds or reverts.”551 
 
 
As result of the limitations on the ICC‟s jurisdiction, as well as the principle of 
universality, the exercise of which remains problematic, this chapter considers other 
ways to move forward in the fight against impunity for war crimes in the African 
Great Lakes Region, where the DRC needs its Nuremberg.  
 
Given that the Congolese national judiciary is unable to curb the perpetration of war 
crimes, this chapter examines the need for a special criminal tribunal for the DRC in 
order to find a system of justice that can deal with all war crimes perpetrated during 
that horrendous conflict, but which remain unpunished. 
  
An overview of the justification, legal basis and judicial nature of such jurisdiction are 
examined in the Congolese context and its inception and materialization are 
scrutinized. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of such a Tribunal in respects of type of 
crime, time frame, territory, and individuals, which may be prosecuted, are discussed.  
 
6.1 Design of ad hoc tribunal for the DRC 
 
The establishment of a special criminal tribunal for the DRC is not a new concept, as 
this mode of criminal jurisdiction has been established under other historical 
circumstances, as described in Chapter 4. 
 
Indeed, the perpetration of numerous grave crimes during the last century led to 
several attempts to set up judicial institutions in order to fight the impunity for serious 
                                                 
551 D McGoldrick, P J Rowe & E Donelly (eds) (Note 301 above; 10, 18).  
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crimes. These include the International Tribunal of Nuremberg to the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone, the Tribunals of Tokyo and the Former Yugoslavia, of Rwanda and, 
more recently, the Tribunal for Lebanon and the Special Chamber for Cambodia.552 
The legitimacy, legality and nature of those tribunals set an important precedent for a 
Special tribunal for the DRC. Regarding the nexus between the genocide in Rwanda 
and the wars in the DRC, some have proposed the extension of the mandate of the 




The recent wars in the Congo had such grave implications that they were regarded as 
the “first African World War”554 and the first war that had consequences comparable 
with those of World War Two.555 Since 1996 the history of the Congo has been 
marked by serious armed conflicts, which still occur on a spasmodic basis in the 
Eastern Province, although the war officially ended in 2003. These wars led to several 
million deaths, the pillaging of natural resources, and the destruction of property. 
There have been serious and systematic violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, to the extent that it is hard to find a category of human rights that 
was not violated during the wars in the DRC.556  
 
This horrendous situation has earned the DRC the questionable labels of world capital 
of killing, and capital of rape.557 To these the researcher would add the world capital 
of impunity. The post-conflict situation in the DRC calls for measures to deal with war 
crimes.  
 
                                                 
552 There have also been ad hoc Courts for East Timor and Kosovo. See S Katzenstein „Hybrid 
tribunals: searching for justice in East Timor‟ available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss16/katzenstein.pdf, accessed on 10 July 2011; C P R 
Romano A Nollkaemper & J K Kleffner (eds) Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra 
Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (2005) available at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/romano-nollkaemper-kleffner305.htm,accessed 
on 10 July 2011. 
553 H Friman (note 485 above; 11). This is a good solution as it may capitalise on the experience of this 
tribunal, but it may need to be adjusted to Congolese social, political and judicial reality. 
554 Note  4 above. 
555 C Hemedi (note 102 above). 
556 See Chapter 2 above. 
557 See Chapters 1 and 2 above. 
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In the light of article 4 (h) (o) of Constitutive Act of the AU, article 1 of the UN 
Charter and Preamble of the founding document of the ICC, there is no doubt that 
these grave crimes committed in DRC are a threat to peace and security for Africa as 
well as for the world. As with the Nazi criminals after World War Two, there is a 
need for justice. Peace and security worldwide will not be assured as long as those 
responsible for crimes in DRC go unpunished. 
 
Political negotiations led to the establishment of a Government of National Unity in 
2003, with transitional institutions. Even judicial instruments opted for transitional 
options.558 Amnesty was granted in order to promote reunification and reconciliation.  
 
However, these transitional mechanisms did not reconcile the people of the Congo, 
nor did they deter war criminals, who continue to kill, rape and loot in the DRC.559 
Although general elections were held in 2006, the human rights situation in the DRC 
remains very problematic. There is a clear need for justice, which on the one hand, 
would deter potential criminals from committing such crimes and, on the other hand, 
to provide redress for the numerous victims of these odious crimes. Instead of 
reconciliation, the extra-judicial mechanisms applied during the transition led to 
impunity. This cannot serve as the basis for a strong and truly united nation. It is for 
this reason that Binda advocates the setting up of another Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which may actually be able to reconcile people.560 However, while a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission could play an important role in terms of 
restorative and symbolic justice, the fact remains that in the Congo, repressive justice 
is still important for the purposes of deterrence. 
 
6.1.2 Legitimacy (Justification) 
 
As demonstrated above, there is a need to prosecute war criminals in the DRC for 
several reasons. Since 2006 the political regime has changed. The transitional 
government is no more. Those in charge of official institutions are mandated by the 
                                                 
558 Ngoma Binda Justice Transitionnelle en R. D. Congo : une expérience de commission vérité et 
réconciliation  (2008) 13-14. 
559 Amnesty International (note 415 above; 123-126). 
560 Ngoma Binda (note 558 above; 164). 
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populace through elections, and are bound by the rule of accountability and the rule of 
law. 
 
Indeed, there would have been no need to conduct this research if equitable justice 
had been extended to the people of the DRC. It is not only the number of deaths or the 
level of destruction, which need to be taken into account, but the conscience of 
humankind and the political will to redress wrongs. With around seven million deaths 
since the conflict started, there are no grounds to contest the right of the victims to 
justice. A Tribunal was set up to investigate the deaths of six million Jews during the 
Holocaust and the deaths of 700 000 Tutsi and Hutu were investigated by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Two hundred thousand deaths in the 
former Yugoslavia were the focus of an International Criminal Tribunal and there 
have been special Tribunals even for individual deaths, such as in Lebanon.561  
 
Indifference to the causalities in the DRC cannot be justified, for whatever political 
reasons. The Congolese situation is, of course sensitive because of the interests of 
multinational companies operating out of capitalist countries involved in the pillage of 
the natural resources of the Congo.562 The supremacy of the politics of imperialism 
over the rights of the people of the Congo must be stopped. 
  
For a long time, Congolese victims seem to have been sacrificed to satisfy capitalist 
interests. During the dark days of the Leopold regime around 10 million deaths were 
reported.563 With nothing done by the international community to put an end to these 
massacres organized by the King of Belgium, Leopold II, the stage was set for the 
impunity of nationals and foreigners responsible for the assassination of Lumumba in 
                                                 
561 „The History Place. Genocide in 20th century‟ available at 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/index.html, accessed on 12 May 2011. 
562 Indeed due to the political involvement of certain powers in Congo crisis, the UN Security Council 
seems so far unwilling to establish a Tribunal for Congo. Regarding the request of Congolese for such 
a Tribunal read Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula-Bula para 82, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/121/8142.pdf, accessed on 21 January 2012 and regarding Intervention on 13 
February 2003 of Permanent Ambassador of the DRC at the UN, Sir ILEKA ATOKI. For more on 
major capitalist powers involvement in Congo matters, see Chapter 2 above; K Masire (note 8 above) 
563 Note 96 above read, also J Conrad Heart of Darkness (1998) passim. 
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1960 and the Mobutu regime‟s murderous rule, with the political and financial 
support of the international community.564 
Some analysts have gone as far as to suggest that the indifference of the international 
community can be explained by a desire on their part for the extermination of the 
Congolese so that their territory might be occupied and its resources exploited.565 
 
While the DRC is extremely rich in terms of strategic mineral and other resources, 
this is exploitation of the worst kind. If well managed, the DRC‟s riches have the 
potential to benefit the whole of Africa and indeed the whole world.566  
 
This is why proper management of the problems in the DRC should interest everyone 
and why all should support efforts to put a halt to the impunity for war criminals that 
is fueling conflict to establish a predatory regime. 
 
The rule of law in the DRC should begin with the accountability of those responsible 
for mass atrocities before an independent Tribunal. 
 
What kind of legality would such a jurisdiction have?  
 
6.1.3 Legality (Legal basis) 
 
In contrast with the challenge faced by the judges before the Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg regarding the anteriority of the legality of acts567 which were prosecuted 
as international crimes (discussed in Chapter 4 above), in the DRC, most of the acts 
perpetrated can be qualified as grave crimes in international criminal law, which 
outlaws genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Furthermore there are 
                                                 
564 T R Essolomwa (note 107 above; 193, 205-210) ;L De Witte The Assassination of Lumumba. Verso 
Books: London,(2001)1-45;P  Merriam  Congo: background to conflict  (1961) 1-10    
565 Ibidem 132.  
566 For instance, a recent investigation by V Noury indicated that the value of Congolese mineral 
resources is approximately US$24 thousand billion. Read „Les potentialités minières de la RDC 
évaluées à 24 mille milliards USD‟(2010) available at 
http://www.mediacongo.net/show.asp?doc=16201, accessed on 05 May 2011; T R Essolomwa (note 
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567 According to D McGoldrick: “That crimes against peace and crimes against humanity were 




several judicial precedents of such crimes, which are even condemned in current 
Congolese criminal law, and in the legislation of many other countries. 
 
A Special Criminal Tribunal would capitalize on these facts to show that dealing with 
Congolese war criminals on a legal basis is superior to other mechanisms.  
 
Therefore, in keeping with the UN Charter, the UN Security Council might pass a 
resolution for the establishment of such a tribunal for the DRC. 
 
6.1.4 Type and judicial (Nature of jurisdiction) 
 
As noted above, several forms of criminal jurisdiction have been employed to 
prosecute the perpetrators of serious violations of human rights across the world. 
Most of these tribunals were adjusted to the context of the country or territory where 
the crimes were committed. It is obvious that the type of tribunal created in the first 
ad hoc generation of tribunals as implemented at Nuremberg and in the Far East 
cannot be a reference point. However the second generation ad hoc international 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda offer better models in respect of their 
legality and legitimacy, even though they have been criticized as moving too slowly, 
being costly and being located far from the place where the crimes were committed 
(see Chapter 4 above). 
 
Only the UN Security Council of UN, acting under Chapter VII of its Charter, has the 
necessary force to impose the creation of such a tribunal, which may need much 
political support to succeed in its mission. In terms of the difficulties arising from the 
limitation of capacity of the ad hoc second-generation tribunals, this tribunal could 
resemble the recently created Tribunal for Lebanon. It might focus only on 
prosecuting those mainly responsible for the international crimes perpetrated in the 
DRC during the war, to deter other criminals who remain dangerous and have the 
potential to continue to commit such crimes.   
  
Despite numerous reports on the human rights situation in the DRC, the Security 
Council remains (for different political reasons such as the indirect involvement of 
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different powers in that war) insensitive to the necessity of the creation of such a 
Tribunal.568 This creates the need to explore other options.  
 
The third generation tribunal, tailored to the model of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, which was created on the basis of an agreement between the UN General 
Assembly and the political authorities of Sierra Leone, could be considered. 
 
This formula is interesting in terms of the mix of international and national judges. 
This mix may empower the national judges in the long term. As outlined above, an 
international tribunal for the DRC might focus only on high-level criminals who have 
committed crimes in the past but cannot be prosecuted by the ICC because its 
temporal jurisdiction is limited. However, the request for such a Tribunal will depend 
on the political will of the incumbent political authorities, who may not be keen on 
such an idea for personal reasons (such as being a warlord in the past). Some have 
proposed that national mechanisms should rather be set up to deal with such crimes.569 
A proposal for the creation of a Special Criminal Chamber has previously been 
considered by the UN.570 
 
While a Special Criminal Chamber might be appropriate to deal with the small war 
criminals at a national level, it does not do away with the need for a special tribunal 
for the Congo for several reasons. Notably, the jurisdiction of a special chamber for 
the DRC would be national in terms of jurisdiction, even though it might include 
some international judges. It therefore runs the risk of being less independent or 
subject to political influence; it might not easily investigate Congolese officials or 
criminals who now hold power. Its competence could not extend to foreign criminals 
involved in the Congo war. Therefore the successful formula of jurisdiction, which 
could significantly contribute to the fight against impunity in the DRC, seems to be a 
mixed Tribunal with international preponderance. 
 
 
                                                 
568 See note 562 above. 
569 See CAD (note 280 above; 29-30); UNOHCRH (note 3 above; 465). 




The special tribunal for the Congo should exercise specific criminal jurisdiction to try 
perpetrators of international crimes committed in the DRC during the wars of 1996-97 
and 1998-2003 regardless of their nationality and wherever they may be found. 
 
6.2.1 Jurisdiction ratione materiae 
 
The tribunal may prosecute mass atrocity crimes committed in the DRC: war crimes, 
genocide, crimes against humanity. The definitions of most of those crimes are 
already available in different international instruments such as the Rome Statute.  
6.2.2 Jurisdiction ratione temporis 
 
The question relating to jurisdiction ratione temporis of such a tribunal is very 
important for it is one of raison d’être of the establishment of such a tribunal. The 
ICC cannot retroactively punish crimes committed before 2002. 
 
In the DRC most of the international crimes were perpetrated during wars, which took 
place before that date. Therefore the new Tribunal should have jurisdiction to try 
crimes perpetrated before 2002. 
 
The moot point is how far back such jurisdiction may go, given the numerous crimes, 
which have marked the Congo‟s history. There is no doubt that some would prefer the 
extension of the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the tribunal to the colonial period. 
However during the Intercongolese Dialogue related to the political negotiations held 
in Sun City, South Africa (2002-2003), 1960 was chosen as the starting point of the 
temporal jurisdiction of an eventual international tribunal for the Congo.571 
 
Such extension of ratione temporis jurisdiction might be too broad and may require 
resources, which may not be available in the foreseeable future. The Mapping Report 
                                                 
571 WOPPA.; Confessions religieuses (Organization); Switzerland. Eidgen ssisches Departement f r 
Ausw r tige Angelegenheiten „Résolution No. DIC/CPR/05 relative a l‟institution d‟un tribunal pénal 
international‟ in Les résolutions du dialogue intercongolais: tenu à Sun City du 1  février au 2  avril 
2002 et du 1er au 02 avril 2003. Kinshasa: WOPPA, Département fédéral des affaires étrang r es, 
(2003) 107-108 
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proposes to start with crimes and grave violations of international humanitarian law 
committed from 1993 to 2003.572 
  
This is still a broad jurisdiction. If is accepted that the tribunal should target high-
level criminals responsible for the gravest crimes for the purposes of deterrence, then 
the jurisdiction of such a tribunal may be limited to odious crimes perpetrated during 
the two recent armed conflicts in the DRC described as the first African World War 
(see Chapter 2 above).  
 
As for the rest of crimes perpetrated before that date, several other judicial (such as 
the principle of universality, special criminals chambers) and even non-judicial 
mechanisms (such as a Truth Reconciliation Commission) should be promoted to deal 
with them. Further, the municipal judicial system in the Congo and elsewhere could 
be reformed to take on prosecution of these crimes. The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda 
could also be considered as a model. These community courts were established in 
2001 because the established courts could not deal with the vast number of awaiting 
trial prisoners.573 
 
The recent attempt to launch a prosecution against Lumumba‟s assassin, who is still 
alive and living in Belgium, is insightful in this respect.574 
 
6.2.3 Jurisdiction ratione loci 
 
The competence of such jurisdiction should be exercised to prosecute crimes within 
the territory of the DRC and its neighboring states. The DRC shares borders with nine 
countries. Most of these borders were and are porous; therefore, it seems imprudent to 
confine the jurisdiction to DRC territory, because during the wars there was large-
scale trafficking of warriors through the different Congolese borders. However the 
exercise of this jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals beyond Congolese borders may 
face serious obstacles if a State is not willing to cooperate. This is why judicial 
                                                 
572 UNOHCRH (note 3 above; para 1046). 
573 Government of Rwanda, “Context or historical background of Gacaca Courts” available at 
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/Generaties.htm accessed on 24 January 2012. 
574 Note 24 above. 
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cooperation between Members States of the International Conference on Peace, 
Security and Development in the Africa Great Lakes Region needs to be promoted to 
deal with such eventualities. 
 
6.2.4 Jurisdiction ratione personae 
 
Numerous actors were involved in the war in DRC, including Congolese and 
foreigners. Therefore the jurisdiction of this Tribunal should apply a form of the 
principle of active as well passive personality to make sure that all war criminals 





The creation of a Special Tribunal for the DRC is an imperative for the international 
community, if it really desires to deal with unacceptable impunity for grave crimes in 
a country, which is infamously known as the world capital of killing, the world capital 
of rape and the world capital of impunity. Despite the gravity of these international 
crimes and massacres, those responsible have largely gone unpunished and have even 
been promoted to official positions. The atrocities are recurrent and the collapse of the 
national judiciary gives little hope that they will end. The creation of an international 
criminal tribunal for the DRC would play a crucial role in fighting against impunity in 
the Congo. Unfortunately, apart from different reports on the problematic human 
rights situation in Congo, nothing has been done at multilateral level, especially in the 
UN, to mobilize the necessary resources to create such a tribunal. There is no doubt 
that political and economic reasons exist, which deter members of the UN Security 
Council, from doing so.  
 
The political context in the Congo has changed and new leaders have been elected. It 
was expected that this would usher in winds of change that could change the paradigm 
in international policy and take into account human rights, especially on the part of 
the Obama575 Administration. One remains hopeful that the US will support the 
                                                 
575 Adekeye Adebajo (2010) The curse of Berlin: Africa after the cold war (2010) 288-291. 
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creation of such a Tribunal in time. Another possible way to bypass the delays is the 
creation of such a jurisdiction through the conclusion of a convention between the 
DRC government and the UN as was the case in the creation of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone.576 The recent proposal from the Congolese Minister of Justice for the 
Creation of a Cour Spécialisée pour les grands criminels = Specialized Court for 
High Criminals, is a giant step forward; however for different historical political 
reasons some Congolese politicians remain hostile to such proposal.577 
 
Even if such a jurisdiction is created, it will only deal with high profile war criminals 
and serve a deterrence purpose. Many other war criminals will remain unpunished. 
There is a need to reform the Congolese judiciary by creating appropriate organs such 
as Special Chambers, which can deal with the rest of the war criminals. Others crimes 
committed during the war period could be addressed by extra judicial mechanisms, 
whose jurisdiction could even be extended to crimes perpetrated before independence 
in 1960. Beyond the judicial approach, there is still a need for other non-judicial 
mechanisms, which can help to reconcile society by addressing aspects such as truth, 
reparations and forgiveness. However a future Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
might integrate other, local traditional mechanisms for settling disputes such as 
l`arbre à palabre during the barza communautaire.578 
                                                 
576 See „Special Court for Sierra Leone‟  available at http://www.sc-sl.org/, accessed on 21 January 
2012. 
577 See S Etinga „Une Cour spécialisée contre les grands criminels‟ (2011) available at 
http://www.mediacongo.net/show.asp?doc=18589, accessed on 20 August 2011; Ngandu, MD. „Rejet 
au Parlement du projet de loi créant une Cour spécialisée en RDC, décision désapprouvée par la 
Coalition pour la CPI‟ (2011) available at http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/78014, accessed on 10 
September 2011. 
578 C Villa-Vicencio, P Nantulya & T Savage (note 416 above; 58-63). 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
“The task facing countries in transition from autocratic, oppressive and in some instances 




7.1 Findings  
 
Grave, large-scale war crimes have been committed in the DRC over a long period of 
time. Several reports, such us the recent Mapping Report580 by the United Nations 
Office for the High Human Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) clearly 
document these atrocities, which Congolese victims suffered between the two wars 
(1996-97 and 1998-2002) and which unfortunately continue until today.581  
 
These horrendous atrocities led to several million lives being lost, the serious 
destruction of the social fabric, the looting of the Congo‟s natural resources, the 
demolition of basic infrastructure, and physical and environmental damages.582 Most 
of those acts committed by different parties during the war period constitute serious 
and gross crimes, notably war crimes, which remain unpunished.583  
 
The institutional crises due to a long period of dictatorship and two wars have plunged 
the country into a state of decay, which caused the collapse of the Congolese judicial 
system, which is weaken and undermined by different factors such as corruption, a 
lack of independence and political interference.584 Although international crimes such 
as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity are provided for in national 
criminal legislation, they have hardly ever been prosecuted by the national justice 
                                                 
579 C Villa-Vicencio P Nantulya & T Savage (note 416 above; v). 
580 UNOHCRH (note 3 above). 
581 Amnesty International (note 414 above; 123-126). 
582 See references in notes 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.  
583 See Chapter 5 above. 
584 See M Wetsh‟okonda Koso (note 221 above); CAD (note 280 above). 
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system. This incapacity has been obvious from the time of the war of 1996, and as far 
back as the Mobutu regime and the Cold War period.585 
The referral by the Congolese authorities of the situation of crime in the DRC to the 
Office of Prosecutor before the ICC in 2004 confirmed the inability of the national 
judiciary to try war crimes.586  
 
Hence, the advent of the ICC in 2002 created hope among victims of crimes in the 
world in general and in the DRC in particular.  
 
The creation of the ICC at the end of the twentieth century represented a realization 
on the part of the international community that it is honour bound to combat impunity 




During the twentieth century, numerous odious acts were committed by human beings 
against humankind. To describe the degree of barbarity attained by criminals during 
the occurrence of these different conflicts, several terms were coined, including 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace. For the first time, it was 
possible to regulate and punish war crimes at an international level.  
 
The emergence of international criminal justice was marked by several attempts to 
punish atrocities committed during World War One and World War Two, which had 
shocked the collective human conscience. This led to the creation of the first 
international criminal tribunal namely, the Military International Criminal Tribunal 
created at Nuremberg on 8 August 1945 and later at Tokyo for the Extreme Far East 
on 19 January 1946. Those temporal, imperfect and embryonic jurisdictions laid 
strong foundations for building the international criminal justice endeavour on the one 
hand, and catalyzed international energy to fight impunity for crimes of international 
concern on the other. Furthermore, to deal with the consequences of the numerous 
international crimes perpetrated during the last decade of twenty century, two ad hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals were established, one for the Former Yugoslavia 
                                                 
585 L Devlin (note 106; 259-261). 
586 Note 23 above . 
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(1993) and one for Rwanda (1994). Even though these tribunals were as temporally 
and territorially limited as their predecessors, they contributed significantly in the 
long run to the establishment of a permanent criminal jurisdiction.  
 
Thus, after a long process, which lasted roughly a half-century, for the first time in 
human history, a permanent international criminal tribunal was created as the result of 
the adoption of the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998. The entry into force in July 2002 of 
the ICC can be regarded as the greatest achievement yet of international justice in the 
fight against impunity for gross violations of human rights.  
 
Considering the fact that the proposal to create the ICC was attacked by the most 
powerful587 states in the world such as the US, China, India and Israel, there can be no 
doubt that the advent of this judicial institution was a significant achievement on the 
part of the international community, which seems determined to end the culture of 
impunity for systematic human rights abuses in the world. This new era of justice is 
marked by the primacy of humankind‟s concerns in politics and international policy. 
It proclaimed the suppression of impunity for crimes such as immunity and official 
capacity. It has since become clear that no one is above the law.588 
 
The establishment of the ICC ushers in hope for the victims of the serious crimes that 
one day, justice will be done. At the same time, however, those responsible for crimes 
regard it as bad news.  
 
Mass atrocity crimes happen most often during wars. It is no secret that these conflicts 
are in general orchestrated, backed, and fuelled by external forces or world powers 
that will pursue their political agenda even by unlawful means.589 
 
                                                 
587 „Of course the Court has also attracted the venom of the world‟s superpower, the United States of 
America, isolated but also determined in its opposition to the institution‟. See W A Schabas (Note 
above 296; x); J R Bolton „The United States and International Criminal Justice‟ (2004b) in O Bekou & 
R Cryer The International Criminal Court 477-478; J R Bolton „The risks and the weaknesses of the 
International Criminal Court from America‟s perspective‟ (2004a) in O Bekou & R Cryer The 
International Criminal Court 459, 461-462. 
588 D Ntanda Nsereko (note 387 above). 
589 L Devlin (note 106 above) passim; Adekeye Adebajo (note 575 above; 15). 
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The opposition of certain countries to the creation of the ICC is not surprising. But it 
is regrettable that even today, some States, even so called „old democracies‟, still use 
war as the means to achieve their ends. There is no reason for a State, which really 
promotes the rule of law to fear an international tribunal.  
 
It is important to salute the mobilization, which led world stakeholders to end the 
culture of impunity by voting for this change of paradigm in the international justice 
system. Since the advent of the ICC international policy in countries around the world 
has undergone changes. 
 
The victory at Rome was the triumph of humanity against notions such as the 
sacrosanct sovereignty regarding the number of States required for adoption of the 
Statute.590 
 
The ICC is not perfect. It is limited in terms of financial, personnel, material and even 
jurisdiction resources.591 
 
It is true that the creation of the ICC by the conventional mode is one of the sources of 
its different weakness, in so as far as it is limited by the prior consent of a State to 
prosecute a crime committed either in its territory or by its nationals. Its relations with 
the UN Security council are also very critical, for this political organ of the UN may 
lead the ICC to lose credibility through the political games of its members592.  
 
Furthermore, relating to the DRC situation, the jurisdiction of the ICC seems limited. 
As noted above, international crimes and especially war crimes were committed in the 
DRC during the war periods (1996-97 and 1998-2003). Although the Congolese 
situation has been referred to the ICC, it is clear that the ICC will not be able to 
prosecute all those responsible for war crimes committed in the Congo. Initially, the 
ICC was designed to exercise complementary jurisdiction and not to replace national 
jurisdiction. It may possibly prosecute those highly responsible for the perpetration of 
crimes in order to deter other potential criminals.  
                                                 
590 The majority of 120 States supported the Court, against seven States which were opposed and 21 
abstentions.  
591 W W Burke-White (note 1 above). 
592 See note 373 above. 
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It is obvious that the ICC could not possibly prosecute all the war crimes committed 
in the DRC. This is confirmed by the experiences of the ICTR and ICTY. Since the 
ICC launched its investigation into Congo in 2004, only five cases have been filed. 
Even so, it appears that it is the small fish that are being prosecuted. This is explained 
by the biggest obstacle to ICC jurisdiction, which is grounded on the principle of non-
retroactivity and does not allow the ICC to prosecute crimes committed before the 
entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002. Therefore the jurisdiction ratione 
temporis is almost at the opposite of the time frame during which most war crimes 
were committed in the DRC (First War 1996-97and Second War 1998-2002).   
 
The limitation of ICC to prosecute war crimes committed in the DRC before 2002 is 
evident. To put an end to impunity for these international crimes, other mechanisms 
have been explored, notably the possibility of the prosecution of war criminals by 
virtue of the principal of universality. Different domestic judicial systems worldwide 
provide such an option in their criminal legislation. To succeed, such proceedings 
may require the presence of the criminal in the territory of the forum country or good 
judicial co-operation. Unfortunately the exercise of this jurisdiction may sometimes 
cause diplomatic incidents and political disputes. While this principle can hence be 
utilized to a certain extent, it also seems limited in dealing with the Congolese 
situation.  
 
In the light of these limitations it is necessary to investigate other options to combat 
impunity in the Congo and to deter future potential war criminals. 
 
Considering the specific context of the Congo war, qualified as the first African 
World War, which had the most dramatic consequences since World War Two,593 it is 
recommended that a special tribunal special be created for the DRC, which might be 
able to deal once and for all with those responsible for mass atrocities in the Congo.  
 
This tribunal would need to be complemented by other mechanisms, notably the 
creation of a Special Criminal Chamber within the national judiciary system for 
                                                 
593 C Hemedi (note 102 above). 
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certain types of war criminals to avoid overloading the tribunal on the one hand and to 
create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which may take into account damages 
caused to victims in terms of reparations on the other hand.  
 
Thus, three types of mechanisms can be utilized depending on the gravity of the 
crimes and the procedure required:  
 A Special Tribunal for Congo might be an international tribunal comprised of 
both national and international judges and will focus on the prosecution of 
high-level nationals and foreigners responsible for war crimes.  
 The Chambers would be composed of essentially but not exclusively well-
trained national magistrates to deal with other types of criminals, while  
 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission may deal with other type of crimes 
and human rights violations. 
 
These mechanisms can work collaboratively to rebuild a reconciled society in the 
DRC founded on truth, justice, reconciliation and the rule of law. 
 
Impunity for those implicated in atrocious crimes is particularly negative because it 
trivializes human life, and encourages criminals to continue with their behaviour, and 
potential criminals to join in the barbarity. Impunity tears a society apart; it feeds a 
culture of hatred and heinous vengeance.  
 
Instead of the international community intervening only after the perpetration of 
horrific crimes, it is important to opt for a policy of prevention of the sources of future 
crimes. The indifference of the international community to the Congo crisis should be 
brought to an end and world stakeholders should put the necessary measures in place 
at diverse levels to bring those responsible for war crimes in the Congo to justice. The 
powerful members of the UN Security Council should avoid double standards and 
turn their attention to the victims of the Congolese war, as was the case in Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Lebanon. The crimes in the Congo resulted in far more casualties than in 
these countries. As a sovereign State, the DRC must not be discriminated against, but 
treated in the same manner as other UN member States.   
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7.3 Recommendations  
 




 The enactment by Congolese authorities of the Act for the Integration of the 
ICC Statute in national legislation is imperative to allow for the suitable 
prosecution of war crimes in terms of national justice.  
 Congolese legislation should be adjusted to international standards to avoid 
unlawful situations such as the prosecution of civilians by military 
jurisdictions.  
 
7.3.1.2 The judicial system 
 
 The reform of Congolese judiciary is necessary to prepare national justice to 
deal with international crime. 
 Penitentiary installations should be restored or their management privatized 
and the death penalty should be abolished.   
 The selection, appointment, and promotion of magistrates must be based on 
the criteria of competence, integrity, and achievements instead of tribalism, 
regionalism, and nepotism. 
 A magistrates‟ school should be established to provide new magistrates with 
the necessary professionals skills and to train magistrates in general to practice 
consistent with international standards, and especially to know how to 
investigate international crimes.  
 The politicization of the office of magistrate should be prevented by avoiding 
the involvement of judges in political activities.  
 The Superior Judicial Council should be strengthened in order for it to protect 
magistrates who resist interference from different parties or political actors. 
 The conditions pertaining to the removal of members of the judicial body 




7.3.3.3 The political authorities 
 
The political authorities should make a formal request to the UN for the creation of a 
criminal tribunal for the DRC.  
 
Ideally this tribunal should be created by a resolution of UN Security Council; 
however they could also seek an accord with the UN General Assembly for the 
creation of a tribunal. 
 
The political authorities should prepare a proposal for the creation of Special Criminal 
Chamber and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which might be funded by 
external partners.  
 
To promote the rule of law, the political authorities should provide the judicial system 
with all the means necessary to ensure the legality of acts and to render justice. This 
includes financial and material resources as well as other facilities. 
 
The political authorities should also avoid appointing alleged war criminals to official 
positions. They should promote the principles of good governance, such as equality of 
all before the law and fight against any form of corruption and impunity. 
 
7.3.2 The regional level 
 
Different organizations such as the European Union, the African Union, Southern 
African Development Community, and the Regional Conference on Peace Security 
and Development in Great Lakes Region, should mobilize and provide the necessary 
support to fight against impunity for serious crimes by politically and diplomatically 
supporting the proposal for the creation of a special criminal tribunal for the DRC. 
 
They should adopt resolutions relating to judicial co-operation in case of the 
prosecution of criminals for international crimes. To prevent future perpetration of 
such odious crimes on the African continent, regional judicial organs and mechanisms 
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to promote human rights such as an African Court of Justice and Human Rights and 
an African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights should be established.  
 
The prevention policy should emphasize an ideal approach regarding crimes. It is 
better to avoid genocide than to create a Tribunal.  
 
7.3.3 The international level 
 
As with the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, different States should avoid the 
shameful impunity for odious crimes perpetrated in the DRC by supporting the 
establishment of a tribunal, which might serve as an example for future generations. 
Hence, the members of the UN Security Council are called upon to pass a resolution 
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